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COLLEGE COACHING CONTRACTS
REVISITED: A PRACTICAL
PERSPECTIVE
MARTIN J. GREENBERG*
INTRODUCTION
College coaches are some of the highest of profile employees at any
college or university. In many instances the pay that they receive outdis-
tances the pay of the university's chancellor or most esteemed professor.
Their athletic accomplishments receive more notoriety and media atten-
tion than the most celebrated lab discovery of the university's science
department. For many coaches the job can be characterized as "24-7"
due to the exponential growth in their responsibilities beyond con-
ducting practices, teaching and coaching. And what a job - every
coaching moment is surrounded by stress, and every decision, whether
on or off the court, is subject to second-guessing and scrutiny and is the
subject of an often vicious public debate. Moreover, a coach's job secur-
ity is often conditioned on winning because wins are the equivalent of
the bottom line, putting fans in the stands, bolstering alumni contribu-
tions, warranting lucrative TV and cable contracts, and persuading re-
cruits to accept scholarship offers.
Today's coach engages in a very interesting workplace environment
that lends itself to job insecurity. Long-term contracts mean nothing as
buyouts for termination without cause provisions run rampant. As a re-
sult, the coach's contract may be the most important armor that the
coach has in protecting his entry and exit in the job. College coaching
contracts are sophisticated endeavors - no standard forms, no two that
look the same, no union protecting their interests, and no data bank that
correctly reports the intricacies of their packages. Many contracts, with
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important legal implications, are handily and expeditiously crafted.
Those contracts require the input of an experienced and sophisticated
lawyer to protect an unprotected class.
The purpose of this article is to first examine the job environment in
which coaches operate, and second, to analyze the college coaching con-
tract from a financial and legal perspective.
I. JOB ENVIRONMENT
1. Job Movement.
When is a contract not a contract? Where is job security as fleeting
as the last seconds of a basketball victory? In what field is an employ-
ment contract broken as easily as it is made? The answer to each is the
world of college coaching.!
A person who becomes a college coach is put in a tenuous position in
a very fragile environment. The first day of the job often must be spent
planning for the last day of the job, and often the back end of the con-
tract may be more important than the front end or the package. The
college coaching field is characterized by frequent job turnover, move-
ment and relocation. Statistics with respect to turnover are telling. The
following chart presents the number of job changes both major basket-
ball and college football over the last several years.
NCAA Basketball Coaching Changes'
Year Number
2000 38*
1999 53
1998 59
1997 44
1996 48
NCAA Football Coaching Changes
Year Number
2000 56
1999 45
1998 63
1997 52
1996 42
1. MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 522 (2d ed. 1998).
2. Men's Basketball Coaching Changes, USA TODAY, Apr. 18, 2000, at 9C.
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* 2000-01 football season not complete.
Source: NCAA statistics
Head football coaches remain on their jobs for an average of only 2.8
years.' Eighty-seven of one hundred fifteen Division I-A football
coaches have changed jobs in the last three years, according to Thom
Park, a college coaches financial and contract consultant and Florida
State University professor of sports administration.4 Park has said that
this high turnover forces athletic departments to write back-loaded
contracts.
The Joe Paternos (thirty-five seasons) and Bobby Bowdens (twenty-
six seasons) of the coaching world are the exception to the longevity
rule. Only nine major college football coaches in history have spent
more time at one school than Bowden's quarter century at Florida State
University.5 Only four have eclipsed Lavell Edwards' 29-year tenure at
Brigham Young University.6 Only one, Amos Alonzo Stagg, who spent
41 of his 57 years of coaching at the University of Chicago, surpassed
Paterno's 35 years at Penn State.7 If you take away these three icons
(Paterno, Bowden and Edwards), the average tenure for football
coaches in the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) Divi-
sion 1A entering the 2000-2001 season was barely four years (4.07 years
to be exact).' Considerably more than half of those coaches, 67 of 115,
have spent less than three previous seasons at their schools. Only
Paterno, Bowden, Edwards and six others have stayed or survived as
long as a dozen years.9
The general rule is to quickly fire a coach who is not winning. From
the coach's perspective, that is the biggest obstacle to growing old on the
job - ever increasing pressure not only to win, but also to keep winning
in a high stakes sport that frequently foots the bill for a school's non-
revenue producing sports.10 What follows is a chart breaking down the
tenure (length of service) of the 114 football coaches in the NCAA Divi-
sion 1-A at their current schools for the 2000-2001 season.
3. Dale Hofman, U Professor Throws Flag On Athletics, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Sept. 7,
1990, at 21.
4. Patrick F'mley, Contract Tricks Help Lure Coaches to MU, June 7, 2001, available at
http:lwww.digmo.comlnews/sllpremiuml0607sportslocal22109.html.
5. Steve Wieberg, Never Too Old to Have Fun: Coaches Find Fountain of Youth in College
Football Achievements, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2000, at 1C-2C.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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2. The Expanded Meaning Of Coach.
Why are job movement, contract jumping, retirement and firing so
characteristic of college coaching? The Job-Related Almanac indicates
that a NCAA basketball coach has the fifteenth most stressful job out of
the 260 jobs listed.12 A coach is normally defined as "one who trains
intensively by instruction, demonstration, and practice."1 3 This defini-
tion certainly does not recognize the current job environment and em-
ployment conditions of the modern-day coach.14
The coach of the new century is required not only to be an instructor,
but also to act as a fund-raiser, recruiter, academic coordinator, public
figure, budget director, television, radio and internet personality, and
alumni glad hander. A coach must also handle any other role that the
university's athletic director or president may direct him to do in the best
interest of the university's athletic program.15
In some cases coaches have experienced, as a result of their job, seri-
ous health problems related to stress and pressure:
11. Id.
12. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 523.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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a. Former Florida State coach Pat Kennedy has had repeated
ulcers and mysterious illnesses during the season.'6
b. Duke Coach Mike Kryzewski was forced to sit out an entire
basketball season due to health problems. 7
c. Maryland Coach Gary Williams missed the ACC tournament
with a stress-related illness.18
d. In February 1994, Northwestern basketball coach Ricky
Byrdsong's frustration over his team's 0-6 start in the Big Ten
came to a head when he asked for an indefinite leave of ab-
sence and turned over his coaching duties to Assistant Coach
Paul Swanson. 9
e. Phil Ford, the Wooden Award winner in 1978, took a medical
leave of absence in 1999 while an assistant coach at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina following his second DUI in two
years.20
Mike Sertich, hockey coach at Minnesota-Duluth for eighteen years,
and current hockey coach at Michigan Tech, has said, "[w]hen you look
at all the guys that suffer from coaching burnout, run from the ghosts of
the past and all the things which they can't control, it's little wonder why
guys don't stay in the game long anymore and why the turnover is so
great.",2 '
3. Athletic Arms Race - Bigger And More Revenue
Generating Facilities.
Coaches are an integral part of what is now called the "athletic arms
race," a race to develop new sports facilities, that ultimately determines
the life, stability and viability of college athletics, has become as much a
part of the coach's job as on-court activities.22
Coaches are part of a vicious financial spiral. The success of their
programs, which obviously equates to winning, is the financial bulwark
for the support of the remainder of the athletic program. In many in-
stances, football and basketball revenues are the underwriters for wo-
men's programs and minor sports. In order to be competitive and play
16. Il at 522.
17. Id.
18. Id
19. Byrdsong Granted Leave of Absence, UPI, Feb. 7, 1994, BC Cycle.
20. N.C. Assistant Charged With Drunken Driving, Ti STUART NEWS/PORT ST. LucIe
NEws, Sept. 29, 1999, at D3.
21. Todd D. Milewski, A Second Chance, March 8, 2001, available at http:I
www.uscho.com/ml?team=mtu.
22. Martin J. Greenberg, Facilities "Arms Race," FOR Ti REcoRD, Apr./May 2001, at 4.
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on a level playing field in the athletic arms race, new, state-of-the-art
facilities that have the capability to generate higher revenues are now as
much a part of the college game as they are a part of their professional
counterparts. Luxury suites, club seats, enhanced seating, sponsorship,
naming rights, strategic partnerships, and personal seat licenses are the
name of the game for the future of college athletics.2 3
As a result, institutions of higher learning are experiencing an un-
precedented boom in both the creation of new sport and support facili-
ties and the renovation of old ones. During the 1990s, over $4 billion
was spent on collegiate athletic facilities.24 In the last seven years,
spending on athletic facilities has increased 260% according to a NCAA
study, and the spending is still accelerating.25
Nearly three dozen schools across the country have either recently
completed or are in the midst of sports facility projects, which have cre-
ated approximately 350,000 new seats.26 Ten of the fifteen Division 1-A
schools that averaged 75,000 fans or more for a football gave over the
past four seasons have engaged in stadium expansion.27 Nine out of
twelve schools in the Big 12 conference have already undergone facilities
renovation.28
Often projects are undertaken as part of a larger capital plan and are
actually accomplished in stages. Today, renovation is more popular than
new construction.29 The other unique development is that schools are
not just focusing the building boom on the traditionally big revenue
sport: football. Instead, money is being put into hockey arenas, soccer
fields, swimming complexes and training facilities.3"
In many instances collegiate facilities are physically and functionally
obsolete. Many stadiums and arenas are old and antiquated, potentially
unsafe, and in need of substantial renovation or even replacement. Sto-
ried venues with historic significance simply do not meet the demands of
corporate America, the media, and the new breed of fan. Effective facil-
ity design can actually contribute to a venue's financial success in ways
previously unimagined.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Jeff D. Opdyke, An Athletic Arms Race: It's Bigger, Better Stadiums For Schools Aim-
ing to Add Revenue, Lure Recruits, WALL STREET J., Aug. 23, 2000, at B1.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Ken Davis, Perkins' Vision: Stadium for New Millennium, HARTFORD COURANT, May
7, 2000, at E3.
30. Greenberg, supra note 22, at 4.
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Suddenly a general contractor, architect, or facility manager may be
as important as a coach in luring top recruits to a campus. Recruits may
see the physical act of construction as a symbol of a school's financial
commitment to the further continuation and development of the athletic
program.3 ' This investment in state-of-the-art facilities may also give po-
tential recruits the ability to attain their full athletic potential by provid-
ing them with top of the line training and practice facilities that allow
them to reach peak physical conditioning. 2
If a school does not have a state-of-the-art facility competitive with
other universities, it may be unable to recruit the quality of athletes it
needs to put a winning on the field.33 As most coaches would state, the
single biggest factor in winning at the college level is attracting the top
athletic talent. Traditional values such as competition, loyalty, coopera-
tion, and teamwork are still a major part of college athletics, but college
sport today has become just as much about bowl games, alumni support,
endowments, gate receipts, and cable TV contracts.
The increasing popularity of football has also created a greater de-
mand for better and newer facilities. NCAA college football attracted
more than thirty-nine million fans for the 1999 and 2000 seasons,34
roughly four million more fans than the NCAA drew in 1995 and 1996Y.3
In fact, twenty teams averaged 70,000 or more fans per game for the
2000 season.36
Current tax laws and booster support enhance the ability of a school
to build a new facility. Contributors can claim sizeable deductions for
the amounts paid for suites and seat licenses as charitable contribu-
tions.37 Non-profit institutions are also empowered as arms of the state
to issue tax exempt and subsidized low interest construction bonds. 8
Boosters, donors, corporate sponsors and the wealthiest benefactors are
willing to pay millions in order to put their name on any part of a sta-
dium or arena, which also can result in business or charitable deduc-
tions.39 These factors have all contributed largely to the boom in
construction. Universities are also given a competitive advantage in that
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 5.
34. Richard M. Campbell, College Football Attracts Second-Highest Attendance Total, THE
NCAA NEws, Jan. 15, 2001, at 1, 13.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Greenberg, supra note 22, at 6
38. Id.
39. Id.
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they pay no income taxes on the revenue they take in from ticket sales,
booster payments, television revenues, and corporate sponsorship fees.4"
For generations universities have built sports programs because they
foster school spirit and community involvement. A university does not
sacrifice its primary educational mission, however, by merely building a
new sports venue.41 Many would argue that such a mission is actually
enhanced when a new stadium or arena is complete.
4. The Package.
With the rise of college sports as a big business, college coaching has
become a game of high stakes - one where money talks. The position
of head coach may offer not only a salary with institutional fringe bene-
fits, but also additional compensation opportunities that are generally
referred to as the "package."42 The package might include shoe, apparel
and equipment endorsements, television, radio and Internet shows,
speaking engagements, personal or public appearances, and summer in-
structional camps. In addition, the job may also mean such related per-
quisites as housing, insurance premiums, annuities, membership in
health and country clubs, financial gifts from alumni and boosters, busi-
ness opportunities, and the use of automobiles.43
The contract of Rick Neuheisel, University of Washington (UW)
football coach, is a good example of this type of package because it illus-
trates the breadth of compensation in college athletics. Here are some
of the highlights of Rick Neuheisel's contract with the University of
Washington:
o Base salary - $225,000.00 - Neuheisel's base salary is $225,000.00.
o Annuity - $150,000.00. Neuheisel receives two payments of $75,000.00
a year - on January 10 and July 10.
o Housing allowance - $160,000.00. Neuheisel is paid in twelve equal
installments on the 10th of each month. The contract states that the
money is "for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining the em-
ployee's primary residence."
o KOMO - $125,000.00. Neuheisel receives this money for taking part
in pre- and post-game shows as part of KOMO's radio deal with the
university.
o Fox Sports Northwest - $100,000.00. Same as the KOMO deal.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra, note 1, at 534.
43. Id.
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* Car coach program - $20,000.00. This is the assigned value for
Neuheisel being eligible to participate in the university's courtesy car
coach program and assigned two vehicles that are to be used for offi-
cial purposes at university expense. The university also provides a
$2,000.00 annual mileage allowance.
" Family travel allowance - $25,000.00. Travel expenses are provided for
Neuheisel's wife for all away football games, all post-season events in
which the UW participates, and two additional business-related trips
each fiscal year. In addition, the university grants to Neuheisel an
annual budget of $25,000.00 for travel expenses for his family for
travel related to University athletics. Neuheisel will technically be re-
imbursed for such travel, and any unexpended balance will be paid to
Neuheisel.
* Country club membership - $5,000.00. Neuheisel receives a univer-
sity-owned membership at Broadmoor Goff Club in Seattle.
" Outside compensation - $85,000.00. Neuheisel receives $60,000.00 an-
nually from Nike and $25,000.00 from "other corporate
opportunities."
" Total - $897,000.00. Neuheisel is guaranteed to receive this much
money each season.
" Incentives - $100,000.00. There are two separate incentive clauses in
his contract - $60,000.00 for meeting certain academic incentives and
$40,000.00 for taking UW to a bowl game. The academic incentive
calls for Neuheisel to receive $20,000.00 if UW has a graduation rate
of 65-69%, $40,000.00 if the graduation rate is 70-74% and $60,000.00
if the graduation rate is 75% or higher. UW had a graduation rate of
57% last year.
* Buyout clause - Neuheisel will have to pay UW $100,000.00 if he
takes another job before his contract is completed.
* Termination pay - Essentially, the contract is guaranteed for five
years, but Neuheisel can be fired at any time. If he is fired "with
cause" - such as for committing a serious NCAA violation - he would
not be owed any money by the university. However, if he were fired
"without cause," he would receive termination pay. If he is fired with
one year remaining, he will receive 100% of his base salary, annuity,
housing allowance and travel budget, roughiy $560,000.00. If he were
fired with two years left, he would receive 100% of that money the
first year and 75% the next year. If he were fired with three or more
years left, he would be paid 100% the first year, 75% the second
year, and 50% the third year.
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o Negotiating with other schools - Neuheisel must notify UW and re-
ceive permission from the university before negotiating with any
other school or professional team about a coaching job. The contract
states that permission "shall not be unreasonably withheld."
o Relief of Colorado housing allowance - As part of the contract, UW
will pay off an $800,000.00 interest-only loan, which Neuheisel had
received at Colorado in June of 1997 for buying a house. Neuheisel is
to be paid $320,000.00 immediately, with three more payments of
$160,000.00 each on January 10, 2001, January 20, 2002 and January
10, 2003.4
Gary Pinkel, head football coach at Missouri, has a new contract
package containing the following elements:
o Base: $185,000.00
o Shoe: $ 60,000.00
o TV/Radio: $120,000.00
o Football camp: $70,000.00 (2001 and 2002)
o Special fund: $75,000.00
o Promotion of program: $60,000.00
o Country Club of Missouri membership
o Two courtesy cars
o Petty Cash: $15,000.00
o Higher budget revenue: $10,000.00
o Big 12 Title: $50,000.00
o Bowl game: $15,417.00
o New Year's Day bowl game: $38,834.00 (two months salary)
0 BCS Bowl game: $46,250.00 (three months salary)
o National Title game: $100,000.00
o National Title victory: $250,000.00
o Seven wins: $10,000.00
o Eight wins: $15,000.00
o Nine wins: $20,000.00
o 10 wins: $25,000.00
o Attendance more than 60,000: $10,000.00
o Attendance more than 65,000: $25,000.00
o Academic standards: $25,000.00
o Toledo buyout: $50,000.00
44. Bob Condotta, Neuheisel Now Top-Paid Pac-lO Coach, NEW TRIB., Aug. 18. 1999, at
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Total: Best case scenario: $955,000.00 (plus two cars, country club mem-
bership and petty cash)"5
Eighteen college football coaches now earn more than a million dol-
lars a year, while Steve Spurrier (Florida) and Bob Stoops (Oklahoma)
make two million plus a year.46 There were only two million-dollar
coaches in the NCAA in 1997.4 7 At top tier programs, football and bas-
ketball coaches earn far more than tenured professors do. In some in-
stances, coaches earn nearly seventeen times the average salary of a full-
time professor. 8
Each time a school bumps up the package of one of its elite coaches,
it creates a ripple effect in the coaching ranks inside and beyond the
university. Compensation for coaches in other sports also goes up fol-
lowed by pay increases for athletic directors, administrators and confer-
ence executives. 9 When the University of Nebraska hired Barry Collier
as its head basketball coach at an annual base salary of $200,000.00, it
was nearly $20,000.00 higher than the salary of the University of Ne-
braska's Chancellor, James Moeser, and nearly two and a half times the
average salary of full professors at the university.50
The Knight Foundation Report, A Call to Action in June of 2001 ad-
dresses the salaries of coaches when it states:
A glaring symptom of the arms race run amok is the salaries of
so-called "star" coaches. At last count, some 30 college football
men's basketball coaches are paid a million dollars or more a
year. A few are nearing twice that or already there. The irony is
not lost on the critics. A college provost points out that the
school spent more money hiring the head football coach than it
did hiring five department heads - combined. A trustee laments
that his university signed the basketball coach to a salary three
times greater than its president. Many players join the com-
plaining chorus when they compare their scholarships to their
coaches salaries and when their coaches break contracts and jump
from team to team, just as their professional counterparts. Some
dissatisfied players have begun to organize in an attempt to in-
45. Finley, supra note 4, available at http:llwww.digmo.com/news/sl/premium0607sports
loca122109.html.
46. Dylan B. Tomlinson, College Football: Keeping Best Coaches is Costly, GAINESVILLE
SUN, June 22, 2001, available at http://www.gatorsports.com/stories/O62201/fbc3.shtml.
47. Id.
48. College Coaches in Elite Sports Programs Can Earn Top Dollar, PHILADELPHIA IN-
QUIRER, Sept. 11, 2000.
49. Id.
50. Jim Rasmussen, Coaches' Pay Causes Concern, UNL Chancellor: Rise in Salaries is
Price of Staying Competitive, OMAHA WORLD-HER., Apr. 9, 2000, at IA.
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crease their clout and have aligned with the United Steelworkers
of America for help in doing so. 5 1
5. The Newly Defined Student Athlete
The student athlete of today may be a different athlete than that of
years past. The reverence paid to the coach as a father figure or surro-
gate parent may no longer be the case.52 The student athlete who the
coach has recruited, nurtured and potentially paved the path for a pro-
fessional career, may be part of an insurrection, an insurgence, a boycott,
a plaintiff in a defamation suit, or the focus of public disparagement.
Recent revolts and insurrections by players have forced coaches out of
their jobs.53
For instance, in 1998 basketball coach Tom Penders left after a ten-
year tenure at the University of Texas, partly due to an insurgence of
complaints to Athletic Director DeLoss Dodds from athletes about his
abusive coaching style and lack of leadership.54 Several players stated
that "Penders had become nasty behind closed doors [and that he] and
his staff could not fully develop talent."55 Penders was often noted for
saying, "I'm Irish. I get mad sometimes. If someone lobs a grenade at
me, I throw it back."56
Other examples of coach and player controversies include the
following:
o In January of 1989, San Jose University basketball players said
they would not play for the team unless Coach Bill Berry was
fired. They accused him of verbal abuse and mental cruelty.57
o In February of 1990, Drake University players staged a rebellion
stating they would no longer practice or play for Coach Tom
Abatemarco because of alleged verbal and mental abuse.58
o On November 18, 1992, Oklahoma canceled football practice be-
cause of a daylong meeting to clear the air between players and
coaches. The Sooners refused to practice until coach Gary Gibbs
51. REPORT OF THE KNIGHT FOUNDATION: COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLET-
IcS, A CALL TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION 18
(June 2001) [hereinafter A CALL TO ACTION].
52. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra, note 1, at 531.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 10 Years of Fanning the Flames, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 1998, at C1.
56. Id.
57. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 532.
58. Id.
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explained why quarterback Steve Collins had not taken a snap
after being promised he would share duties with Cale Gundy.59
" On November 21, 1992, sixty-six Morgan State football players
signed a petition asking athletic director Joe McIver to fire coach
Ricky Diggs, claiming Diggs was verbally abusive and showed fa-
voritism. Morgan State canceled its season finale because players
threatened a half time sit-in.6 °
* On October 12, 1992, University of South Carolina football play-
ers boycotted practice and voted to ask coach Sparky Woods to
resign.6'
" On September 22, 1992, displeased with Coach Chuck Stobart
and a 0-3 record, eighty-four Memphis State football players boy-
cotted practice. 62
• On February 4, 1993, Army basketball coach Tom Miller was
fired because of his poor relationship with players and school offi-
cials. Twice administrators had told Miller during the season that
his outbursts were inappropriate.63
Other examples are more complicated.
In an extreme example, former California basketball coach Lou
Campanelli sued the University of California seeking millions of dollars
in damages in U.S. District Court in protest of his firing by the Univer-
sity over allegedly abusing some of his players.64 Campanelli claimed
that he was denied due process and was arbitrarily fired when school
officials investigated player allegations.65 The official reason given for
his firing was that he had berated team members to the point where the
future of the program was in jeopardy.66 Campanelli's position as to
why he was unfairly fired included: (a) that he was doomed from the
start because he was forced to restructure his contract before the start of
the season; (b) that he was never aware of any problems that led to his
tenuous standing as coach; (c) that he had fulfilled the requirements of
his contract and developed a successful and clean program; (d) that the
publicity surrounding the firing had made it virtually impossible for him
59. Id. at 531.
60. Id. at 531-532.
61. I& at 532.
62. Id
63. Id. at 531.
64. Id. at 532.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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to get another job; and (e) that the University intentionally damaged his
ability to earn a living and caused him emotional distress.67
On October 28, 1993 U.S. District Court Judge Fern Smith dismissed
the lawsuit explaining that the claim was barred by the 11th Amend-
ment, which holds that state agencies are immune from suits in federal
court.68 However, Judge Smith stated that the University would have to
fulfill the requirements of the buy-out clause in Campanelli's contract.6 9
The clause required the University to pay him 100% of his annual salary
for the next season, 75% the next year and 50% in the contract's final
year, and suggested that the suit be brought in state court instead.7 °
Judge Smith also stated that Campanelli could not claim that the Univer-
sity had violated his civil rights and publicly stigmatized him because
officials never publicly explained the firing or criticized the coach.71
Campanelli had a five-year contract that ran through April of 1996
and paid him an escalating base salary that was at $113,610.00 a year
when he was fired.72 The University maintained that it simply exercised
its right to cancel the contract because the buy-out clause allowed the
University to terminate the contract at any time for no stated reason or
hearing, as long as he was paid the buy-out percentages of his salary until
1996.73 Smith stated that the decision could be re-evaluated if
Campanelli could provide proof that specific university officials had
made public statements about his firing that contained serious personal
accusations. 4
In February 1995, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that a state-
ment made by a university basketball coach at a team meeting that a
player was a disgrace to both the team and the school, was not slander
per se. 75 The court said that the player must demonstrate special dam-
ages to successfully recover against the school.76
The player, Amy Bauer, was a member of the University of Wiscon-
sin Madison women's basketball team and had been recruited by Assis-
tant Coach Michael Peckham. During Bauer's junior season, the
Women's Athletic Director told her that Peckham had been suspended
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 533.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Bauer v. Murphy, 530 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
76. Id. at 4.
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because of an allegation that he was having an "inappropriate relation-
ship" with Bauer. At a team meeting the same day, the director told the
entire team the reason for Peckham's suspension and team members
openly discussed the alleged relationship. When Bauer arrived later at
the meeting, team members repeatedly questioned her, but she denied
the allegations. The meeting progressed to an argument and ended with
the head coach, Mary Murphy, calling Bauer a disgrace to the team and
the university.77
Based on this comment, Bauer filed the suit against the coach for a
number of claims, including defamation. The trial court granted the
coach's motion for summary judgment because Bauer had failed to as-
sert any special damages due to the conduct.7"
The appeals court asserted that to prove slander (i.e. defamation by
the spoken word) the plaintiff must allege and prove special damages.
However, four categories of slander are actionable without alleging or
proving special damages; (1) those imputing a criminal offense, (2) a
"loathsome" disease, (3) conduct affecting the plaintiff's business, (4)
sexual misconduct by a female plaintiff.79
Bauer argued that the words at the team meeting fell into the fourth
category. The court ruled that the disgrace comment did not qualify be-
cause the comment was made directly after Bauer had criticized Mur-
phy's coaching abilities.80 The court also adopted the Massachusetts
Supreme Court's view that the word "disgrace" is a word of general dis-
paragement and is "equally discreditable to all persons."81 Bauer's alle-
gations failed to allege special damages to her, and the lower court's
decision was therefore upheld.
6. Importance Of Winning
College sports have become a big business with high financial stakes.
If the coach is not bringing in enough revenue, or is not perceived posi-
tively by the alumni or public, a university may be forced to terminate
his employment for fear of losing large amounts of money.8 2
Coach Rich Haddad was fired as the basketball coach of Jacksonville,
concluding a 6-21 season.83 As Haddad said, "[w]inning is the bottom
77. Id. 2-3.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id. at 3-4.
80. Bauer, 530 N.W.2d at 5.
81. Id at 6.
82. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 528.
83. Id.
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line. Schools are looking for coaches who run clean programs, graduate
their players and win big. If you stumble in any area, you're in trouble.
But winning big is the big factor. And that translates into money." 84
Even winning does not guarantee job security. J. D. Barnett had a
winning record, including two NCAA tournament appearances, a clean
slate with the NCAA and a rollover five-year contact at Tulsa when he
joined the roll call of fired basketball coaches in March of 1991.85 Where
did Barnett go wrong? Tulsa Athletic Director Rick Dickson said Bar-
nett was fired for not making enough money for the school. He cited
dwindling attendance, contributions and season ticket sales. He also
cited the turnover in the assistant coaches and the student athletes not
completing his program.86
There is no better way to illustrate the high financial stakes associ-
ated with winning than by looking at the dollars paid out for bowl game
participation. Fifty College Football Association teams that played in
2000-2001 bowl games earned a total of $161 million.87
2000-2001 Bowl Schedule88
Bowl
Mobile Alabama
Las Vegas
Oahu
Aloha
Motor City
Date Site
Dec. 20, 2000 Mobile, AL
Dec. 21, 2000 Las Vegas, NV
Dec. 24, 2000 Honolulu, HI
Dec. 25, 2000 Honolulu, HI
Dec. 27, 2000 Pontiac, MI
Galleryfurniture.com Dec. 27, 2000 Houston, TX
Humanitarian
Music City
Micronpc.com
Insight.com
Liberty
Dec. 28, 2000 Boise, ID
Dec. 28, 2000 Nashville, TN
Dec. 28, 2000 Miami, FL
Dec. 28, 2000 Tempe, AZ
Dec. 29, 2000 Memphis, TN
Projected
(per-team)
Payout Teams/result
$750,000.00 Southern Miss (8-4) 28.
TCU (10-2) 21
$800,000.00 UNLV (8-5) 31,
Arkansas (6-6) 14
$750,000.00 Georgia (8-4) 37,
Virginia (6-6) 14
$750,000.00 B.C. (7-5) 31. Ariz. St.
(6-6), 17
$750,000.00 Marshall (7-5) vs.
Cincinnati (7-4)
$750,000.00 Texas Tech (7-5) vs.
East Carolina (7-4)
$750,000.00 Boise State (9-2) vs.
Texas-El Paso (8-3)
$750,000.00 West Virginia (6-5) vs.
Mississippi (7-4)
$750,000.00 Minnesota (6-5) vs. NC
State (7-4)
$750,000.00 Iowa State (8-3) vs.
Pittsburgh (7-4)
$1.25 million Colorado State (9-2) vs.
Louisville (9-2)
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 2000-2001 Bowl Schedule, USA TODAY, Dec. 26, 2000, at 5C.
88. Id.
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Projected
(per-team)
Bowl Date Site Payout Teams/result
Sun Dec. 29, 2000 El Paso, TX $1 million Wisconsin (8-4) vs.
UCLA (6-5)
Peach Dec. 29, 2000 Atlanta, GA $1.8 million Georgia Tech (9-2) vs.
LSU (7-4)
Holiday Dec. 29, 2000 San Diego, CA $1.9 million Oregon (9-2) vs. Texas
(9-2)
Alamo Dec. 30, 2000 San Antonio, TX $1.2 million Northwestern (8-3) vs.
Nebraska (9-2)
Silicon Valley Dec. 31, 2000 San Jose, CA $1.2 million Fresno State (7-4) vs.
Air Force (8-3)
Independence Dec. 31, 2000 Shreveport, LA $1.1 million Miss. State (7-4) vs.
Texas A&M (7-4)
Cotton Jan. 01, 2001 Dallas, TX $2.5 million Kansas State (10-3) vs.
Tennessee (8-3)
Outback Jan. 01, 2001 Tampa, FL $2 million Ohio State (8-3) vs.
South Carolina (7-4)
Gator Jan. 01, 2001 Jacksonville, FL $1.4133 million Clemson (9-2) vs.
Virginia Tech (10-1)
Florida Citrus Jan. 01, 2001 Orlando, FL $4 million Michigan (8-3) vs.
Auburn (9-3)
Bowl Championship Series89
Projected
(per-team)
Bowl Date Site Payout Teams
Rose Jan. 01, 2001 Pasadena, CA $13.5 million Purdue (8-3) vs. Washington (10-1)
Fiesta Jan. 01, 2001 Tempe, AZ $13.5 million Oregon State(10-1) vs. Notre Dame (9-2)
Sugar Jan. 02, 2001 New Orleans $13.5 million Florida (10-) vs. Miami (FL) (10-1)
Orange Jan. 03, 2001 Miami $13.5 million Oklahoma (12-1) vs. Florida State (11-1)
The NCAA's Final Four basketball tournament is also all about
money and winning. The $70 million annual revenue from the tourna-
ment is allocated as follows:
" The unit of measurement is the share, and in 2001, each share
is worth roughly $94,000.00.
* A conference gets one share for each team invited to the tour-
nament and one additional share per victory up to four per
team. In other words, Final Four participants pick up five
shares for their league, and their performance this weekend
can't change that.
" Distribution of finances is based on a conference's perform-
ance for the past six years, which means a good year keeps
paying off and a bad one keeps rearing its head. A league's
annual take is the value of the share times the number of
shares accrued over the six-year period.
89. Id.
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o This year, the ACC picked up 15 shares - five each by Duke
and Maryland, two by North Carolina and one each by first-
round losers Georgia Tech, Virginia and Wake Forest. Only
twice in the eleven-year history of the formula has the confer-
ence done better. Only the Big Ten and the Pac-10 (17 shares
each) top the ACC this year, and both have more members.
o By league revenue-sharing policies, the ACC's total of
$7,050,000.00 is split equally nine ways. Each school will take
home $783,333.33 from the 2001 tournament. 90
Here is more proof that the rich in college athletics indeed get richer.
Florida State announced in May of 1999 that it had renegotiated its con-
tract with Nike Inc., coming to a new deal worth in excess of $20 million
in product and financial compensation.91 The new deal is an extension
of the original 1995 contract valued in excess of $6 million over five
years.92
The comprehensive contract with the Oregon-based company will
keep the "Swoosh" on the shoes, clothing and equipment worn and used
by the Seminoles' twenty intercollegiate athletic teams and their staff
members through 2005. 9 3 Florida State's contract is believed to be one
of the richest deals between a manufacturer and a college athletic de-
partment.94 Nike has about one dozen comprehensive contracts with
marquee college athletic programs around the country. 95
Penn State University's the athletic department operates like an au-
tonomous business with a $42 million budget.9 6 It is responsible for rais-
ing and spending all of its own money.97 It has its own CEO, a cadre of
middle managers handling administration, marketing and ticket sales,
and a well-oiled publicity machine.98 Penn State spends twice as much
on athletic scholarships ($5.5 million annually) as it does on academic
aid for its top students. 99 The budget for its fourteen-person sports in-
formation staff - $578,479.00 - is bigger than the entire athletic budgets
90. Rob Daniels, ACC Gets Fair Share of the NCAA Kitty the League Will Split $7,050,000
From This Year's NCAA Tournament Nine Ways, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Mar. 29, 2001,
at C3.
91. Bob Thomas, Shoe Fits: FSU Likes Nike Deal, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 14, 1999, at
Cl.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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of many smaller colleges.' Additionally, Beaver Stadium has under-
gone seven expansions since it opened in 1960, doubling in size. It now
has a capacity of about 94,000 - the fourth largest stadium in the na-
tion.' The ticket price - $38.00 a game - makes it among the most ex-
pensive in the Big Ten, and after being adjusted for inflation, booster
payments to secure season tickets have grown forty-six-fold since
1965.102
Last year, Penn State collected nearly $8.8 million from its football
seating plan which rewards boosters based on the size of their tax de-
ductible payments, and raised another $5 million in endowments and
gifts for the athletic department.0 3 This brought total donations to ap-
proximately $13.8 million, with nearly all of the money being tax-free.' 4
As of July 2000, Penn State Athletic Department had an endowment of
$18 million to fund scholarships and other projects. It had another $6
million in reserves available to cover emergencies and other expenses.' 5
In fiscal year 1999, Penn State operated the fifth largest football program
in the nation, taking in $25.4 million in revenue. 0 6 The program had
expenses of $9.8 million and a surplus of $15.6 million, a 61% margin. 7
Ticket sales generated $15.6 million. Television and bowl games ac-
counted for $5.6 million. Concessions brought in about $1 million and
the rest came from corporate sponsorships, advertising, licensing, royal-
ties and program sales.' 08 The revenue figures did not include nearly
$8.8 million that boosters and alumni paid to obtain season tickets. In-
cluding those donations, football accounted for a total of $34.2 million,
82% of the Athletic Department's $42 million in revenue. 0 9
Further, the advent of major television and cable network contracts
for the right to broadcast these events has created even more revenue
for the NCAA and its constituent universities. CBS paid the NCAA
$143 million for television rights to the NCAA College Basketball Tour-
nament from 1991 to 1997, will pay $1.725 billion from 1998-2002, and
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Id.
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will pay $6 billion over eleven years starting in 2003.10 The NCAA av-
erage annual payment from the contract will more than double from the
8 year $1.725 billion agreement in effect to 2002.111
All of this potential revenue presents today's coaches with a win at
any cost dilemma. The pressure to generate revenues from television,
gate receipts, sponsorship relationships, alumni donations and tourna-
ment participation has put the bottom line or balance sheet psychology
on an equal basis with "wins and losses."' 1 2
In response to this perceived focus on winning and revenues derived
from winning, the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate
Athletics report makes the following recommendation:
Revise the plan for distribution of revenues from the NCAA con-
tract with CBS for broadcasting rights to the Division I basketball
championship. No such revenue should be distributed based on
commercial value such as winning and losing. Instead, the reve-
nue distribution plan should reflect values centered on improving
academic performance, enhancing athlete's collegiate exper-
iences, and achieving gender equity." 3
8. Rules, Rules, Rules
Today's coach operates in an environment controlled by the NCAA
rules - voluminous, complicated and very often broken set of guidelines.
In addition, the coach is also subject to conference and university rules.
The purity of amateur athletics is sometimes shrouded by academic
fraud, alumni indiscretions, assistant coaches acting beyond their author-
ity, improper payments, travel irregularities, compliance deviations and
the absence of University control.
According to the Knight Foundation Report, 57 out of 106 Division
I-A institutions (54%) had to be censored, sanctioned, or put on proba-
tion for major violations of NCAA Rules in the 1980s. 114 In the 1990s,
58 out of 114 Division I-A college and universities (52%) were similarly
penalized." 5 In other words, more than half of the institutions compet-
110. Steve Wieberg, Players Want Cut of $6 Billion TV Contract, USA TODAY, Mar. 20,
2001.
111. Jill Lieber, Blue Devil With a Cause, USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 2000, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/sports/basketba/skmfsl5.htm.
112. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 531.
113. A CALL ro ACTION, supra note 51, at 28.
114. Id. at 12
115. Id.
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ing at the top levels continue to break the rules. Wrongdoing as a way of
life seems to represent the status quo.
The 2000-2001 NCAA Division 1 manual contains approximately 466
pages of rules, rules, and more rules." 6 Today's coach needs not only to
be concerned with wins and losses, but also with academic eligibility,
continuation and maintenance of amateur status, extra benefits, the ac-
tivities of representatives of athletic interests, recruiting, expense report-
ing, and the principles of ethical conduct. The coach's job can be up for
grabs on the basis of acts of third parties presumably beyond their con-
trol but for which they suffer the consequences. Presidents of universi-
ties get relieved of their jobs because of the uncontrolled actions of their
athletic departments and boosters, and in some instances in situations
for which the coach is deemed to have control but in reality may not.
Coaches contractually commit to recognize and comply with the laws,
policies, rules, and regulations governing a university and its employees
and the rules of the National Collegiate Athletic Association and the
Conference. The coach is required to take all reasonable steps to ensure
that all assistant coaches and any other employees for whom the coach is
administratively responsible comply with the aforesaid policies, rules,
and regulations.
Any failure to comply can result in the termination of the coach's
contract. The contract will contain language indicating that the coach
will be terminated for just cause on the basis of committing a deliberate
or serious violation, material in nature, of any law, rule, regulation, con-
stitutional provision or bylaw of the university, the Conference or the
NCAA, which violation may, in the sole judgment of the university, re-
flect adversely upon the University or its athletic program, including any
serious violation which may result in the University being placed on pro-
bation by the Conference or the NCAA. The contract should also con-
tain language that punishes the coach when a member of the coaching
staff or any other person under the coach's supervision undertakes any
violations serious in nature and direction, for which violation was the
result of the coach's failure to reasonably supervise the offending
individuals.
Rules violations can have a dramatic effect on the career of the
coach, the program and its future. Some examples are illustrative:
* Don James, University of Washington. Fifteen violations by
boosters (improper loans to athletes, free meals, excess pay for
116. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLEI-c ASS'N, 2001-02 NCAA DMVISION I MANUAL (2001)
[hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
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summer employment). RESULT: James resigned; 2 year absence
from bowl games; 1 year loss of TV revenue; loss of 20 scholar-
ships; loss of 75 on-campus recruiting visits.117
o Ron Abegglan, Weber State. Gave a player money to pay for
correspondence courses, arranged loans for or gave athletes jobs,
and allowed an athlete to stay in his home for a few days. Also
introduced athletes to NBA personalities, gave one player bail
money, had his son tutor a prospective player, and had his wife
edit and type a player's class paper. RESULT: 4 years probation;
loss of two scholarships; re-certification of athletics policies and
practices; compulsive attendance at compliance seminar develop-
ment of comprehensive compliance program. WSU imposed the
following sanctions: cut Abegglan's salary by 25%; suspended fi-
nancial incentives for 2 years, reduced the number of assistant
coaches and reduced off-campus recruits.118
G. Cal State Northridge Coach Ron Ponciano was fired on July 16,
1999 amid an internal university inquiry into alleged rules viola-
tions in the football program. President Louanne Kennedy said
that the results so far show "serious and substantial" violations of
NCAA and university rules that compelled the school to take ac-
tion. The university sent Ponciano a non-retention letter, ending
his tenure as coach that began in February 1998.119
o In April 1998, ULCA fired head basketball coach Jim Harrick for
violating NCAA rules which including the coaching staff provid-
ing improper entertainment and benefits to a club coach whose
team included prospective student athletes and the head basket-
ball coach furnishing false and misleading information to univer-
sity investigators. As a result, the school was put on three years
probation and recruiting visits were reduced to six visits for the
next two following seasons.12 0
o In April of 1998, Southeast Missouri State fired its head men's
basketball coach for NCAA violations which included improper
benefits to student athletes, including above-average wages for
summer jobs, loan and cash payments for rent and furniture, as
well as unethical conduct and recruiting violations. Penalties im-
117. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 569.
118. Id.
119. Northridge Football Coach Fired, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 17, 1999, at 7C.
120. Danny Robbins, The Verdict Is In: Tech Gets Four Years' Probation, Postseason, TV
Sanctions Avoided, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 5, 1998.
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posed upon Southeast Missouri State included three years' proba-
tion, reduction of another scholarship, show cause orders limiting
job opportunities for former basketball coach and assistant
coaches.' 2 '
In January of 2000, Howard University fired men's basketball
coach Kirk Saulny and his two paid assistant coaches for violating
NCAA and university rules. "We cannot and will not tolerate any
conduct inconsistent with NCAA bylaws and our own code of
ethics and conduct," Vice President of Student Affairs, Ray
Archer said. The rule violations were uncovered during an inter-
nal investigation of the program. The areas of inquiry included
altering a transferor's transcript and conferring illegal benefits.' 22
II. CONTRACTS - LEGAL AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
College coaches need representation, in fact, they require a much
more sophisticated form of contract negotiation than professional ath-
letes do. A coaches' contract may range from a one-page letter of ap-
pointment subject to the University. Employee Handbook with no
protections - to an eighty-page document full of legalese and other types
of protective and negotiated clauses.
Because of the lack of job security in coaching and the amount of
money paid to coaches for their services, meticulously drafted employ-
ment contracts have become a necessity for both the coach and the uni-
versity. According to Judson Graves,
college athletics is big business. Whatever else they may be -
master strategists, charismatic inspirers of young athletes, or na-
tional celebrities - today's college athletic coaches are big busi-
nessmen. In the high stakes, win at all costs atmosphere of major
college athletics, job security for coaches can be as fleeting as last
Saturday's victor, and complex, tightly drawn employment con-
tracts have become a necessity for those coaches with enough ne-
gotiating leverage to obtain them. These relatively new entrants
to the business world operate in a volatile atmosphere in which
hiring and firings often occur in rapid sequence, and hard legal
questions are being raised about the proper methods of enforcing
their employment contracts when breaches occur."2
121. Id.
122. Mark Asher, Howard Fires Saulny, Staff; Basketball Coaches Violated Rules; 2 Play-
ers Ruled Ineligible, The WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2000, at D1.
123. Judson Graves, Commentary: Coaches in the Courtroom: Recovery in Actions for
Breach of Employment Contracts, 12 J. COLL. & UNiV. L. 545, 545 (1986).
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Coaches should be protected by what can be thought of as a Coach's
Contractual Bill of Rights, which includes legal analysis and advice as to
(1) defined rather than omnibus duties, (2) term and the ability to roll
over the contract, (3) the exclusion of reassignment or constructive ter-
mination clauses, (4) contractual guarantees in a stressful and unstable
job environment, (5) creativity in financial structuring beyond the box
including other potential perquisites, fringe benefits, outside income
such as retention annuities, tuition waivers, complimentary tickets, club
and golf club memberships, living accommodations, housing allowances,
continuing education and conference attendance, moving and relocation
expenses, automobile and expense accounts, rewards for success, (6) a
recognition between the coach and university that the job and the suc-
cess of the program is a joint venture, (7) a clearer definitional under-
standing of what is termination for just cause and a redefinition of what
is just cause, (8) the entitlement of coaches to due process and constitu-
tional guarantees, whether the college is state chartered or private, (9)
better protections when the coach does not win and is terminated with-
out cause, including lump sum settlements and no mitigation of damage
provisions, (10) buyout provisions in the event the coach jumps or early
terminates, (11) university support provisions especially in the area of
technological and facility parity, (12) certain autonomy and authority
with respect to operation of the program, and (13) financial commit-
ments from the university to improve and upgrade the program.1 24
The process is one that is involved and time consuming, that requires
an understanding of the operation of universities and, most importantly,
an understanding of the intricacies and goals of the parties in obtaining a
fair and protective contract.
As previously stated, there is no standard form of a college coach's
employment contract. This section will discuss certain contract clauses
and issues that are important to the coach's contract from both the uni-
versity's and the coach's perspective.
Newly appointed head coaches are often so elated to get the "job"
that, as long as the package numbers are respectable, they will execute
the proffered contract without the advice of counsel. Universities "often
negotiate coaching contracts in a frenzy, making impossible a careful 'in-
124. The author has developed this Bill of Rights through many presentations to college
coaches and other groups.
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vent-the-wheel' legal drafting job within the time constraints."'1  Fur-
ther, "the 'general' terms of university coaching contracts often are
negotiated by persons who lack knowledge of university's interests and
how to protect them.' l 6 Consequently, lawyers become the benefi-
ciaries of contracts that have already been negotiated and drafted result-
ing in a contract that fails to protect the parties' interests. Because of
the complexity of the issues in today's coach's contract, those skilled in
legal training and knowledgeable about the contractual provisions of
coaching contracts should be involved both in the negotiation and draft-
ing process. a7
In 1987, Stoner proposed a model coach's contract in order to protect
the university's interest. 28 In an accompanying article details were laid
out as to how university and college attorneys should negotiate and draft
college coaching contracts. 29
As the unions in professional sports have negotiated the contract lan-
guage for their players, so too should the associations representing col-
lege football and basketball coaches. They should take a more active role
and interest in not only the format of their coaches' contracts, but also
the economics of a coach's contract and what the coach and the repre-
sentative should be negotiating. 130 A central and open source, such as a
college coach's contract data bank, should be made available to the at-
torneys or agents representing the coaches so that statistical information
is available to each representative.' 3 1
What follows is a discussion of certain clauses and provisions that are
normally found in a college coach's contract, along with some specific
examples.
1. Duties and Responsibilities of Coach.
Before a contract can list the specific duties of the coach, the coach
must agree to devote his best efforts and full-time to the performance of
all duties and responsibilities attendant to the position of head coach of
125. Edward Stoner, II, & Arlie Nogay, The Model University Coaching Contract("MCC"): A Better Starting Point for Your Next Negotiation, 16 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 43, 44
(1989).
126. Id.
127. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 576.
128. National Association of College and University Attorneys (NACUA), Section of
Athletics, 27th Annual Conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico (1987).
129. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 125.
130. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 576.
131. Id.
2001]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
that university's particular athletic team.132 Moreover, the coach must
agree to abide by and to comply with the constitution, bylaws and inter-
pretations of the NCAA and all NCAA Conference and university rules
and regulations relating to the conduct and administration of that partic-
ular athletic program. 133 Beyond the general responsibilities and best
efforts clause, the employment contract will normally list specific respon-
sibilities. 134 For example, a head basketball coach's contract may list the
following general responsibilities:
(A) Assume all of the support services that are necessary for
coaching the sport (For instance, recommend competitive
schedule, budget, necessary equipment, etc.);
(B) Conduct the program with integrity and in a financially
responsible manner that reflects favorably upon the
university as a whole;
(C) Maintain a level of performance in the program that is
consistent with the goals established by the University;
(D) Provide for and encourage academic counseling for the
student-athletes coached by him within the program as
their individual circumstances may warrant;
(E) Provide individual and group training and instruction to
team members at all practices;
(F) Prepare for and accompany teams to both home and away
competitions;
(G) Possess a thorough and up-to-date knowledge of the sport;
(H) Assess talent of prospective student-athletes and recruit
high caliber prospects that are capable of performing
effectively against the University's scheduled opponents at
the highest Division One Level;
(I) Answer all correspondence relative to the sport;
(J) Be available for various community and alumni speaking
engagements;
(K) Promote and stimulate interest in the program among
students and season ticket holders;
(L) Hire and fire, but only after consultation with the
University's Director of Athletics, the Assistant Coaches
for the Men's Varsity Basketball Program;
(M) Work effectively with the media;
(N) Perform related duties as assigned.135
The contract may also list more specific responsibilities:
132. Id. at 576-577.
133. Id. at 577.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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(A) Supervise assistant coaches, including compliance with such
coaches with Conference and NCAA rules and regulations;
(B) Participate in the instruction and coaching of student-
athletes;
(C) Determine scouting schedules for high school and college
games;
(D) Interview prospective players, their parents and coaches;
(E) Contact media, alumni and civic groups;
(F) Work to integrate sports into the whole spectrum of
academic life to complement the University and its mission
in the community;
(G) Work within the confines of rules, regulations, guidelines
and policies of the University athletic department;
(H) Keep public statements complimentary to the athletic
program and to the University;
(I) Make every effort, working in cooperation with and
support of the University's faculty and administrative
officials, to ensure that all student-athletes' academic
requirements are met;
(J) Have complete knowledge of the rules and regulations
governing intercollegiate athletic competition and maintain
strict compliance therewith by the program;
(K) Apply effectively experience in recruiting, training and
coaching of student-athletes;
(L) Be a disciplinarian but be fair, sympathetic and protective
of student-athletes while motivating them to excellence;
(M) Maintain a mature and rational attitude, keep emotions in
control and downplay defeats;
(N) Prepare players for each game and each season with
dedication; and
(0) Establish and maintain a frequent and systematic program
of personal communication with the University's student
body.136
Another example delineates responsibilities between coaching
duties, administrative duties, travel duties, recruiting duties, student
affairs, alumni relations development and other, as follows:
DUTIES:
1. Coaching Duties
A. Full responsibility for coaching and training University's
football team; for developing and conditioning all in-season
136. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 125, at 59-60.
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and out-of-season sessions in fall and spring as deemed nec-
essary and appropriate.
B. Has responsibility for psychological preparation of team in
both pre-game and post-game; and for developing motiva-
tional approach to game.
C. Organize teaching procedure for football staff. Conduct
team meetings and assignments as necessary.
D. Continue to develop comprehensive knowledge of football.
Responsible for all football-related decision-making, dele-
gating football staff authority, and setting team and staff
objections.
2. Administrative Duties
A. Responsible for search and selection of qualified assistant
coaching staff with approval of Director of Athletics; and to
actively support and comply with the University's Affirma-
tive Action program.
B. Direct and manage staff of assistant football coaches. Dele-
gate and prioritize administrative responsibilities to
assistants.
C. Conduct annual staff evaluations and recommend merit sal-
ary increases to Director for approval.
D. Must be fully knowledgeable and adhere to all rules and reg-
ulations of the NCAA, Big Ten Conference and University
as amended from time to time.
E. Responsible for presenting to the Director and the Associate
Director a projected annual budget in the areas of responsi-
bility for approval. Accountable for expense control compli-
ance and administration of annual budget. Implement
Department operational procedures and policies to assist in
budget development.
3. Travel Duties
A. Responsible for working with Associate Director/Business in
making team and individual travel arrangements for compe-
titions and off-campus practice, and for the conduct and ap-
pearance of the team when traveling as representatives of
the University.
4. Recruiting Duties
A. Responsible for the national recruitment of top student-ath-
letes, commensurate with the admissions qualifications of
University who are capable of successfully competing at the
Big Ten level. Maintain good relations with parents of pro-
spective and current student athletes.
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B. Manage and direct extensive on-campus recruiting program,
developing sound relations with faculty and staff as
appropriate.
5. Student Affairs
A. Demonstrate interest in academic progress of student ath-
letes. Work closely with Director of Academic Services in
solving and preventing academic problems.
B. Cooperate with team physicians and training staff regarding
health care and decisions of practice and participation of stu-
dent-athletes.
6. Alumni Relations, Public Relations, and Development
A. Responsible for the maintenance of sound alumni relations,
and for promoting and participating in various alumni
events.
B. Assist Director and Assistant Director of Development/Ath-
letics in fund-raising efforts on behalf of the Department and
the University as necessary.
C. Responsible for maintaining good public relations with the
public news media, and working with the Department's Me-
dia Relations Director in promoting Northwestern Univer-
sity. Maintain amicable public relations with faculty, staff,
students and media of the University; friends, alumni support
groups and secondary school coaches.
7. Other
A. Report to the Director of Athletics and faithfully and dili-
gently carry out other Department related duties as assigned.
B. Demonstrate a cooperative attitude toward all sports in the
Intercollegiate and Recreational program.
In addition to a list of specific duties, the university will want to in-
clude a clause indicating that the coach will perform such other duties as
are incident and consistent with his position, and as may be prescribed
from time to time by the Athletic Director or President, or by mutual
agreement between the parties. 37 From the university's perspective, a
listing of specific duties is advantageous especially in attempting to en-
force the termination provisions for just cause, i.e. failure to perform the
duties and responsibilities specifically assigned. 38
On the other hand, the coach will probably desire a broad responsi-
bility statement such as "performance of such duties as are incidental to
137. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 578.
138. Id.
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the position and as may be prescribed from time-to-time by mutual
agreement between the parties." '139 This gives the coach room to argue
against the university's potential charge that the coach has failed to per-
form the duties of the position.
2. Term of Employment.
This clause creates the term of employment, which is normally for a
stated number of years. In general, coaching contracts are usually three
to six years in length and some contain rollover provisions.140 Several
sample terms of employment provisions follow.
Employment and Term. Subject to the conditions set forth in this
letter, you are hereby employed as Head Football Coach at the
University for the period beginning on - and ending
(the "Contract Term"). A current job description for the position
of Head Football Coach is attached as Exhibit A. The job
description will not be materially changed during the Contract
Term without the mutual written consent of both you and the
University.
For a period of thirty (30) days following the last regularly
scheduled football game of the __ football season, the Univer-
sity will discuss with you the possibility of extending your contract
beyond the initial five-year term. Both you and the University
must agree any such extension to in writing. This agreement to
discuss an extension in no way obligates the University to con-
tinue your contract beyond -, 20_ .
Term and Extension.
A. University agrees to employ Coach hereunder as Head
Football Coach for a term commencing on - and ending
on _ , subject to the extension and termination provisions
set forth expressly herein ("Term"). Coach shall be considered a
full-time University employee twelve (12) months of each year.
B. This Agreement shall terminate without further notice to
Coach at the conclusion of the Term specified above. Any exten-
sion or renewal of this Agreement must be expressly agreed to in
writing, and is subject to written approval as provided for in this
Agreement.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 578-579.
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Term of Employment, Compensation, and Benefits.
A. Subject to the provisions below for termination, the term
of employment under this Agreement shall be for six years begin-
ning on July 1, 1998 and continuing for the 1998-199 Contract
Year (defined below) and for the next immediately succeeding
five contract years.
B. As used in this Agreement, the term "Contract Year" is de-
fined to mean the twelve month period commencing each July 1
and ending the following June 30. Each such Contract Year is
designated by the calendar years in which it begins and ends (so
that the Contract Year from July 1, 1998 through June 30, 1999, is
referred to as the "1998-1999 Contract Year").
The case of Roberts v. Wake Forest University, 4' is instructive with
respect to the term of an employment contract. Pursuant to an oral
agreement, the plaintiff, Roberts, was hired to become the golf coach
and associate athletic director at Wake Forest University. There was an
oral agreement on salary, but there was no specific request as to a defi-
nite term of employment. 42 Golf coaches traditionally have a very long
tenure. The plaintiff understood from circumstances surrounding his ini-
tial visit to the university that he would be given a reasonable amount of
time to demonstrate that he could coach the golf team.
143
Although the duration of his contract was not fixed, the plaintiff al-
leged that the parties intended employment to be for a substantial pe-
riod, at least six years."44 On December 2, 1977, after less than a year
with the program, the president of the university requested plaintiff to
relinquish his duties and accept other duties in the athletic program.
45
The North Carolina court concluded that, "[e]mployment for an in-
definite term is regarded as an employment at will which may be termi-
nated at any time by either party."'1 46 In this case, the court indicated
that the record fell far short of showing the intention of the parties for a
fixed term of employment. 47 In addition, the plaintiff relied on the
Wake Forest University Personnel Policies and Regulation Manual to sup-
port his argument that he was a permanent employee and could not be
dismissed without cause.
148
141. 286 S.E.2d 119 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
142. Id. at 122.
143. Id.
144. I& at 123
145. Id.
146. Roberts, 286 S.E.2d at 123.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 124.
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Although the court admitted that the coach was a permanent em-
ployee, at least pursuant to the Manual, it also indicated that a perma-
nent employee in a general sense means a position of some permanence
as contrasted with a temporary employee.14 9 Ordinarily, where there is
no additional expression as to duration, a contract for permanent em-
ployment implies an indefinite hiring terminable at will. The Roberts
case is a clear expression of the coach's need to define in writing the
term of his intended employment contract, rather than let custom, usage,
or the intentions of the parties bind the pathway of the future term of
employment. 150
Another interesting case with respect to the issue of term of employ-
ment is Lindsey v. University of Arizona. 5' In the spring of 1982, the
University of Arizona attempted to locate a new coach for the men's
basketball program. Ben Lindsey, who had successfully coached men's
basketball at Grand Canyon College for several years, was ultimately
chosen. Lindsey stated that at a meeting with the search committee, the
members had stated that no one would be hired for the coaching posi-
tion for less than three to four years. Lindsey also testified that during
discussions with the University of Arizona athletic director, Dave Strack,
Lindsey was told that it was the university's policy to give coaches a min-
imum of four years before being evaluated. 52 On July 6, 1982, Lindsey
accepted a formal appointment as adjunct professor of physical educa-
tion from 1982 to 1983.153 A coaching contract, in the form of a letter to
Lindsey from the University of Arizona President John P. Schaefer
stated:
Dear Mr. Lindsey:
You are requested to serve as Head Coach of Men's Basket-
ball at the University of Arizona, effective July 1, 1982 and ending
no later than June 30, 1983.
It is the policy of the Arizona Board of Regents that an aca-
demic-administrative assignment is not a contract and that it can
be terminated by the President of the University at any time.
It is also policy that the assignment is renewable at my option
and that renewal must be confirmed by a letter from my office. I
would appreciate it if you would sign the enclosed copy of the
letter to indicate your willingness to serve in this assignment.
149. Id.
150. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 580.
151. 754 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
152. Id. at 1154.
153. Id.
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Please return it to Faculty Records (Administration 507) within
ten days.
Sincerely,
/a/ John P. Schaefer' 54
Lindsey signed the bottom of a copy of the Schaefer letter on July 7,
1982. Above his signature and date he noted, "I hereby accept the fore-
going assignment."' 55 Lindsey was to receive approximately $90,000.00
per year as compensation, including; a $49,115.00 annual salary, approxi-
mately $30,000.00 per year arising from a contract with a shoe company
that Lindsey promoted, and an additional $10,000.00 anticipated from
conducting a basketball camp and other benefits associated with the
position. 56
After Lindsey was hired, the university men's basketball team exper-
ienced its worst record in history (four wins and twenty-four losses).
Sometime around March 15, 1983, the new athletic director, Cedric
Dempsey, notified Lindsey that his appointment would not be renewed
after June 30, 1983. The university provided Lindsey two checks totaling
$49,115.00 as severance pay.157 Lindsey brought suit, alleging breach of
contract, fraud, intentional interference with contractual relations, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 8
The jury awarded Lindsey $215,000.00 for deprivation of three years
of employment.'5 9 The appellate court indicated that:
Despite the specific language contained in the letter from Presi-
dent Schaefer, Lindsey presented evidence from which the jury
could have concluded that he would have the security of coaching
for four years at the University of Arizona. An employer's oral
representation may modify the terms of a contract and create a
question of fact for the jury as to the terms of the contract. 6 °
The court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a
verdict that the university had breached an express contract with Lind-
sey by terminating his employment before four years of employment
elapsed.'61 Implicit in this finding is the holding that Lindsey accepted a
one-year renewable contract, which the university promised to renew for
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1155.
156. Lindsey, 754 P.2d at 1155.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1156.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1157.
161. Lindsey, 754 P.2d at 1157.
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three additional years. Thus, the appellate court held that the university
violated an oral promise to renew Lindsey's contract for three additional
years, and therefore affirmed the $215,000.00 trial court judgment.162
Obviously, oral promises inducing performance that may be in oppo-
sition to the stated letter of appointment were significant in the Lindsey
case.163 Discussions, promises, intentions, customs and usage's need to
become part of the written document so that there is no mistake with
respect to the term and conditions of employment. 164
3. "Rollover" Provisions.
If the university is satisfied with the coach's performance after the
completion of each season, the contract may be extended for an addi-
tional year. This means that at all times the remaining term of the con-
tract at the commencement of each succeeding season is the same as the
original term of the contract. This is commonly referred to as a rollover
clause.1 65
To illustrate, Coach Jones has a five-year contract with a rollover pro-
vision. At the end of each season, the university, with Coach Jones' con-
sent, has a right to extend the contract an additional year, provided the
university is pleased with the performance of the coach. Thus, if the
university continues to exercise its rollover provision, Coach Jones will
have at all times a five-year contract.1 66 Coach Jones may want the rol-
lover provision to state that if the university does not extend the contract
for two consecutive years, the coach has a right to terminate the contract
without needing to comply with the release or buy-out provision.167
An example of a rollover contract provision suiting Coach Jones'
needs is as follows:
The term of this Agreement shall be for a period of five (5) years
commencing on April 1, 1989 and ending on March 31, 1994. In
addition thereto, the University shall have the right to extend the
term of this Agreement with the prior written approval of the
Coach for one (1) additional year following the completion of
each Men's Varsity Basketball season (but in no event later than
May 1st of each year) during the term of this Agreement. Upon
the completion of each season, the Coach will meet with the Ath-
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 582.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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letic Director of the University to review the season. Following
such review, a decision shall then be made by the Athletic Direc-
tor whether or not to exercise this one-year extension option for
that year. In the event of a decision to exercise such extension
option, then the University shall extend the term of this Agree-
ment for an additional one (1) year in accordance with such deci-
sion. If this extension option is not exercised in a given year but is
exercised in a subsequent year in the above-described manner,
the University may in the event, with the Coach's consent, in-
crease the term of such subsequent extension to a full five (5)
year period from the effective date of said extension. In the event
the term of the employment is not extended by the University in
any two (2) successive years, then the Coach shall have the right
to terminate his employment under and pursuant to this Agree-
ment without the necessity of complying with the release provi-
sions as more specifically described in paragraph 9.3
hereinafter. 68
Another example of a rollover clause follows:
Annual Automatic Renewal of Contract for New Four Year Terms
(Roll-over Clauses). On Julyl, 1995, and July lof each year there-
after, the term of this Contract of Employment shall be automati-
cally renewed for a new term of four (4) years, unless ninety (90)
days prior to July 1, 1995, or ninety (90) days prior to July I of any
year thereafter, the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics shall no-
tify Coach in writing that this Contract will not be automatically
renewed for a new term of four (4) years beginning on the follow-
ing July 1. It is the intention of the parties by this section to pro-
vide for an automatic "roll-over" of the term of this Contract for
a new term of four (4) years beginning on July 1, 1995, and on
Julyl of each year thereafter unless the Director of Intercollegiate
Athletics shall at least ninety (90) days prior to any such July 1
give to Coach written notice that this Contract will not be auto-
matically renewed for a new term of four (4) years. In the event
the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics shall notify Coach at any
time in accordance with the notice provisions stated above that
this Contract will not be renewed for a new term of four (4) years,
then there shall not be an automatic "roll-over" of the term of
this Contract to a new four (4) year term and this Contract shall
expire at the end of the contract term then in effect.
Generally, a rollover clause has four major drawbacks for the univer-
sity. First, a university's notice of a decision not to extend the contract
168. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 125, at 47.
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for the extra year could be considered by some to be a current breach of
the contract, which might immediately entitle the coach to a certain
number of years of severance pay or some other remedy. 169 Second,
"[r]ollover clauses are typically poorly drafted because drafters write
them in the euphoria of the moment. '170 Third, "[t]he rollover clauses
require the university to give years of notice of its intention to let the
contract expire." '171 Finally, "[r]ollover clauses are typically one-sided.
While they bar the university from removing the coach without paying
for the balance of the term, contracts with such clauses tend not to guar-
antee the university that the coach will not terminate the agreement and
coach elsewhere."' 172
Therefore, rollover clauses can be written in four varieties; (1) where
there is an automatic right of the university to rollover or extend, (2)
where the rollover is subject to the mutual consent of the University and
Coach, (3) where the rollover increases the term to the original term in
the event that a rollover does not occur in one year, and (4) where the
rollover provision is subject to the right on the part of the coach to ter-
minate the contract in the event the rollover does not occur in successive
years.
Some state institutions are prohibited from entering into contracts
that bind the institution for more than a period of one year.' 73 Often,
even though those contracts are only binding for one year, there will be
an expression between the parties of an intent to continue the employ-
ment relationship provided the terms of the original contract are met. 174
An example of such a clause is as follows:
The term of this Employment Agreement shall be for one (1)
year, commencing .. . and terminating _ . The
parties hereby acknowledge that the University is an agency of
the State of __ and that the laws of the State of - pro-
hibit the University from entering into legally binding agreements
for periods longer than one year. The parties also agree, however,
that absent the occurrence of an event or events that would allow
for termination of this Agreement in accordance with the provi-
sions set forth in Article VI hereof or events beyond their control
prohibiting such action, it is their intent to enter into successive
169. Id. at 48.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 583.
174. Id.
[Vol. 12:127
COLLEGE COACHING CONTRACTS REVISITED
one-year Agreements on substantially the same terms and condi-
tions as this Agreement for the next - ( ) year(s).175
In University of Arizona v. County of Pima,17 6 the University of Ari-
zona attempted to utilize a "fiscal out statute" to nullify contentions of
former University of Arizona head basketball coach Ben Lindsey that he
had an employment contract with the state for longer than a one-year
duration. Arizona Revised Statute Section 35-154 provides as follows:
Unauthorized obligations, effect; liability
A. No person shall incur, order or vote for the incurrence of any
obligation against the state or for any expenditure not authorized
by an appropriation and an allocation. Any obligation incurred in
contravention of this chapter shall not be binding upon the state
and shall be null and void and incapable of ratification by any
executive authority to give effect thereto against the state.
B. Every person incurring, or ordering or voting for the incur-
rence of such obligations, and his bondsmen, shall be jointly and
severally liable therefor. Every payment made in violation of the
provisions of this chapter shall be deemed illegal, and every offi-
cial authorizing or approving such payment, or taking part
therein, and every person receiving such payment, or any part
thereof, shall be jointly and severally liable to the state for the full
amount so paid, or received. 77
This public statute is referred to as the "fiscal out statute."' 7 s The
court interpreted the statute to operate as a condition subsequent, al-
lowing the University of Arizona to avoid its obligations if prerequisite
funding is not forthcoming. "Subject to this implicit condition, contracts
for more than one year are valid and do not violate the statutory provi-
sion against financial obligation for which there is no appropriation.' 79
While neither Arizona nor Lindsey had so pleaded, the court indicated
that it could take judicial notice of the fact that the University of Ari-
zona had maintained a men's basketball program after Lindsey's termi-
nation. Legislative funding for Lindsey's position must necessarily have
been approved. 80 Thus, the court held that the University of Arizona
was not prevented by statutory provision from promising a basketball
coach a four-year period in which to rebuild the basketball program.
175. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 125, at 63.
176. 722 P.2d 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
177. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 35-154 (2000).
178. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 584.
179. Univ. of Arizona, 722 P.2d at 355, 356.
180. Id.
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4. Reassignment Provisions.
A reassignment clause allows the university to remove a person as
head coach without terminating the employment relationship by as-
signing the coach to a new title and different duties.' Often such a
clause will contain a statement that the coach is not to be assigned to any
job that is not consistent with his education and experience. 182 Several
examples of reassignment clauses follow.
Reassignment.
The College retains the right to assign Employee to another posi-
tion within the College that requires the performance of different
duties during the term of this Agreement. In no event, however,
will Employee be assigned to a position that is not consistent with
his or her education and experience. If the College reassigns Em-
ployee, and Employee refuses to accept such reassignment, then
the College may terminate this Agreement for cause pursuant to
the terms and conditions for termination under Section 4.01(b)
herein.
Coach Subject to Reassignment.
Throughout the term of this Employment Agreement, the coach
shall use his best full time energies, efforts, and abilities to the
exclusive benefit of the University. The parties understand, how-
ever, that the University retains the right to assign the Coach to
other positions with different duties during the term of this
Agreement. In no event, however, will the Coach be assigned to
a position that is not consistent with his education and experi-
ence. If the University exercises its right to reassign the Coach
temporarily and the Coach refuses to accept such reassignment,
the University may terminate this Agreement pursuant to Section
X hereof. In the event that the University exercises its right to
reassign the Coach permanently, Coach may elect to terminate
the contract.
Sometimes, reassignment provisions are contained in the University
Employment Manual and pertain to coaching positions in that the posi-
tions may be classified as general faculty. An example follows:
Reassignment and Removals. Members of the general faculty may
be removed from their position by one of the following four pro-
cedures: reassignment, adequate notice of termination (Stan-
dards for Notice above), by action for just cause, or by abolition
of positions or financial stringency.
181. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 585.
182. Id.
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a. Reassignment. Members holding a general faculty position
may have their duties reassigned at any time. Reassignment is at
the discretion of the unit manager and can involve removal from
administrative title supervisory responsibilities, or reassignment
to another department. Neither notice (as defined above) nor ac-
tion for just cause is required to effect a reassignment. The Uni-
versity's responsibility under reassignment shall be to make
available a substitute position or duties reasonably commensurate
with the person's education, experience, and performance. Ad-
ministrative reassignment normally has no effect on academic
rank or the current faculty term of election.
An example of a reassignment clause can be found in former Univer-
sity of Wisconsin head football coach Don Morton's contract. 183 The
clause is found under the heading of "Title and Duties During Appoint-
ment Term." The clause states that "During the Appointment Term,
you shall hold the appointment title and duties of Head Coach in the
University's football program, except that at any time during the Ap-
pointment Term with 30 days notice, the appointment title and duties as
Head Coach may be terminated and another title: and duties as-
signed."'' If the coach refuses to accept such reassignment, the univer-
sity may attempt to terminate the contract pursuant to the termination
provisions.' 5
In essence then, if the university wishes to avoid an accusation by the
coach that he was constructively discharged by such reassignment and
shift the burden of refusing to accept reassignment to the coach. Such
refusal to accept reassignment may be a just cause for the university to
terminate the employment contract and, thus, limit the university's lia-
bility for liquidated damages.
Because universities have so much to lose, careful drafting of reas-
signment clauses must be undertaken to protect the university. Any lan-
guage contained in the contract that gives the coach the apparent right to
be the "Head Coach" during the term of the contract should be avoided.
Such language could result in the coach bringing a suit for injunctive
relief for the right to continue as head coach for the balance of the term
of the contract. The coach could also contend that reassignment is, in
legal fact, a constructive discharge, thus, entitling the coach to perform
no duties at all and get paid pursuant to the terms of the contract. There
is case law in the employment context that seems to show that when a
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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coach contracts to fill a particular position any material change in duties
or significant reduction in rank could constitute a constructive discharge
which, if found to be unjustified, is a breach of the contract.18 6 The fact
that the coach receives the same salary is immaterial because the status
associated with the original position may well have been the primary
inducement for making the contract.
The case of McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corp., also provides gui-
dance for the construction of personal service contracts.187 McLaughlin
involved a five-year personal service contract of an advertising manager
who worked for a New Hampshire newspaper. After the execution of
the agreement, the newspaper installed a new advertising manager and
placed McLaughlin on an "indefinite leave of absence" with pay. 8
When McLaughlin sued for breach of contract, the newspaper stopped
paying his salary, asserting that McLaughlin had breached the contract
by rendering inadequate performance. 189 The jury rejected the newspa-
per's argument and awarded McLaughlin a substantial verdict, which
was upheld on appeal.1 90
The turning point of the case occurred when the court recognized a
breach on the part of the newspaper, both in its refusal to pay McLaugh-
lin's salary and its denial of the position he had contracted to receive.1 91
To support it's holding, the court cited section 433 of the Restatement of
Agency:
If the [agent] . . . is to receive a fixed salary, a promise by the
principal to furnish him with work is inferred from a promise to
the employee only if it is found that the anticipated benefit to the
agent from doing the work is a material part of the advantage to
be received by him from the employment. This anticipated benefit
may be the acquisition of skill or reputation by the employee or
the acquisition of subsidiary pecuniary advantages, as in the case
of the employment of public performers whose reputation will be
enhanced by their appearance or diminished by their failure to
appear beginners in a trade or profession, and those whose com-
pensation is likely to be enhanced by receiving gratuities from
outside sources.
1 92
186. Id.
187. 116 A.2d 489 (N.H. 1955).
188. Id. at 491.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 492.
192. McLaughlin, 116 A.2d at 492-93.
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In holding that the removal of McLaughlin from the position prom-
ised constituted a separate and distinct breach of contract, the New
Hampshire court took a significant step toward recognizing certain em-
ployment positions as including far more than merely the opportunity to
work for an employer and earn the agreed-upon compensation.193
Under this reasoning, preventing an employee from ascending to a
sufficiently unique employment position (such as that of a coach) could
constitute a separate breach of contract, and render the employer liable
in damages, even if that employer continued to pay the full contract
compensation. 94 Damages in such a situation could flow from the loss
of the kinds of "subsidiary pecuniary advantages" and the "gratuities
from outside sources" described in the Restatement. 95
In sum, relieving an employee from a position could constitute a
compensable loss in addition to the paid compensation to which the em-
ployee is clearly entitled under the contract. Moreover, in the area of
major college coaching, the value of the lost "subsidiary pecuniary ad-
vantages" and "gratuities," such as alumni gifts, television revenues, en-
dorsements, etc., could easily (and often does) exceed the combination
of a base salary and related compensation paid by an employer.
To ensure maximum protection, the attorney for the head coach will
seek to have a prohibition against reassignment included within the em-
ployment contract.'96 An example of a clause prohibiting reassignment
is as follows:
The university hereby acknowledges that the position in which
the coach is hired is unique and requires special talents. The posi-
tion as herein specified in this agreement is the only position for
which the coach is hereby being employed. The university shall
have no right pursuant to this agreement to reassign the coach to
any other position of employment for the university during the
term of this employment or any renewal therefor.197
Another issue that needs to be defined in any reassignment clause is
the compensation that the coach will receive in the newly assigned posi-
tion, if the position is actually accepted. For instance, does the coach
receive only the guaranteed base salary plus university fringe benefits, or
does the coach also receive those other compensation perquisites that
are normally associated with the position of head coach?
193. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 562-63.
194. Id. at 563.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 586.
197. Id.
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The presence of a reassignment clause in a coach's contract has been
used by a university as leverage with respect to buying out the remaining
term of a contract.19 Essentially, the university will reassign the coach.
There will be some confusion or conflict with respect to the salary, fringe
benefits and other compensation perquisites available to the coach by
virtue of the reassignment. This will eventually lead to a negotiated set-
tlement between the coach and the university with the university using
the reassignment clause as leverage in such negotiations.199
Don Morton did not bring football fortunes to the University of Wis-
consin. Morton was reassigned, pursuant to his contract, from the posi-
tion of head coach to the position of assistant athletic director in the
third year of his five-year contract.200 The issue in the Morton case was
not the reassignment clause, but the compensation that Morton would
receive for the remaining two years of his contract term.20 1 The univer-
sity agreed that Morton had a right to his salary, university fringe bene-
fits, plus a car and country club membership.20 2 Morton, however,
demanded the additional outside income, i.e., his radio and television
shows and summer camps that were directly a result of his position of
head coach.203 Although the parties chose to battle their differences in
the newspapers, and a lawsuit was Morton's game play, the parties even-
tually settled their differences with the university buying out the contract
and Morton terminating his employment.20 4
In Monson v. State of Oregon,2 °5 Coach Monson brought a breach of
contract claim following his removal as head men's basketball coach. On
January 27, 1986, plaintiff signed a "Notice of Appointment and Con-
tract," appointing him as an officer of administration, non-tenure re-
lated, with the rank of professor and title of head men's basketball
coach, for the period July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1990, at an annual salary of
$60,000.00. In October 1988, plaintiff signed another "Notice of Ap-
pointment and Contract" for the period July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1992.
Both contracts provided that "[the] position is subject to the provisions
of the Oregon Administrative Rules of the Oregon State Board of
Higher Education and to other now existing administrative rules, regula-
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 587.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 901 P.2d 904, 905-909 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
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tions and policies of the University of Oregon relating to Officers of Ad-
ministration which are incorporated by reference herein. 20 6
Although none of his Notices of Appointment and Contract men-
tioned outside income, Monson earned additional income during his em-
ployment via a summer basketball camp, outside contracts with
equipment sponsors such as Nike and Rawlings Sporting Goods, and
through contracts and other agreements involving television and radio
companies.20 7 These included companies under contract with the univer-
sity's Oregon Sports Network. The university arranged some of the con-
tracts, but all of the opportunities for outside income made available to
Monson were in connection with his duties as University of Oregon's
head men's basketball coach. Monson also was given a complimentary
country club membership and, after the first year, the use of two new
courtesy cars.
Monson met with Bill Byrne, Athletic Director, on March 17, 1992,
after the basketball season had ended. At that time, Byrne explained to
Monson that the basketball program was not going in the direction that
he wanted and that he was reassigning Monson from basketball coach to
golf coach. Monson testified that he interpreted Byrne's concerns to be
related to the program's finances and the team's win-loss record. Mon-
son told Byrne that he was unwilling to be golf coach. At trial, Monson
testified that accepting the position would have been "professional sui-
cide." 20 After his meeting with Byrne, Monson left the campus and
never returned or attempted to contact the athletic director, the vice-
president, or the president of the university.
Shortly after the meeting, Monson received a letter from Byrne,
dated March 17, 1992, confirming their conversation of that date and
formally reassigning Monson to head men's golf coach and fund raiser.
The letter stated that the university would honor the terms of Monson's
contract, but that a change in leadership was needed "for the good of the
department.1209
In a letter to Monson dated April 29, 1992, Byrne offered to reassign
Monson to a position as the university's compliance coordinator for
NCAA rules and regulations.210 Monson testified that, as with the golf
coach position, had he accepted that position, he would have never been
206. Id. at 905.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 906.
209. Id.
210. Monson, 901 P.2d at 906.
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able to get back into basketball coaching. After Monson failed to accept
the new assignment by May 18, 1992, the university considered him to
have resigned and paid him no further compensation. Monson testified
that, as of that date, he had no unfulfilled contracts or agreements for
outside income.
In July 1992, Monson filed a breach of contract action.2 1' In his com-
plaint, Monson alleged that he had signed written contracts employing
him as head men's basketball coach through June 30, 1994. He argued
that he had performed all conditions of the contracts and that,
[o]n or about March 18, 1992, the defendant State of Oregon dis-
charged Monson as coach at the University of Oregon to Mon-
son's damage in the sum of $178,936.92 together with the sum of
$221,066.00 as the value of the money and benefits plaintiff would
have received form non-public sources if he remained in the posi-
tion as coach, and together with the sum of $25,785.60 for the
medical, dental and retirement benefits included within the con-
tract but which benefits have been terminated, and all for which
Monson demands judgment against defendant State of Oregon. 211
At the close of Monson's evidence, the state moved for directed ver-
dict on three grounds; (1) that the university had a contractual right to
reassign Monson from his position as men's head basketball coach, (2)
that the university validly exercised that right to reassign, and (3) that
Monson demonstrated no contractual entitlement to receive from the
university any of what's been referred to in the case as outside in-
come.21 3 The motion was denied, as was the states renewed motion for
directed verdict at the close of all evidence.214 The jury found for Mon-
son and awarded him $292,087.83 in damages. 215
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the university's removal
of its head basketball coach, and offer to reassign him as golf coach or
basketball rules compliance coordinator, did not violate his contract,
which incorporated by reference an Oregon statute allowing university
to reassign personnel in accordance with staff needs.216 The court also
held that the university's right of reassignment under the statute in-
cluded not only the right to reassign for purpose of filling vacant posi-
tions but also the right to reassign based on the determination that the
211. Id.
212. Id. at 906-907.
213. Id. at 907.
214. Id.
215. Monson, 901 P.2d at 907.
216. Id. at 911.
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staff member was no longer the most effective person for the position. 17
Therefore, even if the coach was reassigned for cause, it did not follow
that reassignment decision was not in accordance with staff needs.
5. Base Salary
A base salary provision states the amount of money the institution is
willing to pay the coach. Several examples follow:
The base salary paid by the University to the coach for services
and satisfactory performance under the terms and conditions of
this Employment Agreement shall be at the rate of $ per
year, payable in - installments by the University to the
Coach on the - day of each calendar month during the term
of this Agreement.
Your salary will be paid at the rate of $180,000 per year, in equal
monthly amounts on the last day of the month, prorated accord-
ingly. The amount payable under this paragraph will be reviewed
in May of each year in conjunction with a performance review
conducted by the Director of Athletics, and upward adjustments,
if any, will be made subject to the normal University process.
Any new salary amount resulting from such review will be effec-
tive as of the first day of the next University fiscal year. The Uni-
versity's fiscal year begins on September 1.
Presuming that the coach's contract is long-term in nature, the con-
tract should also address periodic increases in the base salary during the
contract term. 1 8 In essence, the coach may be entitled to merit in-
creases based upon periodic evaluations. Normally, these merit increases
based on periodic evaluations will occur on the same basis as evaluations
and increases available to other university coaches or employees within
the coach's employment classification. 19 In some instances, the coach,
depending upon his leverage, will negotiate a guaranteed minimum base
increase.220 The following example illustrates this point:
The coach shall be eligible to be paid a merit increase or raise,
which raise shall be determined by using the same procedures for
evaluating and rewarding meritorious performance as used for
other coaches of the coach's classification within the university
system. Provided, however, that in no event shall the merit in-
217. Id. at 909-910.
218. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 589.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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crease during each year during the term of this employment
agreement be less than 5% of the previous year's base salary.221
The university may be faced with various limitations as to the extent
of such salary in the sense that the coach is no more or less an employee
of the university than any other university professor. Therefore, the sal-
ary granted a coach is scrutinized and must be justified in light of other
coaches' salaries and in the interest of preserving the university's empha-
sis upon its academic purpose. Even so, many coaches nonetheless re-
tain healthy base salaries despite concerns over the school's academic
prestige. When you factor in the "package" (outside compensation)
coaches are compensated on whole far in excess of the chancellor or the
top full professor.222 Steve Spurrier, University of Florida football
coach, at approximately $2.1 million a year, is paid twenty-six times the
average salary of a full professor at Florida.22 Nick Saban, head foot-
ball coach at LSU earns nearly seventeen times the average salary of a
full LSU professor.224
What follows are some sample reported base salaries for head foot-
ball and basketball coaches from various Division I schools as reported
by the news media (the figures as herein expressed have not been veri-
fied or corroborated as being true or correct):
University of Wisconsin
Louisiana State Univ.
Univ. of Nebraska
Univ. of Georgia
Univ. of Georgia
Univ. of Alabama
Iowa State
Oklahoma State
LSU
Tennessee
Syracuse
UCLA
Univ. of Cincinnati
Michigan State
Purdue
Iowa
Oregon State
Barry Alvarez
Nick Saban
Barry Collier
Mark Richt
Jim Harrick
Dennis Franchione
Larry Eustachy
Eddie Sutton
John Brady
Jerry Green
Jim Boeheim
Steve Lavin
Bob Huggins
Tom Izzo
Gene Keady
Steve Alford
Ritchie McKay
$500,000.00
$250,000.00
$200,000.00
$160,000.00
$160,000.00
$150,000.00
$160,000.00
$130,000.00
$100,000.00
$150,000.00
$191,770.00
$153,000.00
$150,000.00
$267,000.00
$200,000.00
$400,000.00
$140,000.00
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Univ. of Kentucky Guy Morriss $170,000.00
Tennessee Phillip Fulmer $175,000.00225
Even assistant coaches are starting to earn six-figure salaries. Seven
of Arkansas' nine assistant football coaches now earn at least $100,000
annually.226 The University of Washington is preparing to aggressively
match a national trend toward increasing the compensation for assistant
football coaches. The proposed salaries for Washington's nine assistants
average $130,000.00 annually, with coordinators Keith Gilberson and
Tim Hundley topping the group at $170,000.00 a year.227 For the first
time, the assistants will be offered two-year deals instead of the tradi-
tional one-year contracts. 2'
Some contracts will contain a re-opener clause permitting the coach
to renegotiate his compensation after a designated period of time. An
example follows:
The amount of the base salary and additional compensation set
forth in Section 3.02(a)-(c)- of this Agreement will remain in ef-
fect for the first two contract years (1998-1999 and 1999-2000).
No earlier than June 1, 2000, the parties agree that they will rene-
gotiate in good faith this amount for the succeeding contract
years. It is understood that only the base salary and additional
compensation will be subject to renegotiations, and all other pro-
visions will remain in effect during the entire term of this
Agreement.
Some coaches' contracts will contain conditional compensation
clauses subject to the approval of the university's budget and appropria-
tions.229 This clause will normally indicate that payment of the compen-
sation as set forth in the contract is subject to approval of annual
operating budgets by the university's governing body and appropriations
225. Brian Dunleavy et al., Bank Shots, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 22-28, 2000, available at
http:llwww.villagevoice.comlissues/0012/jockbeatlshtml; Wire Reports, Pay Raises Expected
for Summitt, Green, available at http://www.groups.yahoo.com/group/LadyVolsbasketball/
message/466; Mike DeCourcy, UC Rewards Huggins with a Pay Raise, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
May 19, 2000, available at http:llwww.enquirer.combearcatsl2000/05119/uc uc rewards.
huggins.html; Don Stewart, Big Bucks in the Big Ten, CENRE DAILY TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001;
UK's Morriss to Earn Barely Half of Mumme's Salary, Feb. 27, 2001, available at http://www.
tsn.sportingnews.com/cfootball/articles/20010227/297908.html; Stan Crowley, Fulmer Gets
$200,000 Raise, CHATTrAOOoA TIMES, Jan. 1, 1999, available at http://www.chattimes.com/
sports/sportsnews/today
226. Scott Cain, New Hogs Assistants Check In At Top Dollar, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-
GAZnT, Apr. 27, 2001, at C4.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 589.
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of sufficient funds to pay the coach's compensation. 230 An example of
such a clause is as follows:
The payment of all forms of compensation set forth in this agree-
ment is subject to the approval of the annual operating budget by
the university's governing body, and the sufficiency of appropria-
tions or the availability of sufficient funds within the athletic de-
partment's budget to pay such compensation. 31
6. Fringe Benefits.
The employment contract will also contain a provision for fringe ben-
efits. Normally, the coach will be entitled to the standard university
fringe benefits appropriate to the coach's university employment classifi-
cation which may include group life insurance, health insurance, vaca-
tion with pay, TIAA/CREF, etc. 23 2
In addition, there will be a provision covering reimbursement for ex-
penses including all travel and out-of-pocket expenses reasonably in-
curred for the purposes of and in connection with the performance of the
coach's duties. Reimbursement of expenses are normally made pursuant
to and in accordance with standard procedures of the university upon
presentation of vouchers or other statements itemizing such expenses in
reasonable detail.233 As additional compensation, the university may
provide the coach with the use of an automobile during the term of the
employment contract. Sometimes cars are provided through tradeout
sponsorship deals (tickets and advertising). Luxury cars are now stan-
dard perks for coaches and athletic directors in big time programs.
Dealers provide the cars in return for tickets and advertising.
Coaches at some schools get not one luxury car, but two. If the uni-
versity provides a coach with an automobile, there should be a periodic
auto replacement provision and a provision for the use of a university
provided gasoline credit card.234 Finally, the university should provide
comprehensive liability insurance and be responsible for all costs of
maintenance and repair with respect to the subject automobile. 35
Other forms of fringe benefits may be offered to the coach depend-
ing upon his contractual leverage. They may include tuition waivers for
his immediate family members, season and complimentary tickets to
230. Id.
231. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 125, at 89.
232. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 590.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
[Vol. 12:127
COLLEGE COACHING CONTRACTS REVISITED
each of the university's team games including post-season games and
tournaments, club memberships to either golf, country club or health
club facilities, living accommodations and dependent travel.236 For ex-
ample, it was alleged that Jerry Tarkanian, former head men's basketball
coach at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas received as a fringe ben-
efit 234-season basketball tickets (with a face value of over $40,000) to
dispose of at his will.3 Joe B. Hall, former head men's basketball coach
at the University of Kentucky, was alleged to have received more than
322 complimentary tickets and at one point faced criminal charges for
selling those tickets for more than face value3 8
Coaches are also provided with housing benefits. Clemson provided
former head football coach Danny Ford with a home and made payment
on his $280,000.00 mortgage for him.239 Auburn head football coach Pat
Dye lives rent-free in a $500,000.00 house.24° Both head football and
men's basketball coaches at the University of Arkansas have $10,000.00
housing allowances. 241 When Jackie Sherrill signed his Texas A&M con-
tract he was promised as much as $75,000.00 toward the purchase of a
new home.242 When John Thompson considered leaving Georgetown
for a coaching position at the University of Oklahoma, a group of Ge-
orgetown alumni purchased a $300,000.00 house in the District of Co-
lumbia and donated it to the University with the provision that
Thompson be allowed to live in it for as long as he remained at
Georgetown.243
It is extremely important for both the coach and the university to
specifically list every fringe benefit provided as part of the employment
relationship to avoid future assertions by the coach of any assumed
fringe benefit that is not listed in the contractual arrangement. 2' An
example of a coach's benefit package provision follows:
Employee Fringe Benefits
1. General. You are entitled to the University's customary staff
employee benefits, including paid vacation, sick leave, the
staff retirement plan (TIAA/CREF), health insurance, and
236. Id
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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group life insurance, if any benefit is based in whole or in
part on compensation, such determination will be made solely
on the salary provided for in Paragraph B.1. hereof, and not
on any other items of income.
2. Tickets, Club. During such time as you are an employee of
the University, you will receive fifty (50) tickets to all Univer-
sity football games. You are also required to obtain a mem-
bership at a club to be mutually agreed upon, which club will
be within a twenty-mile radius of the Evanston campus of the
University. The University will pay the initiation fee, dues,
assessments, and all business-related expenses at such club as
long as you are an employee in good standing.
3. Automobile. University will provide, at Coach's option and
subject to the consent of the Athletic Director, either 1) an
automobile for Coach's use in the performance of his duties
(insurance, fuel and maintenance will be provided by Univer-
sity); or 2) an annual automobile allowance of $6,000.00. If
Coach elects to have University provide the automobile, the
automobile will be of the same quality as that provided to the
Athletic Director.
4. Dependent travel. Travel will be provided for Coach's spouse
to all University football games played outside the
__area on the team plane, on a space available basis.
Commercial travel will not be provided unless the team trav-
els on regular commercial flights. Travel will be provided for
Coach's spouse and dependent children (as defined in Federal
tax law) to any football bowl game in which University partic-
ipates. Travel will be provided by team plane, school charter
or commercial travel, as determined by University. One hotel
room will be provided for the family and meal allowances for
each family member, in amounts as determined by the Ath-
letic Director.
5. Moving and Housing Expenses. (a) The University will pay
directly or reimburse you for your moving expenses, provided
such expenses are arranged through the University and the
University's approved moving company is used. The Univer-
sity will provide, or reimburse expenses for, temporary hous-
ing in the area for you and your family as necessary to aid in
relocation.
(b) The University will make you a forgivable, interest-free
housing loan of $250,000.00. The full loan amount will be
paid to you upon your furnishing the Director of Athletics
with a signed contract for the purpose of a primary resi-
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dence in Missouri for you and your family. 'Your obligation
to repay the loan principal will be forgiven in increments as
follows:
(1) if you voluntarily terminate your employment or are ter-
minated for cause before January 31, 2000, you will re-
pay the University the full loan amount of $25,000;
(2) if you voluntarily terminate your employment or are ter-
minated for cause on or after January 31, 2000 but
before January 31, 2001, you will repay the University
$20,000 of the loan amount;
(3) if you voluntarily terminate your employment or are ter-
minated for cause on or after January 31, 2001 but
before January 31, 2002, you will repay the University
$15,000 of the loan amount;
(4) if you voluntarily terminate your employment or are ter-
minated for cause on or after January 31, 2002 but
before January 31, 2003, you will repay the University
$10,000 of the loan amount;
(5) if you voluntarily terminate your employment or are ter-
minated for cause on or after January 31, 2003 but
before January 31, 2004, you will repay the University
$5,000 of the loan amount;
(6) if you voluntarily terminate your employment or are ter-
minated for cause on or after January 31, 2004, you will
not repay the University any part of the loan amount.
Any repayment due hereunder will be paid in full within
thirty (30) days of the date on which you voluntarily ter-
minate your employment or are terminated for cause.
In the event you are terminated without cause, the en-
tire loan amount of $25,000 (or any remaining portion
thereof) will be forgiven.
6. Additional Insurance. Upon receipt 6f an invoice or other ap-
propriate documentation, the University will pay you annu-
ally an amount equal to the yearly premium for a one million
dollar ($1,000,000) term life insurance policy for each of the
years you are the Head Football Coach. This annual payment
will be in addition to the life insurance ordinarily made avail-
able to staff of the University.
7. Tuition Remission. As an employee of University, you are en-
titled to those benefits available to all staff members under
the University's qualified tuition reduction plan. In addition
to the benefits under that plan, the University agrees to pro-
vide you with such necessary additional benefits as will result
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in the following: a) the tuition, for your daughter, Joan, while
she is attending University full time in an undergraduate de-
gree program during the Contract Term, shall be remitted in
full by the University for a total of not more than 2-1/2 aca-
demic years (or until she completes an undergraduate educa-
tion, if sooner), provided, however, that the University will
have no obligation to pay tuition in excess of the tuition
charged for a full-time student at Miami University during the
relevant time period and provided further that the University
will have no obligation to pay tuition for Joan to the extent
that she receives tuition remission through Miami University;
and (b) your son, John, is admitted to an undergraduate de-
gree program at any college or university during the Contract
Term, his tuition shall be paid for or paid in full by University
for a total of not more than four (4) academic years, pro-
vided, however, that the University will have no obligation to
pay tuition in excess of the tuition charged for a full-time stu-
dent at University during the relevant time period. The tui-
tion benefits provided for in this paragraph are not available
for enrollment in summer academic terms.
University will have no obligations under this paragraph un-
less you are an employee of the University during the period of
John's and/or John's enrollment in their respective undergraduate
degree programs. Should your employment cease voluntarily in
the middle of one of Joan's or John's academic terms, you will
repay the University on a pro rata basis for any amounts already
paid by University for that or any succeeding term. You will also
repay the University in the event University has inadvertently
overpaid under this paragraph any amounts due for prior terms.
7. Moving-Relocation Expense Allowance.
The coach is bound to incur expenses in his move from his old em-
ployment to his new coaching position. The coach's representative
should negotiate for a moving-relocation expense allowance. The allow-
ance should cover some, if not all, of the following moving-related ex-
penses: house-hunting expenses, travel expenses, expenses for moving
household goods and personal effects including packing, storage and in-
surance.245 The allowance should also cover temporary lodging, ex-
traordinary costs incurred to dispose of former residence, such as a
mortgage prepayment penalty, costs incurred in the buy-out of an ex-
245. Id. at 591.
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isting leasehold obligation, and costs such as attorney fees, commissions
or other expenses incurred in the purchase of the new residence, etc. 246
The contract clause should either cap out the total amount of dollars that
the university is willing to expend on such allowance or specifically list
without limit those expenses for which the moving-relocation expense
allowance applies.247
8. Bonuses.
Bonus clauses in employment contracts are supplemental compensa-
tion as an incentive based upon a coach's performance.248 These incen-
tives may come in the form of a predetermined set amount or in the
form of percentages of either the coach's base salary or of the net reve-
nues received by the university as a result of post-season play. What
follows is a listing of bonus types:
1. Signing bonus (execution of original employment contract or
renewal contract)
2. Participation in post-season tournaments or Bowl games
3. Regular season win/loss record
4. Regular season or conference championship
5. End of year conference championship tournament
6. Home game attendance
7. Graduation rates or grade attainment levels
8. Length of service based on years of employment (annuity)
9. Administrative performance bonus249
Steve Spurrier, University of Florida football coach, received a
$275,000.00 signing bonus when he agreed to a new contract several
years ago- 50 Performance bonuses are often calculated to be a pre-de-
termined amount if the condition generating the bonus is achieved as a
percentage of the coach's income. Several examples follow:
Bonus. If the football team is selected to participate in a post-
season bowl game, you will receive as additional compensation a
bonus based on a percentage of your salary as set forth in Exhibit
B. The bonus is earned upon qualification or selection and is pay-
able, less any deductions required by law, within thirty (30) days
after the determining selection.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id
249. Id.
250. Mark Long, UF Inks Spurrier For Six Years, $12 Million, UNiv. WIRE, Sept. 9, 1997.
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Bowl Bonus Amounts. (Exhibit B)
a. 7.5% if the football team (that is, no bonus will be due if you
are coaching, e.g. in a collegiate all-star bowl) appears in any
bowl game that has a payout of less than $1,000,000.00;
b. 10% if the football team appears in a bowl game that has a
payout of $1,000,000.00 or more;
c. 12% if the football team appears in a Bowl Championship
Series (BCS) bowl or is the Big Ten conference champion or
co-champion.
The above bonus amounts are not cumulative; for example, if the
football team plays in a BCS bowl and that bowl has a net payout
to the University of $1,000,000.00 or more, your bonus will be
12%, not 22% (12" + 10%). Further, bonus amounts will be cal-
culated solely on the salary you receive in accordance with Para-
graph B.1 and not on any other items of income.
Exceptional Performance Bonuses. In addition to the annual sal-
ary to be paid to Coach as provided in this Contract, the Univer-
sity will pay to Coach an exceptional performance bonus for each
season in which the University's Men's Basketball Team under his
direction as Head Basketball Coach is invited to and does partici-
pate in the NCAA post-season championship tournament. Such
exceptional performance bonus shall be paid to Coach within
forty-five (45) days after completion of such tournament and shall
be calculated upon the final standing or position of the team in
the tournament as follows:
a. One-twelfth of then current annual salary as provided in Sec-
tion 2 of this Contract in the event the team is invited to par-
ticipate in the NCAA post-season championship tournament;
or
b. One-sixth of then current annual salary as provided in Sec-
tion 2 of this Contract in the event the team achieves a posi-
tion as one of the four teams in the semi-final round of the
NCAA post-season championship tournament (the so-called
"Final Four"); or
c. $50,000 in the event the team wins a national championship.
Administrative Performance Bonus. Each fiscal year during the
term of this Agreement, and provided Coach is a full-time em-
ployee of the University on the final day of such fiscal year,
Coach shall be entitled to a bonus (not to exceed ten percent
(10%) of Coach's Base Salary for such fiscal year) equal to the
product of (i) .10, and (ii) the positive difference between (a) the
annual budget for the men's intercollegiate basketball during such
fiscal year, and (b) the expenditures and expenses for such pro-
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gram during the fiscal year. The parties acknowledge and agree
that the Director in his sole discretion shall determine the amount
of and items constituting such budget, and that the increase in the
amount of such budget shall relate to the rate of inflation, as mea-
sured by the Consumer Price Index for the preceding year. The
bonus shall be paid on or before September 15, of the next fiscal
year.
University Athletics Academic Excellence Incentive Program
1. Coach will receive a bonus, calculated and payable on Au-
gust 31 of each year in which a bonus under this section is
due and payable, for promoting academic excellence in the
football program as follows:
1.1 For the graduation of 100% of signed recruits within five
years, a bonus of 10% of his annual base salary.
1.2 For the graduation of 90% or more and less than 100% of
signed recruits within five years, a bonus of 5% of his annual
base salary.
2. Bonuses will be calculated and payable beginning in the fifth
year of Coach's employment as head football coach, based
upon the class entering University in fall, 2001, and each
year thereafter based upon succeeding classes. Transfer stu-
dents will be considered with the class they have joined.
3. Coach must be then employed as head football coach at
each time of calculation and payment for this program to be
applicable and for the bonus to become due and payable.
4.2 Bonuses
In any year of this contract, University will pay to Coach bonuses,
as set out in Appendix 3, for the following accomplishments:
4.2.1 University finishes first or ties for first in the ACC regular
season football standings
4.2.2 University wins the post season Bowl Championship Series
National Championship Bowl Game
4.2.3 University participates in the post season Bowl Champion-
ship Series National Championship Bowl Game
4.2.4 University participates in a post season Bowl Champion-
ship Series Non-Championship Bowl Game (top four
bowls: Orange, Sugar, Rose, and Fiesta)
4.2.5 University participates in a post season Non-Bowl Cham-
pionship Series Bowl Game
4.2.6 University participates in a pre-season Bowl Game
4.2.7 For success in the University Athletics Academic Excellent
Incentive Program, as set forth in Appendix 2.
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4.2.8 Any other condition deemed sufficient by University -a
bonus to be determined.
More than one bonus may be earned in each contract year (ex-
cept that Coach shall not be paid a bonus under both 4.2.2 and
4.2.3 above). Unless otherwise directed by the Athletic Director,
the competitive bonuses described in 4.2.1 through 4.2.6 will be
paid on the January 31, following the season in which the bonus
was earned. Academic incentive bonuses described in 4.2.7 will
be paid on August 31, of each year in which such a bonus is due
and payable, and subject to the terms as set forth in Appendix 2.
The popular coach will most certainly be in demand for personal ap-
pearances and speaking engagements by local and national alumni and
booster groups. The coach and university will normally negotiate a spe-
cific number of appearances to be made by the coach as part of his salary
compensation package.2 5 1 Appearances over and above the base mini-
mum should result in the coach being compensated in the form of addi-
tional compensation or bonus. 2 A sample clause is as follows:
As part of the compensation as herein stated, coach shall be re-
quired to participate in at least __ alumni-booster personal ap-
pearances or speaking engagements. The university shall be
responsible for incurring all expenses with respect to the making
of such speeches or appearances. In the event that in any con-
tract year the coach is required to make in excess of the minimum
amount of personal appearances or speaking engagements as re-
quired herein, coach shall receive as additional compensation
$_ per speaking engagement or pubic appearance. This par-
agraph shall not in any way prohibit the coach from separately
entering into agreements or making public appearances on his
own behalf and not for the university wherein the coach is com-
pensated from a third party other than the university, all as pro-
vided by the outside employment provisions of this contract.253
A sample of some reported bonuses for current and former coaches in-
cludes the following:25
4
251. GREEN3ERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 592.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL
Neil McCarthy New Mexico State
Angela Beck Nebraska
Rick Neuheisel Colorado
John Calipari
Bob Huggins
Umass
Cincinnati
Joe Harrington Colorado
Lon Kruger Univ. of Florida
Bill Frieder Arizona State
Dan Monson
Glen Mason
Univ. of Minnesota
Univ. of Minnesota
Nick Saban LSU
BONUS
$50,000.00 if team has GPA over 2.0
One month salary for NCAA tournament
appearance. Two months salary for Final Four
appearances. $50,000.00 for national title.
$1,600 for every 500-person increase in
attendance
$10,917 for bowl appearance; $21,833 for non-
alliance New Year's Day bowl appearance;
$32,750 for New Year's Day bowl alliance;
$65,000.00 for alliance top ten finish; $76,417
for alliance national title
35% of NCAA tournament profits, $50,000.00
if team wins Atlantic-10 regular season title.
Percentage of tickets sales
$10,000.00 if Bearcats reach the first round of
NCAA tournament; an additional $20,000.00
for reaching the 2nd round, $25,000.00 for the
Sweet Sixteen, $30,000.00 for the Elite Eight,
$40,000.00 more for a Final Four appearance,
$50,000.00 for championship game appearance,
and another $75,000.00 for a tournament win
$10,000.00 for NIT appearance; $20,000.00 for
Big XII Title and NCAA appearance,
$25,000.00 for making the 2nd round,
$30,000.00 for Sweet Sixteen, $35,000.00 for
Elite Eight, $40,000.00 for Final Four,
$50,000.00 for NCAA championship
$1,000.00 if 40% of scholarship players
graduate; $2,000.00 if 50 % of scholarship
players graduate; an extra month's salary in
any year that 60% of scholarship players earn
degree
$14,000.00 for winning NCAA tournament;
$10,000.00 for improving academic performance
of players; $30,000.00 if season home
attendance exceeds 11,000.00
$25,000.00 if squad compiles a 2.8 GPA
$75,000.00 if more than 75% of players
graduate; and $25,000.00 for graduation rate of
60-75%.
$50,000.00 bonus for winning a national
championship; $30,000.00 for attending the
Southeastern Conference game; $50,000.00 for
taking LSU to a bowl championship series
game (Sugar, Orange, Fiesta or Rose Bowl);
$25,000.00 for any other bowl appearance;
$25,000.00 merit increase if LSU's graduate
rate places it among the top 6 SEC schools and
an additional $25,000.00 if LSU is among the
top two
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Jim O'Brien Ohio State 33.3% of his base salary for a national title;
20% for a Big Ten tourney title, 20% for an
NCAA berth, 10% for a Big Ten title; 10% for
a Sweet 16 appearance; 10% for making the
Final Court, and 10% for winning NCAA
coach of the year honors
9. Additional Retirement Benefits and Retention or Loyal Bonuses.
Retirement benefits separate from the university's fringe benefits in
the form of an annuity are popular today in college coaching. Such ben-
efits are used as additional incentives to the coach, not only in recogni-
tion of his accomplishments, but also in hope of retaining the coach for
the full term of his contract.a55 There are two methods for providing
additional retirement benefits.256
Under the first method, the university can purchase an annuity,
which the coach owns. As the university pays premiums, the coach in-
cludes those premiums in income.257 The advantage for the coach is that
the earnings are tax deferred until they are withdrawn 8.2 5 The advantage
of annuities are that if the interest or earnings are allowed to compound
on a tax-deferred basis, there can be a substantial increase in the net
worth of the annuity in a very short period of time.259 Annuities are
normally purchased through insurance companies and take on such form
as straight or life annuity, joint and survivorship annuity, refund annuity,
deferred annuity and variable annuity to name a few.260 It is suggested
that the coach seek assistance of not only a financial advisor, but also a
life insurance agent when attempting to structure an annuity that fits his
economic and retirement situation.
Under the second method, the university agrees to pay a retirement
benefit as deferred compensation.261 The university can use a commer-
cial annuity to accumulate funds to pay the deferred compensation bene-
fits, but the university must own the annuity and the retirement
benefits.2 62
There are special income tax considerations that must be kept in
mind when negotiating deferred compensation for university coaches.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 594.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 595.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes limitations on the
amount that an employee of a tax-exempt organization can defer under
a nonqualified deferred compensation plan.263 As a general rule, an em-
ployee of a tax-exempt organization, such as a university, will be taxed
on any amount he defers if the "amount of compensation deferred" ex-
ceeds $7500.0.260 While the rule is defined in terms of the amount that
the employee actually defers, the Internal Revenue Service has taken
the position that the limitations of section 457 also apply to nonqualified
retirement plans that do not involve elective deferrals by the em-
ployee.265 Consequently, additional retirement benefits provided as an
incentive would be includible in the coach's income currently if the sec-
tion 457 limit is exceeded.266
Presumably, in cases where the coach does not actually defer current
compensation but rather the university agrees to pay an additional re-
tirement benefit, the "amount of compensation deferred" would be de-
termined by calculating the present value today of the benefit that is
promised in the future.267 In those situations where the university agrees
to set aside a specified amount for the benefit of the coach, the amount
set aside would be the "amount of compensation deferred. 2 68
The limits imposed by section 457 can be exceeded without targeting
current taxation on the deferred amount if there is a substantial risk of
forfeiture on the right to receive the benefits.269 Section 457 defines sub-
stantial risk of forfeiture as a condition requiring the future performance
of substantial services by an individual.270 In a case where the university
wants to provide a substantial nonqualified retirement benefit, taxation
of the promised benefit can be postponed until retirement.271 However,
the right of the coach to receive the benefit must be conditioned on his
continuing to perform services for the university until the time when
benefits are due.272
Since it is not likely that the coach will provide substantial services
after retirement, the risk of forfeiture will lapse and the coach will be
taxed on the present value of the future benefits or the value of the ac-
263. Id.
264. Id
265. INTERNAL REvENUE NOTICE 87.13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, QSA 26 (1991).
266. Id
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. I.R.C. § 457 (f) (1991).
270. I.R.C. § 457(h)(3)(b).
271. Id.
272. Id.
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count set aside for his benefit at the time he retires.2 73 Because of the
acceleration of the income tax, it is necessary to structure the payments
so that there is a balloon payment at retirement that will permit the
coach to pay the tax and still receive the retirement income desired.274
As subsequent payments are made, a portion of the payment will be tax-
free to the coach as representing the amount on which he already paid
tax.
275
Former Auburn University head football coach Pat Dye's financial
package was augmented by a retirement plan, including an annuity of $1
million at age 65.276 Nolan Richardson, whose Arkansas basketball team
made the 1990 Final Four, obtained a $1 million annuity to make certain
of his stay at Arkansas.277 Xavier University is reported to have given
former basketball coach Pete Gillen an annuity or insurance policy
worth $1 million after he rejected overtures to fill the coaching vacancy
at Virginia. 278 Denny Crum, the former head men's basketball coach at
the University of Louisville, obtained a lump-sum payment of $1 million
in 1993 when he fulfilled the obligations of his long-term contract with
the school.279 If Rick Pitino stays for the entire term of his new contract
at the University of Louisville, he will receive a $5 million loyalty
bonus.28 o
Several examples of funded-deferred compensation plans condi-
tioned on the coach stay for the term follow:
During each month following (i) the month in which this
Agreement is executed (ii) through the last month in which
Coach shall act as head football coach of the University's men's
varsity intercollegiate football team (including any extension(s) of
this Agreement unless the parties shall otherwise agree), the Uni-
versity, in addition to the salary payable to Coach, shall afford
Coach with an additional amount at a rate of $_ for the first
such month and $_ per month for each subsequent month.
However, such additional monthly amounts shall be deferred and
shall not become payable until the last day of the term of this
Agreement or any subsequent agreement extending the term of
Coach's employment as head football coach of the University's
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. I.R.C. § 457(f)(1)(B) (1991).
276. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC. 164-165 (1990).
277. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 596.
278. Id.
279. Jerry Wizig, Conference USA Notes, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 1996, at 5.
280. Pitino's Contract Includes $5 Million Loyalty Bonus, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 29, 2001.
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men's varsity intercollegiate football team. Any such deferred
amounts accrued through the date when they become payable
shall be forfeited by Coach in their entirety if Coach shall not be
employed by the University as head football coach of its men's
varsity intercollegiate football team on the date such amounts are
payable. Forfeiture shall not occur, however, if the reason for
Coach's failure to be such head football coach on a date the de-
ferred compensation becomes payable was Coach's death, termi-
nation for disability, or involuntary termination without cause as
defined in this Agreement. In the event of Coach's death prior to
a date on which such deferred amounts would otherwise have be-
come payable, the deferred amounts accrued prior to Coach's
death shall become payable on the date of Coach's death. Should
Coach fail to designate a beneficiary in accordance with the pre-
ceding sentence or should the beneficiary not be living at Coach's
death, all such amounts shall be payable to Coach's estate. Coach
shall designate to the University in writing a beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries to receive such payment in the event of his death. In the
event of Coach's termination for disability prior to a date on
which such deferred amounts would otherwise have become pay-
able, the deferred amounts accrued prior to Coach's termination
without cause shall be paid to Coach upon his termination with-
out cause. The deferred amounts shall not accrue any interest
during the period of deferral; shall not be taken into account for
purposes of computing salary increases under this Agreement or
for purposes of the University's contribution to - or any
other pension or employee benefit plan on behalf of Coach; shall
be paid to Coach without interest within 30 days after the date on
which they become payable; and shall be subject on the date they
become payable to withholding of taxes and all payroll taxes in
accordance with applicable law on the date the deferred compen-
sation becomes payable. All deferred compensation payable to
Coach by the University shall be a general unsecured obligation
of the University to him. The University shall not be required to
set aside or accumulate any funds to pay such obligations, nor
shall Coach have any claim against any funds which the Univer-
sity, as a matter of sound fiscal planning determine by it, may
elect to set aside or accumulate to fund such obligation when it
becomes payable. If the University elects to set aside or accumu-
late funds to satisfy its obligation, such election, and any funds set
aside or accumulated, shall not create, or be construed to create, a
trust of any kind or a fiduciary relationship between the Univer-
sity and Coach. Any funds set aside or accumulated shall remain,
at all times, part of the University's general assets. Coach's rights
to deferred amounts under this Agreement shall not be senior to
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claims of the University's general creditors, nor may such rights
or the deferred amounts to be assigned, encumbered, pledged, or
otherwise transferred by Coach. In the event that the Internal
Revenue Service or the - State Department of Revenue de-
termines that any deferred amounts under this Agreement are in-
cludible in Coach's income for purposes of income taxation
notwithstanding the fact that Coach has not received such de-
ferred amounts, the University shall pay to Coach an amount
equal to the additional federal and state income taxes (including
any penalties and interest) which Coach must pay as a result of
the inclusion of such amounts in his income. The first such pay-
ment shall be made within 30 days of the date it shall be deter-
mined that any deferred amounts are includible in Coach's
income for purposes of income taxation, and any subsequent such
payment(s) shall be made on or before April 15th following any
subsequent years in which that determination shall require that
deferred amounts be included in Coach's income for purposes of
income taxation. The University shall have no right to recover
any such amount(s) paid to Coach if Coach ultimately does not
receive the deferred amounts that were included in his income for
income tax purposes. However, if Coach shall ultimately receive
any deferred amounts, the University may deduct from the de-
ferred amounts payable an amount equal to any amount(s), with-
out interest, paid to Coach pursuant to the preceding two
sentences.281
Deferred Compensation. University will establish and maintain
on its books a deferred compensation bookkeeping reserve ac-
count ("Deferred Compensation Account") on your behalf. The
Deferred Compensation Account will be credited in the amount
of $500,000.00 effective December 1, 2000 and subsequently ad-
justed for the rate of return on the University's Balanced Growth
Fund ("Pool 750") as if the $500,000.00 had been placed in Pool
750 on December 1, 2000. The University will credit the De-
ferred Compensation Account with an additional $100,000.00 on
December 1, of each succeeding year through and including De-
cember 1, 2005 (the "Vesting Date"). These additional amounts
will likewise be adjusted for the Pool 750 rate of return. The De-
ferred Compensation Account will remain an asset of the Univer-
sity and subject to University creditors, and you will not have a
secured interest in such account or be able to assign or alienate
such account until you vest.
281. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 596 n.354.
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Subject to the conditions contained in this agreement, on the
Vesting Date you will be entitled to all of the contributions
credited to the Deferred Compensation Account, plus adjust-
ments thereon; provided, however, that you will have no vested
right to any part of such compensation unless you are still an em-
ployee of the University as of the close of business on the Vesting
Date. This amount, less any deductions required by law, will be
payable to you by the University within thirty (30) days of the
Vesting Date. If your employment terminates for any reason
prior to the close of business on the Vesting Date, you will not
become entitled to any deferred compensation amount, except as
otherwise provided for under Paragraph F.2. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, in the event you die or become permanently dis-
abled such that you are unable to perform the duties of Head
Football Coach (as determined by the University or the Univer-
sity's insurance carrier) while you are still so employed and prior
to the Vesting Date, you or your estate will be entitled to the
amount credited to the Deferred Compensation Account as of
the date of your permanent disability or death.
Barry Alvarez, head football coach for the University of Wisconsin,
signed an amendment to his contract on April 30, 1994, which reportedly
guaranteed him a $1 million bonus if he stayed at the University for the
next fifteen years.282 The deal vested Alvarez with three separate bo-
nuses based on five-year increments. He was free to leave the Univer-
sity at any time under the terms of his contract but he would forfeit a
bonus payment if he should leave during one of the five-year periods.
The Mendota Gridiron Club, the booster arm of the football program,
raised the money from private sources and UW alumni. The funds will
remain in a UW Foundation account and be distributed by the athletic
department in accordance with NCAA rules. Alvarez could only lose
the bonus if he left early, or if he ran afoul of NCAA rules, criminal
laws, or if UW fired him for cause. The University could have liability
for the payments to Alvarez if it were to fire him without cause prior to
the completion of a five-year increment.
What follows are the recitals and the establishment of a Trust under a
deferred compensation agreement between the Mendota Gridiron Club,
Inc. and the University of Wisconsin Foundation for Barry Alvarez.
TRUST UNDER DEFERRED COMPENSATION
AGREEMENT:
282. Id. at 600.
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MENDOTA GRIDIRON CLUB & UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN FOUNDATION
RECITALS
WHEREAS, MGC has adopted a nonqualified deferred
compensation plan In a Deferred Compensation Agreement
effective April 30, 1994 (hereafter, "Deferred Compensation
Agreement"), between itself and Barry Alvarez (hereafter,
"Alvarez"); and
WHEREAS, MGC has incurred or expects to incur liability
under the terms of such Deferred Compensation Agreement with
respect to Alvarez, the sole individual participating in such
Deferred Compensation Agreement; and
WHEREAS, MGC wishes to establish a trust (hereafter,
"Trust") and to contribute to the Trust assets that shall be held
therein, subject to the claims of MGC's creditors until paid to
Alvarez and his beneficiaries in such manner and at such times as
directed by MGC: and
WHEREAS, it is the intention of MGC that this Trust shall
constitute an unfounded arrangement and shall not affect the
status of the Deferred Compensation Agreement as an
unfounded plan maintained for the purpose of providing deferred
compensation for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees for purposes of Title I of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; and
WHEREAS, it is the intention of MGC to make contributions
to the Trust to provide itself with a source of funds to assist it in
meeting its liabilities under the Deferred Compensation
Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties do hereby establish the
Trust and agree that the Trust shall be comprised, held, and
disposed of as follows:
ARTICLE 1:
ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUST
1.1 The sums deposited by MGC with Trustee shall constitute the
principal of the Trust to be held, administered, and disposed of by
Trustee as provided in this Trust Agreement.
1.2 The Trust hereby established shall be revocable by MGC.
1.3 Upon MGC's transfer of funds to Trustee, Trustee shall
establish as many Football Fund accounts as MGC shall direct.
For purposes of this Trust Agreement, these Football Fund
accounts shall be collectively referred to as "the Trust."
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1.4 MGC intends the Trust to be a grantor trust, of which MGC is
the grantor, within the meaning of subpart E, Part I, subchapter J,
chapter 1, subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, and shall be construed accordingly.
1.5 The principal of the Trust, and any earnings thereon shall
beheld separate and apart from other funds of MGC and shall be
used exclusively for the uses and purposes of Alvarez and MGC's
general creditors as herein set forth; provided, however, that
Trustee shall rely exclusively upon written directions from MGC
in accordance with this Trust Agreement as to the disposition of
any Trust funds. Alvarez and his beneficiaries shall have no
preferred claim on, nor any beneficial ownership interest in, any
assets of the Trust. Any rights created under the Deferred
Compensation Agreement and this Trust Agreement shall be
mere unsecured contractual rights of Alvarez and his
beneficiaries against MGC. Any assets held by the Trust will be
subject to the claims of MGC's general creditors under federal
and state law in the event of Insolvency, as defined in Section 3.1.
herein.
1.6 MGC, in its sole discretion, may at any time, or from time to
time, make additional deposits of cash or other property in trust
with Trustee to augment the principal to be held, administered,
and disposed of by Trustee as provided in this Trust Agreement.
Neither Trustee, nor Alvarez, nor any beneficiary of Alvarez shall
have any right to compel such additional deposits.
10. Outside or Supplemental Income Sources.
Contrary to popular belief, a successful coach's life-style is not con-
ducive to long vacations, lazy afternoons during the off-season and three
hours of fun and excitement on game day during the season.- 3 The ma-
jority of successful coaches are either on the road recruiting, in the film
room strategizing, or performing the multitude of duties concomitant to
their job. Equally misconceived is the notion that all college coaches
earn top salaries. Again, the majority earns only modest incomes.2s4
For this reason, there are clauses within the framework of the con-
tract that provide coaches with the opportunity to supplement their in-
come through outside sources. Outside income significantly affects the
economics of high visibility college sports. Coaches of successful foot-
ball and basketball programs often make more money from outside in-
283. Id. at 601.
284. Id.
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come than they do from their base salaries and value of fringe benefits,
which may be restricted either by law or budgetary limitations.8 5
NCAA Bylaw 11.2.2 requires that contractual agreements, including
letters of appointment between full-time and part-time coaches in insti-
tutions, shall include the stipulation that the coach is required to annu-
ally obtain prior written approval from the chief executive officer to
receive all athletically-related income and benefits from sources outside
the institution.28 6 The coach's request for approval shall be in writing
and shall include the amount and the source of income.28 7 Income
sources outside the university include, but are not limited to, income
from annuities, sports camps, housing benefits (including preferential
housing arrangements), country club memberships, complimentary
ticket sales, television and radio programs and endorsement or consulta-
tion contracts with athletic shoes, apparel or equipment manufacturers.
The purpose of this requirement is to monitor the sources of a
coach's outside income and to increase and maintain university control
over intercollegiate athletic programs. The rule also was intended to
have university presidents informed of possible conflicts of interest and
commercial influences on coaches.
Generally, the university will require that the coach follow certain
requisite conditions prior to engaging in any outside business or en-
trepreneurial endeavor.288 First and foremost, the university will require
that its interest and the obligations owed to it by the coach remain pri-
mary. This is based on the fiduciary relationship between the university
and the coach and the duty of loyalty owed by each to the other.28 9 This
covenant is an attempt to avoid inferior performance in the coach's du-
ties resulting from conflicts of interest and compromises.2 9°
Second, the coach is subject to all NCAA rules regulating the coach's
sources of income. In this way, the coach's independent judgment can-
not be persuaded by outside interest groups.
Third, the university will normally retain the right of final approval
before the coach is allowed to enter into such agreements.29 a However,
the university's right of approval may not be used to unreasonably deny
the coach's justifiable request or income expectancies.
285. Id.
286. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 116, at 57.
287. Id.
288. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra 1, note 601.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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The coach may or may not retain all of the proceeds that result from
outside sources. The issue of whether the income belongs to the univer-
sity or the coach should be specifically designated in the contract. Pre-
sumably, if the coach acts independently of the university, he will retain
the proceeds from such outside sources. If, on the other hand, the uni-
versity supplies the means or personnel to assist the coach, it may re-
quire acertain percentage of the proceeds or a predetermined fee. The
university will also want a statement that such outside employment is
independent of the university's employment, and the university will have
no responsibility or liability for any claims arising from the performance
of this outside employment.
Finally, the contract, as well as state law, may require the coach to
report annually in writing to the President of the University through the
Athletic Director, on or before a date certain of each year, all athleti-
cally-related income from sources outside the University. Such report-
ing includes, but is not limited to, income from annuities, sports camps,
housing benefits, complimentary ticket sales, or television and radio pro-
grams. Endorsement or consultation contracts with athletic shoe, ap-
parel, or equipment manufacturers or sellers and the University will also
require reasonable access to all records of coach necessary to verify such
report.
What follows is a sample university reporting letter:
Dear Coach:
Enclosed is your reappointment letter agreement for 1992-93.
Although its terms are generally self-explanatory and vary little
from your 1990-91 agreement, there are some items that I have
been specifically asked to call to your attention by the Chancellor
and University counsel:
OUTSIDE INCOME REPORTS. Paragraph 10 of your
agreement requires you to report your athletically related outside
income annually, both for compliance with NCAA Bylaw 11.2.2
and for compliance with the State's ethics law applicable to em-
ployees of the University found in Chapter 8 of the Administra-
tive Code. There are two separate forms for this reporting. The
report required to meet the NCAA requirement is one of the
forms provided to you with the Division's "Policy on Outside Ac-
tivities and Interests and Employment Perquisites." Once com-
pleted, this report must be submitted to me and forwarded to the
Chancellor. The other form is sent to all employees by the Uni-
versity and must be submitted to me for forwarding to the Vice
Chancellor's office by April 30 each year.
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Both forms require that all sources of outside income be iden-
tified whether the amount equals or exceeds $5,000.00 or not. The
Division form requires that the amount be listed; the University
form only asks that you check if the amount is in excess of
$5,000.00 from a single source. Outside income that is required to
be reported on the Division "Form A" is income from a non-Uni-
versity source that is paid in exchange for your performance of a
service for the payer. This includes not only situations where you
might be considered an employee of the non-University source of
the income, but also payments for services as an independent con-
tractor or from an ownership interest in the business. Some typi-
cal sources of outside income are television and radio programs
(for which the agreement is between the individual, rather than
the University, and the station), endorsements and advertise-
ments for athletic apparel, equipment companies or other busi-
nesses, and speaking fees. Clinics and sports camps owned and
operated by a coach rather than the institution are also potential
sources. This income is distinguished and reported differently
from employment perquisites paid for by non-University sources
such as club members or for use of an automobile. These will be
discussed in more detail later.
Please also note that contracts and arrangements that you may
have individually with outside sources to compensate you for ser-
vices you perform for the outside entity may not obligate the Uni-
versity in any way. There are two general reasons for this: (1) You
do not have contracting authority on behalf of the University, and
(2) this may constitute the use of one's University position for
personal gain, which presents an ethical problem under __ law.
USE OF THE UNIVERSITY NAME AND LOGOS. Para-
graph 10 of your agreement (and NCAA Bylaw 11.1.4) also pro-
vides that my advance consent is required in order to use the
University's name and logo, either directly or by implication, in
any commercial endorsement or other outside activity for which
you are personally compensated. Although some limited uses will
be permitted, those which might appear to be an endorsement by
the University of a particular product or service and those for
which the University might be entitled to a licensing royalty for
such use will not.
EMPLOYMENT PERQUISITES. These are goods and ser-
vices or payments provided by non-University sources as addi-
tional compensation for the performance of University duties and
not for the provision of any service to the payer. Under the Divi-
sion policy, these may be permitted, but only with advance writ-
ten consent. This is so they are approved as part of your overall
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compensation package. In the absence of such approval, their re-
ceipt may present an ethics problem under __ law. These items
are also reported annually on Division "Form B" which form may
also be used to seek approval.
CAMP INCOME. Currently, all our camps are institutionally
owned and operated and coach's services to camps are part of the
University duties for which the University compensates you. (This
would be distinguished from a camp that you might own and op-
erate as your own business using other facilities, in which case it
would be reported as outside income and/or an outside ownership
interest.) This compensation is reported on your W-2 form. It ap-
pears, however, that if you indeed do work camps that it will be
necessary to amend your agreement to provide for this. If so, we
should be able to have these amendments available within the
next 2 months.
You have recently received copies of the Division "Policy of
Outside Activities and Interests and Employment Perquisites"
and the relevant forms. Please, if you have not already done so,
complete and return Form A and Form B. The University report-
ing form will be sent at a later time for submission before April
30, 1992.
Sincerely:
The employment contract of Barry Alvarez, football coach at the
University of Wisconsin, is subject to:
1. Policy on outside athletically-related employment income and bene-
fits, university employment perquisites and benefits, use of university's
name and logos, and outside activities and interests for Division of Inter-
collegiate Athletic Personnel; and
2. Unclassified Staff Code of Ethics, Ch. UWS-8, Wisconsin Adminis-
trative Code. UWS-8 Code of Ethics requires a reporting by the unclas-
sified staff members of outside activities where the staff member earns,
for such activities $5,000 or more in a year from a single source.
What follows is a report of Alvarez's outside athletically related in-
come and benefits for the period July 1, 2000 through June 31, 2001.
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BUSINESS
Acrivrry
Alvarez Productions
Ameritech
Radio Shows 13 Local Sponsors:
- Avenue Bar
- Gordon Flesch
- Kline Cleaners
- Inn Towner Hotel
- Bachmann Pools & Spas
- Pedros Mexican
Restaurant
- Ahrens Cadillac Olds
- Midland Builders
- Capital Computer
Supply
- Cleary Building Supply
- Planning Associates, Inc.
- Mendota Gridiron Club
- M&I Bank
Radio Show Learfield Communications
Radio Show
Radio Show
Team Radio
WKLH-Milwaukee
Radio Show WLUM-Milwaukee
SECTION B(1)
TYPE OF
PERQUISITE NAME OF BUSINESS
TIME COMMITMENTSECTION A(I)
2 9 2
TV Show
TV Show
sponsor
EST. AMOUNT
12 h-hour shows (season)
1 hour
12 1h-hour shows (season)
Pre and post game show
during season. Network
daily shows during season
12 5-min. shows during
season
13 10-min. interviews at
home
13 10-min. interviews at
home
EXPLANATION/REASON EST. AMOUNT
Merchandise
Allotment
Coach of the
Year Award
Coaches
Consulting
Agreement
Advisory Board
Country Club
Mem.
Additional
Tickets
Extraordinary
Achievement
for Football
Reebok
Victor Awards
Reebok
Wilson
Departmental Special
Acct.
Mendota Gridiron Club
Departmental Special
Acct.
Staff clothing allowances
Won Coach of the Year
$3,500.00
$13,000.00
$140,000.00
$1,000.00
Head Coach Benefit
Add'l football tickets beyond
immediate family
Bowl Bonus
$5,580.00
$1,008.00
5-10-15% Salary
The Knight Foundation Report recommends that "agreements for
coaches' outside income be negotiated with institutions, not individual
292. Don Walker, Outside Income Sweetens Pot, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 16, 2001,
at 1C.
$240,000.00
$15,000.00 (1 year)
$45,500.00
$33,000.00.00
$10,000.00.00
$11,200.00
$13,000.00.00
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coaches. Outside income should be apportioned in the context of an
overriding reality: Advertisers are buying the institution's reputation no
less than the coaches'." 293
11. Shoe, Apparel, And Equipment Contracts.
Shoe contracts are generally negotiated between the coach and the
shoe company. In most cases, the company will pay the coach a certain
sum of money as a consultant and provide a supply of shoes, warm-up
togs and gym bags in exchange for the coach's team players wearing the
shoes. The benefits are readily apparent to the shoe company as high-
profile teams advertise the company's product during every game. At
almost every major collegiate program, a shoe company contracts to
have its shoes worn by the coach and team members. When considering
the hundreds of thousands of dollars television broadcasters are de-
manding for 30-second commercial slots, the consultant fee for 25 games
at 40 minutes a game is a bargain. In a typical shoe contract provision,
the coach will want the university's agreement that the coach may re-
quire the athletic team to wear the shoes during competition. In addi-
tion, the coach will also want the university to consent that he may be
permitted to wear, promote, endorse or consult with the shoe, apparel,
or equipment manufacturer concerning the design or marketing of such
shoe, apparel or equipment without such activities being in violation of
the employment agreement.294
While arrangements directly with the coach have been the norm,
some reported coach shoe and apparel deals include:
School/Company Coach Approx. Amount
Oklahoma State Eddie Sutton $151,500.00
Tennessee Jerry Green $120,000.00
UCLA Steve Lavin $195,000.00
Michigan State Tom Izzo $235,000.00
Tennessee Phillip Fulmer $250,000.00295
A sample shoe, apparel and equipment contract clause with the
coach follows:
Shoe and Apparel Contracts. Subject to the provisions of Section
5.03.a hereof, coach may retain any monies offered by shoe or
293. A CALL TO AMHON, supra note 51, at 27.
294. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 606.
295. Dunleavy et al., supra note 225; Stan Crowley, Fulmer Gets $200,000 Raise,
CHA-rrANoOGA TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1999, available at http://www.chattimes.comlsportslsportsnewsl
today/Friday/Januaryll999/CTSports.
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apparel manufacturers or sellers in exchange for an agreement
that the university men's basketball team shall wear its shoes or
apparel during competition or that coach shall wear, promote, en-
dorse or consult with the manufacturer or seller concerning the
design and/or marketing of such shoes or apparel, providing that
such agreements are in writing, do not extend beyond the term of
this Agreement, would be coterminous with coach's termination
of employment as Head Coach of the university men's basketball
team, and are subject to the approval of the university's Athletic
Director.
Shoe companies also have multi-sport contracts with the university to
outfit several sports (usually football and men's and women's basketball)
and all-school, all-sport, all-the-gear-you-can-imagine deals with mar-
quee programs.296
The University of North Carolina has a five-year, $7.1 million con-
tract with Nike for its entire athletic program.297 For the right to outfit
UCLA athletes, Adidas America, Inc. has paid the school's athletic de-
partment more than $19 million over a six-year period beginning in July
of 1999. Adidas will pay the school $11.15 million in cash and provide
about $8 million worth of shoes, uniforms and equipment, all embla-
zoned with the company's logo.298 The University of Florida has a five-
year deal worth $9 million with Nike covering football along with men
and women's basketball. Under terms of its contract with Nike, Florida
receives more than $1.2 million a year in cash, $400,000.00 worth of Nike
products, and an additional $150,000.00 in cash and products. That
makes their agreement one of the most lucrative sponsorship deals in
college sports, worth seven times the amount Florida received from Nike
in 1990.299 Texas signed a $22 million, seven-year deal with Nike in
2000.300
Not all universities permit the coach to contract directly with shoe or
apparel companies. For instance, rather than having contracts directly
with shoe companies, coaches at the University of Virginia have the ath-
letic department handle the Cavaliers' endorsement contracts by seeking
296. Amy Moritz, The Sneaker Advantage In Deals With Apparel Companies, Big 4 Can't
Walk With the Major Players, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 6, 2000, at 85.
297. Id.
298. Greg Sandoval, UCLA Gets $19-Million Adidas Deal Bruins: Six-Year Deal Will
Bring the School More than $11 Million in Cash, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 11, 1998, at C4.
299. Gilbert M. Gaul & Frank Fitzpatrick, College Sports: What Was Sacred Is Now Up
For Sale, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 2000.
300. Adam Thompson, A Groundbreaking Deal, DENVER POST, June 26, 2001, at D1.
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bids."' In fact, the Virginia's Attorney General's office issued an opin-
ion that any coach at a state university who accepted promotional money
from athletic shoe companies was violating the state conflict-of-interest
laws.30 2
Furthermore, under Big Ten rules, shoe and apparel contracts be-
tween coaches and vendors must include the university. For instance,
the University of Minnesota guarantees Dan Monson that he will make
at least $210,000.00 from shoe contracts and basketball camps. If Mon-
son falls short of that amount, the university makes up the difference. 30 3
What follows are several sample university-controlled shoe endorse-
ment provisions:
Shoes, etc. (a) You agree to be bound by the existing depart-
ment-wide endorsement/sponsorship agreement between the
University and Adidas American, Inc. ("Adidas") dated August
10, 1997. Further, you agree that upon termination of said agree-
ment, the University will have ninety (90) days from the termina-
tion date to enter into another such department-wide agreement,
either with Adidas or with any other manufacturer, seller, or
product vendor of any shoe, apparel, or equipment company, and
that you will be bound by the same; provided, however, that the
University guarantees you an annual minimum amount of
$90,000.00.00 under any such department-wide agreement. The
amount payable under this section shall be considered for in-
crease by the University if there are substantial changes in posi-
tive University revenues as a result of a new or renegotiated
department-wide endorsement agreement.
(b) In the event the University does not enter into a department-
wide agreement with 90 days following termination of the existing
agreement with Adidas, you may retain any monies offered to
you by shoe, apparel, or equipment manufacturers or sellers or
their produce vendors in exchange for an agreement that the Uni-
versity's football team will wear their shoes, apparel or equipment
or utilize their products during the competition or that you will
wear, promote, endorse, or consult with the manufacturer or
seller concerning the design and/or marketing of such shoes, ap-
parel, equipment, or products, provided that such agreements are
in writing, do not extend beyond the term of this agreement and
are coterminous with your termination of employment. You will
301. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 608.
302. IL
303. Doug Grow, Hmmm, What Does New Coach's Contract Tell Us?, STAR TRIB. (Min-
neapolis, MN), Aug. 1, 1999, at 2B.
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furnish the Director of Athletics with written copies of any pro-
posed agreements and will obtain the Director's approval prior to
entering into any such agreements as are contemplated in this
paragraph. The approval of the Director of Athletics will not be
unreasonably withheld. Further, in the event any such agreement
you enter into under this subparagraph (b) provides you with less
than $90,000.00.00 annually, the University will pay you such ad-
ditional amounts as are necessary to bring your endorsement/
sponsorship compensation to the level of $90,000.00.00 per year.
(c) In the event the University does not enter into a department-
wide agreement within 90 days following termination of the ex-
isting agreement with Adidas and in the further event you do not
enter into any agreement of your own pursuant to the preceding
subparagraph (b), the University will pay you $90,000.00.00 annu-
ally under this provision. Should you subsequently enter into
(an) approved endorsement/sponsorship agreement(s), the Uni-
versity's obligation under this subparagraph (c) will be reduced
by the amount of compensation you receive from such
agreement(s).
4.5 Compensation for Equipment Endorsement Contracts.
As full compensation for participation in the program of Equip-
ment Endorsement contracts, as provided in section 5.5, Univer-
sity will pay to Coach the sum of $155,000.00 per year, payable in
equal monthly installments. The parties acknowledge and agree
that the compensation for such services is deemed to accrue over
the annual term; except as otherwise provided in section 4.10.2, in
the event of termination of this contract other than on its termi-
nation date, Coach shall be entitled to payment only of the ac-
crued amount due on the date of termination.
5.5 Equipment Endorsement Contracts,
5.5.1 University provides a program for its Department of Ath-
letics under which it enters into contracts for the endorse-
ment of equipment and products by its coaches.
University will enter such contracts on behalf of its athlet-
ics program and will provide compensation for the Men's
Head Football Coach.
5.5.2 Coach will make appearances and endorsements as re-
quired by the contract entered by the Department of Ath-
letics or as reasonably required by University.
5.5.3 If the Director of Athletics determines that a particular en-
dorsement opportunity does not fit within the overall pro-
gram of the department, he may permit the coach to enter
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into such contracts, under such conditions as the Director
of Athletics prescribed. All such contracts must comply
with the University Policy on Endorsement Agreements
then in effect. No other equipment or endorsement con-
tracts will be entered by Coach.
12. Radio, Television, Internet.
Common to any sporting enterprise is the media attention it attracts.
Radio, television and Internet talk-show programs offering direct con-
tact between the coach and the fans are a lucrative source of income for
coaches.304
There are various alternatives as to how these show contracts are
structured and negotiated. First, the coach may negotiate with a radio or
television station independently of the university. The coach would re-
ceive the compensation from such show with the university not being
responsible for any amounts due under such agreement. A second alter-
native may include an agreement between the university and a particular
radio or television broadcaster for the production of a show in conjunc-
tion with its athletic program. The coach is paid directly by the media
representative. The coach in these instances should require a minimum
dollar guarantee with respect to such shows each year.30 5
A further alternative is where the university itself owns an rights to
the program and controls the production and marketing. The coach may
be required under such university-controlled and produced shows to as-
sist in procuring sponsors and to make commercial endorsements on be-
half of program sponsors. The coach will normally participate in the
financial success of such a program on a negotiated basis and normally
receive a talent fee or have an entrepreneurial stake in the outcome of
the production. If the university controls production and marketing of its
television and radio programming, it may require the coach not to ap-
pear in any competing radio or television program during the season,
except routine news media interviews." 6
While the structuring of radio and television deals may take different
formats, some coaches are reported to enjoy enormous profits from their
enterprises.0 7 Here are some examples:
304. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 604.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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Eddie Sutton Oklahoma State $216,000.00
John Brady LSU $100,000.00
Jerry Green Tennessee $220,000.00
Quin Snyder Univ. of Missouri $120,000.00
John Calipari Univ. of Memphis $135,000.00
Bob Huggins Univ. of Cincinnati $140,000.00
Barry Alvarez Univ. of Wisconsin $240,000.00
Guy Morriss Univ. of Kentucky $230,000.00
Pat Summitt Univ. of Tennessee $220,000.00
Phillip Fulmer Univ. of Tennessee $400,000.00308
Several sample television/radio contract provisions follow:
Media Compensation. The University shall guarantee the pay-
ment to Coach of Sixty Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($60,000.00.00) per each fiscal year until June 30, 1994 and Eight-
Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($85,000.00.00) per each fiscal
year commencing on July 1, 1994 and thereafter (the "Media
Guarantee Amount") for appearances by Coach on radio, televi-
sion or other media; provided, however, that the Director in his
sole discretion shall increase the amount of such payment to re-
flect inflation, the growth in media markets or any other factor.
Payment of said guarantee is contingent upon Haskins coopera-
tion with the University in arranging and carrying out media con-
tracts; including, but not limited to, Coach appearance on a pre-
game or a post-game show. On or before December 31 of each
year, Coach shall deliver to the University a written certification
of all compensation earned by or paid to Coach from any source
during the year for appearing on any media. In the event Coach
has been paid less than the Media Guarantee Amount, Coach
shall pay the University such overage. The University and Coach,
as the case may be, shall make such payment on or before January
30 of the following year.
4.6 Compensation for Radio and Television Appearances.
As full compensation for successful completion of radio and tele-
vision appearances, as provided in section 5.6, University will pay
to Coach the sum of $100,000.00 per year, payable in equal
monthly installments. The parties acknowledge and agree that
the compensation for such services is deemed to accrue over the
annual term; except as otherwise provided in section 4.10.2, in the
event of termination of this contract other than on its termination
date, Coach shall be entitled to payment only of the accrued
amount due on the date of termination.
5.6 Radio and Television Appearances.
308. Dunleavy et al., supra note 225.
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Coach will make himself available for and perform radio and tele-
vision appearances on a schedule to be determined by University,
as provided in this section. Scheduling the appearances it he re-
sponsibility of University and Coach is entitled to his full compen-
sation upon being prepared to perform if University fails to
provide all or part of the program of radio and television
appearances.
5.6.1 Radio appearances.
Coach will make himself available for and perform radio
appearances on a schedule to be determined by University.
Such appearances may include, but are not limited to, the
following: a three to five minute pre-game show before
each University Football game; a weekday, evening, or
one-hour call-in program during the football season; and a
three to five minute post-game show prior to attending the
post-game press conference.
5.6.2 Television appearances.
Coach will make himself available for and perform televi-
sion appearances on a schedule to be determined by Uni-
versity. Such appearances may include, but are not limited
to, the following: twelve half-hour television shows, ordi-
narily to be taped in a television studio on Sunday morn-
ings; and a "bowl show" in the event University
participates in a bowl game.
Nick Saban's $1.2 million yearly contract includes wording that al-
lows the university to control his presence on the Internet much like the
university handles review on television shows. It is contemplated that the
University would have a regular on-line chat with Saban, much like a
weekly radio call-in show. LSU's control of Saban on the Internet has
added additional revenues to Saban's contract." 9 As universities are
now controlling the coaches' radio and television appearances, one
might add Internet to the contractual mix.
13. Endorsements.
As a result of their high public profile and stature, coaches may often
times attract product or [service] endorsement offers, especially if the
coach is enjoying enormous popularity among boosters and the public.
Basically, three important ingredients can combine to create a marketa-
309. Thomas O'Toole, Net Gains- Future is Now For LSU, New Coach Saban, COMMER-
CIAL APP., Dec. 3, 1999.
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ble coach: (1) television or media exposure; (2) a creative personality;
and (3) a big win. Typically, the university will require that the coach not
utilize his university association with any product endorsement. How-
ever, the coach will require that he be permitted to identify himself as
the coach of the particular athletic team. 310
Former North Carolina State head basketball coach Jim Valvano is a
prime example of an individual who used endorsements to create a lu-
crative supplemental income. After his team won the NCAA national
basketball championship in 1983, Valvano was hailed as one of the top-
rated coaches and strategists in the game. His reputation as a colorful
speaker and unique personality soared, and his comfort in front of a
camera combined to make him an endorsement gold mine. As a result,
Valvano came out with his own line of clothes called "Coach "V's", au-
thored an Italian cookbook, and served as spokesman for Ronzoni Pasta.
This was in addition to numerous other product endorsements, (car com-
panies, Washington Speakers Bureau, corporate art, etc.) that allegedly
earned him as much as $750,000.00 a year.311
A sample commercial endorsement clause follows:
Commercial Endorsement. Subject to the provisions of Section
5.03.a hereof, the University and Coach agree that Coach may
undertake commercial endorsements of products and services in
which he identified himself as the Head Coach of the University's
men's basketball team but that he may not otherwise associate
the University's name with an endorsement and provided that all
such endorsements must cease at the termination of this
Agreement.
14. Summer Camps.
Another source of income for the coach is summer athletic camps
and clinics. The first issue to be considered is whether the university or
the coach is the sponsor of such camps. Normally, the coach will want
the opportunity to use the university's facilities in connection with a
summer camp without cost or at a minimum cost. Another vital question
is which party is to provide and pay for the camp's liability insurance.312
Murray Sperber, in his book, College Sports, Inc., provides the fol-
lowing commentary on the profits many coaches earn from their summer
camps:
310. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 605.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 609.
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Unlike intercollegiate athletics, with its tremendous start-up costs
and huge ongoing expenses, camps can be established and run on
a small amount of capital. Because costs tend to be low - thanks
to the university - summer camp profits for many coaches are
outstanding, in many cases doubling their annual salaries.
Coaches run their camps in one-week sessions, for as many as ten
weeks during a summer; campers who board pay an average of
$200.00 to $300.00 a week; day campers, $150.00 to $250.00. Bill
Frieder, when at Michigan, is reported to have grossed over
$350,000.00 for his 1986 basketball summer camps. Charles
"Lefty" Driesell, the former coach at Maryland, resigned from his
coaching job after his star player, Len Bias, died from a cocaine-
induced seizure; Driesell, however, insisted on keeping his camps
at the university and, in 1986, had 875 kids pay $264.00 each for a
$231,000 gross. Moreover, in his settlement agreement with Mary-
land, the school continued its $20,000.00 subsidy to defray
Driesell's dorm and facility bill. Even when Driesell moved to
James Madison University, he got to keep his Maryland camps
and subsidies.313
Reported income from summer camps include:
Jerry Green - Univ. of Tennessee $80,000.00
Steve Lavin - UCLA $35,000.00
Quinn Snyder - Missouri $70,000.00 first two years;
$45,000.00 for next three years314
Several contract clauses detailing camp provisions follow:
Camp. You or your principal assistant coaches will be allowed to
organize a and direct a "Football Camp" on the Northwestern
University campus each year during the summer beginning in the
summer of 1999, for a term to be mutually agreed upon. You or
your principal assistant coaches may retain any monies earned in
the conduct of such camps after all costs mentioned below are
fully paid. The University will make the facilities for the camp
available to you on the same terms as University facilities are
made available to other coaches for similar camps. In the conduct
of the camp, you will be responsible for the hiring, compensation,
and direction of all personnel. Nothing herein will preclude your
conducting off-campus or "satellite" camps. With respect to all
such camps, whether on-campus or not, you will indemnify the
University against liability for all losses, costs, damages, or ex-
penses arising from any claims, including any alleging bodily in-
313. SPERBER, supra note 276, at 180.
314. Dunleavy et al., supra note 225.
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jury, resulting from or in any manner connect with the operation
of the camps. In addition, you will obtain comprehensive general
liability insurance with coverage in a form acceptable to the Uni-
versity and in a minimum amount of three million dollars
($3,000,000.00). The University will be named as an additional
insured on said policy.
Camp. As additional consideration for the services to be ren-
dered by the Coach hereunder, the University shall make availa-
ble to Coach for summer basketball camps the use of the
University gyms and facilities at a rate not to exceed $3.00 per
camper per week and will charge Coach lodging and food costs
for the campers at normal University rates. The $3.00 per camper
per week shall include the use of the University's gym and related
facilities, including the locker room, swimming pool and the like
and shall further include any and all insurance required for the
purposes of operating such summer basketball camps.
Schools and Camps. During the summer months between the end
of one academic year and the beginning of the next academic year
of the University, Coach shall be authorized in accordance with
schedules to be approved by the University Administration to or-
ganize and conduct basketball schools, camps and clinics which
utilize University buildings, facilities, equipment, materials and
services; provided, that any such school or camp conducted by
Coach shall comply with all University administrative require-
ments relating to athletic schools and camps and shall pay to the
University such charges and fees as shall be from time to time
established by the University Administration for use of Univer-
sity buildings, facilities, equipment, materials and services. The
authorization granted above in this section to organize and con-
duct schools and camps is given pursuant to Section 3.4.5 of the
Bylaws of the Board of Regents. Such authorization shall extend
to each assistant coach under Coach's supervision and shall con-
tinue and be effective throughout the duration of this Contract.
On-Campus Summer Camp. The College has the exclusive right
to operate summer youth basketball camps on its campus using
College facilities. Employee shall continue to participate in the
College's summer basketball camps, compensation therefore will
be established by agreement with the College consistent with past
practice and shall be in addition to the base salary set forth in
Section 5.01 hereof.
5.3 Football Camp
While employed under this contract as Head Football Coach,
Coach may conduct a football camp for not more than four weeks
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each summer, utilizing University property, including but not lim-
ited to, practice football fields, gym (if available, as a backup fa-
cility), dormitories and dining hall, pursuant to terms and
conditions to be agreed to by Coach, the Director of Athletics
and the Treasurer of the University or other official designated by
the President of University. The terms and conditions must be
consistent with those established by the University for the opera-
tion of camps. Schedules must be in accord with University
scheduling policies. The following conditions apply:
5.3.1 Plans for management, staffing and conduct of the
camp will be submitted in writing to the Director of
Athletics for approval not later than October 1 of the
year preceding the year of the camp. University may
make reasonable requirements in writing from any of
those items and must approve the plan before the camp
may be advertised or operated.
5.3.2 University must be insured, at Coach's cost, by liability
insurance affording coverage for University for the
camp in an amount as University reasonably deter-
mines to be necessary for its protection.
5.3.3 Coach will pay room, bed, board, staffing, facility rent-
als, and other expenses of the camp and will pay Uni-
versity its standard overhead charge for camps.
5.3.4 The President and the Director of Athletics of Univer-
sity may make a reasonable determination to cancel the
camps on the basis that:
5.3.4.1 conducting the football camp would be seri-
ously adverse to the overall interests of University; or
5.3.4.2 there is a substantial and overriding University
need for the required facilities during the time planned
for the camps.
5.3.5 In the event the camp cannot be held on campus, it
may be held in another location with the prior approval
of the Director of Athletics.
5.3.6 If in a future year, University determines that it should
manage and contract athletic camps on the campus,
University will employ and compensate Coach in the
football camp in a basis which substantially equals his
return in the management of his own camp at Univer-
sity. Coach agrees to that arrangement.
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15. Income from Speeches and Written Material.
The contract should permit the coach to deliver speeches, make pub-
lic appearances, grant media interviews, write and release books and
magazine articles, and receive the compensation generated by such activ-
ities. The coach will also want permission to utilize publicly his associa-
tions with the university as coach. The university, however, will want
some type of limiting clause that the coach will represent the university
in a professional manner and not bring any discredit or disrespect upon
the university in such spoken and written materials.315
Success breeds success on the RUBBER CHICKEN CIRCUIT. Southern
Cal head coach Larry Smith, who made only $97,000.00 in base salary,
was guaranteed $150,000.00 annually from the USC Speakers Bureau.
He earned $6,000.00 for each speaking engagement.316 Terry Donahue
of UCLA also earned $6,000.00 for every speaking engagement, while
former Pitt head coach, Mike Gottfried, earned $5,000.00.317 Lou Holtz,
while at Notre Dame, however, was the king of college football coaches
when it came to speaking engagements. 318 He commanded $18,000.00
per speech and accepted as many as thirty speaking dates during the off-
season. 319 Companies interested in retaining Holtz must book him six
months in advance.
Some coaches have contractual provisions that require University
promotion, appearances, and public speaking as part of the contract and
for which the coach is paid directly by the university. For example: Quin
Snyder has a promotional fee of $60,000.00 in his contract wherein he is
required to promote University of Missouri nationally.32 °
A sample speech appearance clause follows:
Income from Speeches, Appearances and Written Materials. Sub-
ject to the provisions of Section 5.03.a hereof, Coach shall be enti-
tled to deliver, make and grant public speeches, public
appearances and media interviews and to write and release books
and magazine and newspapers articles or columns in connection
with his position as Head Coach of the University men's basket-
ball team. Coach agrees to represent the University profession-
ally in all such matters.
315. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 608.
316. Id. at 609.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Shannon Conner, Deal Is Done: MU Pays New Basketball Coach Snyder $545,000,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 19, 1999, at 11.
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16. Termination Clauses.
Termination clauses are generally the most difficult to negotiate in
the employment contract. Termination controversies between coaches
and universities have drawn and will continue to draw great attention
from the media. A coach's contract will almost always contain "termina-
tion for just cause" provisions empowering the university to terminate
the contract at any time at its sole discretion if there is a determination
by the university that the coach has committed a violation. The NCAA
requires that contractual agreement between a coach and a university
includes a stipulation that the coach may be suspended for a period of
time, without pay. Also, that the coach's employment may be termi-
nated if the coach is found to be involved in deliberate and serious viola-
tions of NCAA regulations.
The Knight Commission reported in 1991 that approximately one-
half of all Division I-A institutions (the 106 Universities and universities
with the most competitive and expensive football programs) were the
object of sanctions of varying severity from the NCAA during the
1980s.321 It seems that university sports have become a panoply of rules
and interpretations. The Knight Commission Report indicated that
[s]ome rules have been developed to manage potential abuse in
particular sports, in particular schools, or in response to particular
circumstances of individual athletes. Whatever the origin of these
regulations, the administration of intercollegiate athletics is now
so overburdened with legalism and detail that the NCAA Manual
more clearly resembles the IRS Code than it does a guide to
action.322
Even the simplest of rules may taint the coach and trigger sanctions
in his contract. The Knight Commission requested that the NCAA apply
itself to the task of simplifying and codifying complex NCAA rules and
procedures.
Any man or woman on the street should be able to understand
what the NCAA does, how it works, how it makes its decisions
and, in particular, how it determines its sanctions. As it stands,
not only can the average person not answer those questions, but
also very few presidents, athletic directors, coaches or student-
321. REPORT OF THE KNIGHT FOUNDATION: COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLET-
ICS, KEEPING FArrH wrrT THE STUDENT-ATHLETE: A NEW MODEL FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS 6 (March 1991).
322. Id. at 8.
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athletes can predict what it (NCAA) is likely to do in any given
circumstance.323
The coach will need to protect himself with respect to the required
"termination for just cause" provision. The coach may want to require
that, in order for termination for just cause to exist, (1) the coach must
have committed a major violation, and did so knowingly or intentionally
in violation of those rules, and (2) such rules violation be determined or
adjudicated by an unbiased third party or a court of law.3 24
There is a second category of just-cause provisions calling for termi-
nation of the head coach if a member of the coaching staff commits a
serious violation of NCAA rules, providing that such acts were either
under the control or direction of the head coach. In essence, the head
coach becomes responsible for the acts of his coaching staff. Although a
principal/agent-respondent superior relationship may exist, once again,
the head coach needs to protect himself by specifying that the acts of
assistants would have an effect on his employment only if the coach had
actual knowledge of such violations or directed that such violations oc-
cur. The same should hold true with respect to student athletes who also
can violate the rules of the NCAA.325
Finally, there are provisions for immediate termination in the event
the head coach refuses to perform any of the duties that are reasonably
related to his position and/or where such duties cannot be performed
because of death, disability or illness that would make the head coach
unavailable to perform such duties. Terminations for just cause clauses
are normally accompanied by a clause exonerating the university from
any further liability for salary benefits or other compensation after
termination.326
By their very nature, termination for just cause provisions should be
negotiated between the parties. A statement of what constitutes grounds
for termination is necessary. The coach will also want to establish some
independent dispute resolution process such as a due-process hearing, an
arbitration hearing, or a third-party mediator for determining whether
grounds for termination exist. If the university retains the right to make
such determinations unilaterally, the coach's interests may be
compromised.327
323. Id. at 29-30.
324. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 616.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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A typical termination or suspension for just cause provision follows:
TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION FOR CAUSE.
(a) The University may terminate or suspend the employment of
an athletic staff member for adequate cause. For the purpose of
this policy, the terms "adequate cause" and "cause" shall be sy-
nonymous and shall mean any one or more of the following:
(1) Neglect or inattention to performance of duties of University
employment, after reasonably specific written notice of such neg-
lect or inattention has been given to the athletic staff member by
the Athletic Director, and the athletic staff member has contin-
ued such neglect or inattention during a subsequent period of not
less than ninety (90) days; or
(2) material, significant or repetitive violation or breach of any
governing athletic rule or of any University regulation; or
(3) Conviction for violation of a criminal law (excluding minor
traffic or non-criminal offenses); or
(4) Fraud or dishonesty in the performance of duties of University
employment; or
(5) Fraud or dishonesty in the preparation, falsification, or altera-
tion of
(i) documents or records of the University, the NCAA, or
the Conference;
(ii) documents or records required to be prepared or main-
tained by law, governing athletic rules, or University reg-
ulations; or
(iii) other documents ore records pertaining to recruitment
of any student-athlete, including, without limitation, ex-
pense reports, transcripts, eligibility forms, or compli-
ance reports; or permitting, encouraging or condoning
any such fraudulent or dishonest act by any other per-
son; or
(6) Failure to respond accurately and fully within a reasona-
ble time to any reasonable request of inquiry relating to the
performance of duties of University employment or relating
to performance of duties of any prior employment at another
institution of post-secondary education which shall be pro-
pounded by the University, the NCAA, the Conference, or
other governing body having supervision over the intercolle-
giate athletics program of the University, or such other insti-
tution of post-secondary education; or which shall be
required by law, governing athletic rules, or University regu-
lations; or
2001]
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(7) Counseling or instructing any coach, student, or other per-
son to fail to respond accurately and fully within a reasonable
time to any reasonable request of inquiry concerning a matter
relevant to any intercollegiate athletics program of the Uni-
versity or other institution of post-secondary education which
shall be propounded by the University, the NCAA, the Con-
ference, or other governing body having supervision over the
intercollegiate athletics program of the University or such
other institution of post-secondary education; or which shall
be required by law, governing athletic rules, or University
regulations; or
(8) Soliciting, placing or accepting a bet on any intercollegiate
athletic contest, or permitting, encouraging, or condoning any
such act by any other person; or
(9) participating in, condoning or encouraging any illegal
gambling, bookmaking, or illegal betting involving any inter-
collegiate athletic or professional athletic contest, whether
through a bookmaker, a parlay card, a pool, or any other
method of organized gambling; or
(10) Furnishing of information or data relating in any manner
to football, basketball or any other sport to any individual
who the athletic staff member knows or reasonably should
know is a gambler, bettor, or bookmaker, or an agent of any
such person; or
(11) Use or consumption of alcoholic beverages in such de-
gree as to significantly and materially impair the ability of the
athletic staff member to perform his or her duties of Univer-
sity employment; or
(12) Sale, use or possession of any narcotics, drugs, controlled
substances, steroids or other chemicals, under circumstances
where the sale, use or possession of any such item is prohib-
ited by law or by any governing athletic rule; or
(13) Permitting, encouraging or condoning the sale, use or
possession by any student of any narcotics, drugs, controlled
substances, steroids or other chemicals, under circumstances
where the sale, use or possession of any such item is prohib-
ited by law or by any governing athletic rule; or
(14) Failure to fully cooperate in the enforcement and imple-
mentation of any drug testing program established by the uni-
versity for student-athletes; or
(15) Subject to any right of administrative appeal within the
NCAA or Conference, the making or rendition of a finding or
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determination by the NCAA, the Conference, or any com-
mission, committee, council or tribunal of the same
(i) of one or more major, significant or repetitive viola-
tion of any governing athletic rule; or
(ii) of any such major, significant or repetitious violation
by others which were permitted, encouraged or con-
doned by the athletic staff member, or about which
violation the senior athletic staff member knew or
reasonably should have known and failed to act rea-
sonably to prevent, limit, or mitigate; or
(16) Failure to report promptly to the Athletic Director any
known violation of any governing athletic rule or University
regulation by an assistant coach, a student or other person
under the direct control or supervision of the athletic staff
member; or
(17) Failure to report accurately all sources and amounts of
athletically related income as required by governing athletic
rules.
(18) Violation by Employee of any of the other terms and
conditions of this Agreement not remedied after ten (10)
days' written notice thereof to Employee.
(19) Any conduct of Employee in violation of any criminal
statute, or involving moral turpitude or disregard of the civil
rights of others.
(20) Conduct of the Employee seriously prejudicial to the
best interests of the University or its athletic program or
which violates the University's mission.
(21) Prolonged absence from duty without the consent of the
employee's reporting superior.
(22) Any cause adequate to sustain the termination of any
other University coach of the Coach's classification.
(23) An indictment is filed against the Coach charging com-
mission of a felony.
Most coach's contracts provide for automatic termination in the
event of the coach's death or disability. A sample clause follows:
Automatic Termination upon Death or Disability of Employee.
This Contract shall terminate automatically if Employee dies, be-
comes permanently disabled or becomes totally disabled within
the meaning of the University's disability insurance for employees
of Employee's classification in excess of three (3) months so that
Employee qualifies for salary continuation benefits. "Perma-
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nently disabled" shall mean physical or mental incapacity of a na-
ture which prevents Employee, in the sole and absolute judgment
of the University, from performing Employee's duties and
obligations.
i. If this Contract is terminated because of Employee's death,
Employee's salary and all other benefits shall terminate as of the
calendar month in which death occurs, except that Employee's
personal representative or other designated beneficiary shall be
paid all such death benefits, if any, as may be contained in any
benefit plan now in force or hereafter adopted by the University
and due to Employee thereunder.
ii. If this Contract is terminated because Employee becomes
totally disabled or permanently disabled, in lieu of the guaranteed
base salary and any other form of compensation under the Con-
tract, Employee shall receive disability income and any other ben-
efits provided under the University's insurance program.
In some instances a coach's contract is guaranteed against death or
disability. An example of a "guaranteed contract" provision is as
follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the compensation as
stated in Paragraph 4 shall be deemed to be a Guaranteed Base
Salary. "Guaranteed Base Salary" as used herein shall mean that
Coach shall be paid said Base Salary as hereinbefore stated
through the term of this Agreement regardless of and in the event
that the Coach shall die or become partially and/or totally dis-
abled so that the services as hereinbefore referenced cannot be
performed pursuant to the terms hereof. The intention as herein-
stated is that the Base Salary as from time to time increased and
determined during each year of the term of this Agreement shall
be deemed to be guaranteed and paid as a contractual obligation
of the University for the entire term of this Agreement as ex-
tended. It shall be the University's sole financial responsibility to
fund the guarantee as herein contemplated either with its own
financial resources and/or the purchase of such insurance policies
as to guarantee the payment as herein required.
Finally, if the coach is dismissed for cause, the contract should state
the effect of dismissal, including cessation of compensation and fringe
benefits as of the end of the month in which such termination occurs.
The university will also want to indicate that it has no liability for loss of
any collateral business opportunities or any other benefits, perquisites,
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or income resulting from the job as a result of said termination.328 A
sample no liability provision follows:
In the event this Employment Agreement is terminated for just
cause, all obligations of the University to make further payments
and/or to provide any other consideration hereunder shall cease
as of the date upon which such termination occurs. In no case
shall the University be liable to Employee for the loss of any col-
lateral business opportunities or any other benefits, perquisites or
income resulting from activities, including, but not limited to,
camps, clinics, media appearances, apparel or shoe contracts, con-
sulting relationships or from any other sources. Employee shall
be entitled to continue Employee's health insurance plan and
group life insurance at Employee's own expense for up to eigh-
teen (18) months from the effective date of termination, or the
minimum period provided by law, if longer, however, Employee
will not be entitled to any other employee benefits, except as oth-
erwise provided herein or required by applicable law.
From a coach's perspective, specific acts constituting just cause for
termination need to be strictly defined rather than couched in broad-
based statements. Such clauses as willful fraud, moral turpitude or ha-
bitual intoxication may have a different meaning to different parties.
Therefore, these terms, if used in the employment agreement, should be
specifically defined in terms of specific prohibited acts.
Several contracts contain clauses that would dictate termination of
the coach in the event that acts of moral turpitude were undertaken. In
each instance, the coaches' representation asked for exclusion of that
clause on the basis that the words "moral turpitude" are ambiguous, dif-
ficult to legally define, and ultimately require an independent trier of
fact.
At one institution, university counsel indicated that moral turpitude
clauses are standard fare and that the university would not remove the
subject clause. It took approximately one year to define what the words
"moral turpitude" meant, without ultimate success. Some of the ques-
tions proposed were: 1) What happens if the coach goes to a bar after
the game, drinks too much and urinates on the street? 2) What happens
if the coach gets drunk and has sex with a consenting adult? 3) What
happens if the coach is caught beating his wife? 4) What happens if the
coach uses vulgarity and it is quoted? 5) What happens if the coach
makes public statements with respect to his dislike of gays or lesbians?
6) What happens if the coach cheats on his income tax returns? Do any
328. Id. at 620.
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of these acts constitute moral turpitude under the meaning of the moral
turpitude termination for cause provisions?
Specific acts giving rise to a termination for just cause should be scru-
tinized and strictly defined. Frequently, the university will propose a
"morals" clause. Morals clauses are difficult to negotiate and even more
tricky to draft.
For example, consider how a general clause prohibiting moral turpi-
tude might be applied in two different contexts. (1) A written report in
the form of a letter to university counsel concerning a coach's alleged
intoxication at a private function. The coach is employed by a parochial
institution located in a small, southern town. (2) Rumors of the exact
same conduct, however, the employer is a state institution located in an
urban community. Because a finding of just cause is both facts intensive
and consequentially severe, the inclusion of a due process procedure is
critical.
In negotiating termination for just cause provisions, the definition of
"just cause" is factual in nature (such as moral turpitude, prejudicial con-
duct, prolonged absences, willful fraud, complicity in an immoral act, ha-
bitual intoxication, etc.) and, therefore, needs to be determined by an
impartial hearing examiner. A due-process procedure should be estab-
lished for purposes of an objective and impartial hearing to determine
whether termination for just cause exists. Such a procedure should in-
clude a statement of the charges against the coach, right to a hearing,
opportunity for a coach to be present and to provide a defense, the right
to have an attorney present, and/or such other procedures as governed
by normal university grievance procedures.
Affording a coach some opportunity to a hearing and the right to
challenge the university's charges for termination for cause is especially
significant if a state institution is involved since the termination itself
may be considered "state action" subject to due process provisions. In
virtually all litigation in which an individual argues that his constitutional
rights have been violated, the court can grant relief only if it finds that
there has been state action, i.e., some sort of participation by a govern-
ment entity sufficient to make the particular constitutional provision
applicable.
When head football coach Earle Bruce was fired by Ohio State Uni-
versity and filed a $7.45 million lawsuit against the institution, one con-
tention was that his unlawful termination involved state action and,
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therefore, his constitutional rights were violated.32 9 These included de-
nial of due process and equal protection of the law and deprivation of
property without just compensation.
Several examples of a due-process procedure follow:
(a) Employment may be suspended for a period of time, without
pay, or terminated, with immediate cessation of salary payments
and fringe benefits, for cause. Cause for suspension or termina-
tion shall be a violation by a Coach, or a violation by a coach
under that Coach's supervision of which that Coach was aware or
was of a character or extent that the Coach should have been
aware, of any of the rules, regulations or policies of the Big Ten
Conference or the National Collegiate Athletic Association, as
modified from time to time.
(b) Prior to suspension or termination, an Employee (i) shall be
provided with written notice of contemplated suspension or ter-
mination, a statement of the reasons and facts in support thereof
and (ii) shall have five calendar days from receipt of such notice
to deliver a written request for a hearing on the contemplated
action. Written requests shall be delivered to the Office of the
Chancellor. If no written request is received by the Chancellor as
provided herein, a contemplated suspension or termination shall
become final five calendar days following the Coach's receipt of
such notice.
(c) Upon receipt of a written request for hearing, the Chancellor
will appoint a three-person hearing board, composed of two indi-
viduals from the Athletic board and one other University coach,
to consider the matter and hear reasons for and against the con-
templated action. The Coach has the right to appear before the
hearing board, with a representative if he desires, to comment on
the reasons given for the contemplated action and to present rea-
sons against it. The hearing board shall not be bound by formal or
technical rules of evidence. It will send written findings of fact
and recommendations on the matter to the Chancellor or, if the
Chancellor designates someone else, his designee. The Chancellor
or his designee may seek counsel from the Athletic Board, shall
consider the matter and notify, in writing, the Coach, the Director
of Intercollegiate Athletics and the hearing board of the decision,
which shall be final.
Post-termination Hearing.
329. Ma at 624.
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(a) If the employment of an athletic staff member is termi-
nated or cause under this departmental policy, the athletic staff
member upon written request delivered to the Athletic Director
shall have the right to a post-termination hearing within a reason-
able time after termination of his or her employment.
(b) The post-termination hearing will be conducted by a panel
of three academic-administrative employees of the University se-
lected by the Chancellor. Such hearing will be reported by a
qualified court reporter, and a transcript of such hearing shall be
prepared, at the expense of the University. The athletic staff
member shall at his or her option have the right to have a per-
sonal attorney present at such hearing, to call witnesses on his or
her behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses. The formal rules of
evidence applicable in the courts of the State of Nebraska shall
not be applicable in any such hearing; however, the hearing panel
shall only give probative effect to evidence, which possesses pro-
bative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent persons
in the conduct of their affairs. The hearing panel may exclude
incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious
evidence.
(c) After the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing panel shall
promptly make a written recommendation for decision of the case
to the Chancellor and provide a copy of such written recommen-
dation to the athletic staff member. As soon thereafter as possi-
ble, the Chancellor, or his or her designated representative, shall
inform the athletic staff member of the decision of the Chancellor
relating to termination of the athletic staff member's employ-
ment. The decision of the Chancellor shall be final and there may
be no further administrative appeal of such decision with the Uni-
versity of Nebraska.
Due Process. Prior to any contemplated suspension or termi-
nation of Employee, University shall be required to provide Em-
ployee with written Notice of contemplated suspension or
termination of employment and a statement of the reasons and
factual basis and support therefor. Employee, from the date of
receipt of said written Notice, shall have five (5) calendar days
from receipt thereof to deliver a written Request for a hearing on
the contemplated action. Written Request shall be delivered to
the office of the Chancellor or President of the University. If no
written request is received by the Chancellor or President as pro-
vided herein, a contemplated suspension termination shall be-
come final five (5) calendar days following the Employee's
receipt of said Notice. Upon receipt of a written Request for
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hearing, the Chancellor or President shall appoint a three (3) per-
son Hearing Panel composed of the Chief Judge of the County in
which the main office of the University is located, the President of
the local Bar Association who in turn shall select a third arbitra-
tor to consider the matter and hear reasons for and against the
contemplated suspension or termination. The Employee shall
have the right to appear before the Hearing Panel with a repre-
sentative, if he desires, including legal representation, to com-
ment on the reasons given for the contemplated action and to
present evidence. The Hearing Panel shall not be bound by for-
mal or technical rules of evidence but shall be governed by the
arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association. The
decision of the Hearing Panel shall be final and conclusive as to
the employment status of the Employee. Employee shall be af-
forded any and all necessary due process including the right to
hire counsel, call witnesses, conduct discovery, examine documen-
tation and cross examine witnesses so that Employee is given a
fair and unbiased hearing as to his employment status. The cost
of arbitration shall be borne by the University.
In his book, College Sports, Inc., Murray Sperber indicates that al-
though a university may have cause to dismiss a coach, and even though
that coach may cause an NCAA investigation and ensuing penalties, uni-
versities prefer to settle their differences with a breaching coach rather
than fire him outright 3 °0 This is the case even though the university is
absolved from its obligations if the coach violates NCAA rules.
For example, when Mike White finally resigned after years of incur-
ring NCAA sanctions and negative publicity for the University of Illi-
nois, the school rewarded him with $300,000.00 settlement.331 Barry
Switzer settled with the University of Oklahoma for $225,000.00 during
its not so recent troubles.332 After the NCAA put Texas A&M on proba-
tion for over twenty-five violations during Jackie Sherrill's regime, the
school waved goodbye to this football coach and AD with a $684,000.00
cash settlement and a house.333 And when Danny Ford resigned in 1990
at Clemson, with the NCAA cops at the gates, he was rewarded with a
settlement that may have topped $1.1 million.3 34
Because of the potential for litigation that may ensue after a coach is
terminated for "just cause" and the coach's probable contesting of the
330. SPERBER, supra note 276, at 165.
331. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 621.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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facts, the representatives of the coach and the university may want to
simply ease the burden of a continued dispute. If there is a proceeding
for just cause, the university and the coach may mutually agree to a res-
ignation format with the payment of some termination fee or liquidated
damages.
Central Michigan basketball coach Keith Dambrot was fired in early
April, 1993, several days after a student newspaper published a racial
remark Dambrot made about a black assistant coach during a post-game
pep talk to his team.33 Dambrot told players, "I wish we had more nig-
gers on this team" and referred to assistant coach Derrick McDowell as
"a nigger," the student newspaper reported.336 He admitted making the
remarks, but said that his players understood that the word was used to
describe "strong character and toughness" in black and white players.337
"Everyone present understood the context in which the term was used,
and no one in our locker room who heard me was offended or com-
plained," Dambrot said in a prepared statement. Dambrot was sus-
pended without pay for four days beginning April 1, 1993. 338 School
officials said they believed the suspension was adequate punishment, but
changed their minds and fired Dambrot after numerous complaints from
students, faculty, and alumni.339
Dambrot filed a lawsuit, but was unsuccessful. In 1995, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the firing, despite Dambrot's con-
tention that the use of the offensive language was within his First
Amendment rights.340 After an analysis of the various tests that are used
to determine whether speech is protected, the Appellate Court noted
that:
Dambrot's use of the N-word is even further away from the mar-
ketplace of ideas and the concept of academic freedom because
his position as coach is somewhat different from that of the aver-
age classroom teachers. Unlike the classroom teacher whose pri-
mary role is to guide student through the discussion and debate of
various viewpoints in a particular discipline, Dambrot's role as a
coach is to train his student athletes how to win on the court. The
plays and strategies are seldom up for debate. Execution of the
coach's will is paramount. Moreover, the coach controls whom
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995).
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plays and for how long, placing a disincentive on any debate with
the coach's ideas which might have taken place. While Dambrot
argues and we accept as true that he intended to use the term in a
positive and reinforcing manner, Dambrot's total message to the
players is disturbing.34'
The University of Minnesota (University) is suing former men's bas-
ketball coach Clem Haskins for the return of over $1.5 million paid to
Haskins to "buy out" the remainder of his contract.342 Minnesota is
bringing the suit based on four legal grounds: 1) fraudulent inducement;
2) breach of fiduciary duty; 3) breach of contract; and 4) unjust enrich-
ment. The University is pursuing this suit because of alleged major
NCAA violations committed by Haskins while he was the head men's
basketball coach at the University.
Haskins was hired as the head men's basketball coach at the Univer-
sity in 1986. The University hired him due to his strong stance on run-
ning a basketball program free of NCAA violations. In July 1992,
Haskins and the University entered into a 10-year coaching contract.
The contract provided for termination under both "just cause" and "un-
just cause:"
TERMINATION
Section 3.1. The University's Right to Terminate for Just
Cause. The University may terminate this Agreement, suspend
salary payments or take other disciplinary action as it deems ap-
propriate for just cause. "Just cause" as used in this Agreement
shall mean the following:
A. A major violation of a rule of a Governing Association in-
volving Haskins; or
B. A major violation of a rule of a Governing Association by
an assistant men's basketball coach which Haskins knew about or
two (2) separate major violations of a rule of a Governing Associ-
ation by an assistant men's basketball coach which Haskins
should have known about; or
C. The commission of a felony and the conviction therefore
by Haskins; or
D. A substantial failure to perform the duties required in Sec-
tion 1.2 hereof due to the gross negligence or willful misconduct
of Haskins; or
E. The occurrence of all of the following events:
341. Id. at 1189.
342. First Amended Complaint, Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota v. Haskins,
Case No. 00-12750 (Jan. 25, 2001).
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1. Multiple secondary violations of rules of a Governing As-
sociation by Haskins; and
2. A written warning to the University from the Governing
Association of a lack of institutional control resulting from the
multiple secondary violation of rules of a Governing Association
by Haskins described in Section 3.1 (e)(1) above; and
3. A written notice to Haskins from the Director informing
Haskins of the written warning to the University from the Gov-
erning Association described in Section 3.1 (E)(2) above; and
4. A subsequent secondary violation of a rule of a Governing
Association by Haskins relating to a lack of institutional control.
Determination of violation of a rule of a Governing Associa-
tion shall require a finding by the Governing Association.
Section 3.4. The University's Right to Terminate without Just
Cause. The University shall have the right to terminate Haskins'
employment without just cause upon ninety (90) days written no-
tice to Haskins. In such event, Haskins shall be entitled to the
compensation described in Sections 2.1 (Base Salary) and 2.5
(Media Compensation) of this Agreement for the remaining term
of this Agreement, the payment under Section 2.2 (A) (Deferred
Compensation) of this Agreement and the benefits described in
Section 2.6 of this Agreement and the University shall have no
further liability in connection herewith.
Section 3.5. Limited Liability. In no event shall the Univer-
sity be liable for the loss by Haskins of any bonuses, benefits, per-
quisites, or income, including, but not limited to, those arising out
of or relating to consulting relationships, camps, clinics, amounts
payable under Sections 2.3, or 2.4, or from any other sources
whatsoever, that may ensue as a result of the University's breach
or termination of this Agreement, unless otherwise expressly
stated herein. The University shall be liable for amounts refer-
enced in Section 3.4 of this Agreement.343
In 1999, the Minneapolis and St. Paul media reported allegations
made by a University of Minnesota employee named Jan Gangelhoff.
The allegations contended that the University of Minnesota men's bas-
ketball team was involved in widespread academic fraud. She reported
that she had been involved in the furtherance of the fraud for many
years and that Haskins had paid her $3,000.00 to provide improper aca-
343. Employment Agreement Between Clem Smith Haskins and Regents of the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, Exhibit A to First Amended Complaint, Haskins, Case No. 00-12750.
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demic support to members of the men's basketball team. The improper
academic support included the tutoring of players and the writing of aca-
demic papers for players. Haskins denied all knowledge of any improper
activity concerning the men's basketball program when interviewed by
the University of Minnesota.
On March 9, 1999, the University hired two attorneys to act as inde-
pendent investigators. These attorneys were to independently investi-
gate the allegations made by Gangelhoff and determine whether there
had been any academic fraud involving the men's basketball team and
Haskins. 34
Prior to the final report by the independent investigators, the Univer-
sity entered into a "buy out" agreement with Haskins.345 This agree-
ment was formed under the provisions in Haskins' contract for
termination for "unjust cause." Under the "buy out" agreement, the
University agreed to pay Haskins more than $1.5 million and Haskins
agreed to cooperate with the University's investigation. Other terms of
the "buy out" agreement also specified that if Haskins did not fully co-
operate with the University's investigation, the University had the right
to require specific performance through court action.
Haskins continued to deny Gangelhoff's allegations throughout the
continuing investigation to both representatives of the University and
the NCAA. In July 2000, the University learned that Haskins had earlier
that month admitted to NCAA investigators that he had paid
Gangelhoff $3,000.00 for her help in furthering academic fraud for the
men's basketball team. 46 In November 2000, the University submitted a
report to the NCAA outlining numerous violations in the men's basket-
ball program.347
The university contends that Haskins' continued denials of any
knowledge or involvement in academic fraud throughout the investiga-
tion was a direct breach of the "buy out" agreement.348 The university is
claiming that Haskins' involvement in the ongoing academic fraud and
his payment of $3,000.00 to Gangelhoff were major violations of NCAA
344. Minn. Lawyers May Have Known About Allegations, ATLANTA J. & CONST., March
13, 1999, at 4E.
345. Agreement and Release, Exhibit B to First Amended Complaint, Haskins, Case No.
00-12750.
346. Eddie Timanus, Haskins Records Show Payment To Minn. Tutor, USA TODAY, Aug.
2, 2000, at 1C.
347. Randy Furst & Dennis Brackin, Haskins Appeals Coaching Ban, STAR Tim. (Min-
neapolis, MN), Nov. 23, 2000, at 11C.
348. First Amended Complaint, Haskins, Case No. 00-12750, Count IV, para. 73-78.
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rules and therefore, under the terms of his contract, created a foundation
for termination for "just cause." '3 49 The University also points to numer-
ous other major NCAA violations committed by Haskins. These allega-
tions include instructing members of the men's basketball team to lie to
investigators when questioned about the academic fraud allegations and
providing misrepresentations and omissions to the NCAA compliance
officer.35o
The university may still have to compensate Haskins even if this suit
is successful. Under the provisions of Haskins' contract, Haskins is still
entitled to compensation for deferred comp -nsation even if terminated
for "just cause."
Section 2.2 Deferred Compensation. The University shall pay to
Haskins or his estate the sum of Five Hundred One Thousand
Seven Hundred Seventy-Eight and 12/100 Dollars ($501,778.12)
on June 30, 2002, subject to the following:
A. If, during the term of this Agreement, Haskins' employment
with the University is terminated by the University in accordance
with Section 3.1 of Section 3.4 (subject to sub-paragraph C be-
low), Haskins dies or Haskins becomes disabled, the University
shall pay to Haskins or his estate the amount in column C of the
chart below corresponding to the date of Haskins' termination by
the University, death or disability in column A of the chart below.
Such amount shall be payable within sixty 060) days of the date
of termination, death or disability.
B. If, during the term of this Agreement, Haskins' employment
with the University is terminated by Haskins (other than by Has-
kins' death or disability), the University shall pay to Haskins or
his estate the mount in column C of the chart below correspond-
ing to the date of termination by Haskins in column B of the chart
below. Such amount shall be payable within sixty (60) days of the
date of termination.
349. Id. para. 9-29.
350. Id. para. 30-33.
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Column A Column B Column C
Date of Termination by University, Deferred
Date of Haskins' Death, Termination by Compensation
Haskins' Disability Haskins Amount
prior to 7/01/04 $ 32,754.00
prior to 7/01/04 7/01/94 - 6/30/95 $ 55,919.00
7/01/94 - 6/30/95 7/01/95 - 6/30/96 $101,674.00
7/01/95 - 6/30/96 7/01/96 - 6/30/97 $155,475.00
7/01/96 - 6/30/97 7/01/97 - 6/30/98 $212,503.00
7/01/97 - 6/30/98 7/01/98 - 6/30/99 $278,629.00
7/01/98 - 6/30/99 7/01/99 - 6/30/00 $348,722.00
7/01/99 - 6/30/00 7/01/00 - 6/30/01 $423,821.00
7/01/00 - 6/30/02 7/01/01 - 6/30/02 $501,778.12
C. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
herein, if, during the term of this Agreement, Haskins' employ-
ment with the University is terminated as a result of the convic-
tion of Haskins of a felony arising from events that occur in
connection with the performance by Haskins of his duties hereun-
der, the University shall have no obligation to pay the deferred
compensation hereunder.
Haskins shall pay all levies and taxes imposed by any govern-
mental agency in connection with the deferred compensation and
benefits paid to Haskins hereunder.3
If a coach violates any rules governing recruiting or player eligibility,
the coach may not only be subject to NCAA penalties and termination
of his contract but also to a possible breach of contract action by the
university. In essence, the university could sue a coach for expectation
damages including consequential damages, which would include all reve-
nues lost as a result of the NCAA sanction imposed due to the coach's
violation of rules.
In order for a university to receive consequential damages it must
demonstrate 1) the damages were caused by the coach's breach of con-
tract, 2) the amount of damages within a reasonable degree of certainty,
and 3) the damages sustained were within the contemplation of the par-
ties at the time of agreement.35 It is likely the university would be able
to fulfill this burden of proof. The university should be able to show that
351. Employment Agreement Between Clem Smith Haskins and Regents of the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, Exhibit A to First Amended Complaint, Haskins, Case No. 00-12750.
352. Kevin Stangel, Comment: Protecting Universities' Economic Interests: Holding Stu-
dent-Athletes And Coaches Accountable For Willful Violations Of NCAA Rules, 11 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REv. 137, 154 (2000).
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damages were caused by the coach's violation of NCAA Rules through
the investigative report. Secondly, the university should be able to prove
damages with certainty by showing its lost television revenues, revenue
or inability to participate in post-season play. Finally, it would seem ob-
vious that both the university and the coach could reasonably foresee
that a violation of the NCAA Rules would lead to penalties, thus the
university may be able to protect its economic interest by recovering
consequential damages.
The coach's contract will also reserve to the university the right to
terminate the coach's employment for reasons other than those set forth
in the termination for "just cause" provision or for no reason at all.
However, termination without cause is usually based upon the coach's
win-loss record, failure to beat a conference opponent, failure to obtain
post-season invitations or appearances, attendance, lack of attendance,
loss of favor with boosters, program elimination or financial exigency.
This termination provision is more concerned with defining the univer-
sity's financial liability than the reasons for termination. Thus, when the
coach is terminated without cause, the issue centers on the determina-
tion of the amount of damages that the coach will receive, the nature of
the damages, and the method of payment. A number of options are
available, including:
1. A negotiated stated amount.
2. The coach's base salary or other compensation items for the re-
mainder of the contract term.
3. The percentage of the base salary and other compensation pack-
ages for the remainder of the agreement.
4. De-escalating amount depending upon the year of the agreement
and the termination therefor.
5. A lump sum settlement.353
What benefits the coach will receive after a premature termination
should be strictly defined in the contract. If liquidated damages are
agreed to, the university will want a provision indicating it will not be
liable for the loss of any collateral benefits, perquisites or income result-
ing from activities such as, but not limited to, camps, clinics, media ap-
pearances, apparel, shoe contracts, consulting relationships, or from any
other sources that may ensue as a result of the university's termination
353. Id.
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of the agreement without cause or because of the coach's position as
such.3 5
4
Rodgers v. Georgia Tech Athletic Association355 is the leading case as
to whether a coach may recover monetary damages for breach of con-
tract including consequential loss of collateral opportunities. Georgia
Tech removed Franklin C. "Pepper" Rodgers from his head football
coaching position on December 18, 1979, two years before the expiration
of his contract. Rodgers' initial contract was in the form of a letter dated
April 20, 1977 with the Association, a nonprofit corporate entity sepa-
rate from the university, but responsible for the university's varsity ath-
letic program.
Rodgers' contract provided that, in addition to regular compensation,
as an employee of the Association, he would be entitled "to various in-
surance and pension benefits and perquisites" as he became eligible
therefore. 6 After termination, the Association had continued to pay
Rodgers his normal monthly salary plus pension and insurance benefits.
Rodgers' suit, which was for damages in excess of $496,000.00.00, was for
"perquisites" over and above the normal compensation covered under
his coaching contract. 7
Rodgers argued that he was entitled to twenty-nine perquisites that
he grouped into two categories. 8 The first category included items pro-
vided directly to him by the Association but discontinued when he was
fired. The second category included items provided through sources
other than the Association by virtue of his position as head football
coach. What follows is a list of those perquisites as included in the ap-
pendix to the case:
A. Benefits and Perquisites Received by Rodgers Directly from
Georgia Tech Athletic Association:
(1) gas, oil, maintenance, repairs, other automobile expenses;
(2) automobile liability and collision insurance;
(3) general expense money;
(4) meals available at the Georgia Tech training table;
(5) Eight season tickets to Georgia Tech home football games
during fall of 1980 and 1981;
354. Id. at 623.
355. 303 S.E.2d 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
356. Id. at 470.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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(6) two reserved booths, consisting of approximately 40 seats, at
Georgia Tech home football games during fall of 1980 and
1981;
(7) Six season tickets to Georgia Tech home basketball games
for 1980 and 1981;
(8) four season tickets to Atlanta Falcon home football games
for 1980 and 1981;
(9) four game tickets to each out-of-town Georgia Tech football
game during fall of 1980 and 1981;
(10) pocket money at each home football game during fall of
1980 and 1981;
(11) pocket money at each out-of-town Georgia Tech football
game during fall of 1980 and 1981;
(12) parking privileges at all Georgia Tech home sporting events;
(13) the services of a secretary;
(14) the services of an administrative assistant;
(15) the cost of admission to Georgia Tech home baseball games
during spring of 1980 and 1981;
(16) the cost of trips to football coaches' conventions, clinics, and
meetings and to observe football practice sessions of profes-
sional and University football teams;
(17) initiation fee, dues, monthly bills, and cost of membership at
the C Capital City Club;
(18) initiation fee, dues, monthly bills, and cost of membership at
the Cherokee Country Club;
(19) initiation fee and dues at the East Lake Country Club.
B. Benefits and Perquisites Received by Rodgers from Sources
Other Than the Georgia Tech Athletic Association by Virtue of
Being Head Coach of Football:
(1) profits from Rodgers' television football show, "The Pepper
Rodgers Show," on Station WSB-TV in Atlanta for the fall
of 1980 and 1981;
(2) profits from Rodgers' radio football show on Station WGST
in Atlanta for the fall of 1980 and 1981;
(3) use of a new Cadillac automobile during 1980 and 1981;
(4) profits from Rodgers' summer football camp, known as the
"Pepper Rodgers Football School," for June 1980 and June
1981;
(5) financial gifts from alumni and supporters of Georgia Tech
for 1980 and 1981;
(6) lodging at any of the Holiday Inns owned by Topeka Inn
Management, Inc. of Topeka, Kansas, for the time period
from December 18, 1979 through December 31, 1981;
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(7) the cost of membership to Terminus International Tennis
Club in Atlanta for 1980 and 1981;
(8) individual game tickets to Hawks basketball and Braves
baseball games during 1980 and 1981 seasons;
(9) housing for Rodgers and his family in Atlanta for the period
from December 18, 1979 through December 31, 1981;
(10) the cost of premiums of a $400,000.00.00 policy on the life of
Rodgers for the time period from December 18, 1979
through December 31, 1981.119
These perquisites were not defined in Rodgers' contract. The Associ-
ation moved for summary judgment arguing that (1) it had met its con-
tractual obligation by continuing to pay Rodgers as required under the
contract, (2) it could not be held responsible for Rodgers' collateral op-
portunities with third-party providers, and (3) it could not be held liable
for actions of individuals not related to the contract who decided to
cease providing Rodgers gratuitous items when his position as head
coach was terminated. 6 °
The trial court granted the Association's motion for summary judg-
ment dismissing Rodgers' suit in its entirety.361 According to Judson
Graves:
Had this decision gone unchallenged, it would have essentially
preserved the traditional view described previously. This view
would limit the breaching employer's liability to the amount of
direct compensation and related compensatory benefits (such as
pension contributions, for example) which the employee would
have received for the balance of the term of employment had the
contract not been terminated early. 62
Rodgers' appeal, and the appellate decision "broke new ground in Geor-
gia and that may help litigants elsewhere do the same, in expanding the
elements of damages potentially recoverable in these coaches' contract
cases."
363
The court of appeals held that some perquisites may be recoverable
even though received by Rodgers from third parties not controlled or
related to the defendant, if the defendant knew that relieving Rodgers of
his position may occasion their loss.3 4 In essence, the court of appeals
359. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 559-560.
360. Id. at 560-61.
361. Rodgers, 303 S.E.2d at 469.
362. Graves, supra note 123, at 553.
363. Id.
364. Rodgers, 303 S.E.2d at 471.
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found that perquisites could be recovered if all of the following elements
were met:
1. The damages must be traced solely to the breach;
2. The damages must be capable of exact computation;
3. The damages must have arisen naturally and according to the
usual course of things from such breach; and
4. The damages must be such as the parties contemplated them as
a probable result of the breach.365
As a result, the court of appeals' decision excluded certain damages
as a matter of law, while other categories of damages were remanded for
a jury trial on the merits.366
Of the twenty-nine perquisites that Rodgers tried to collect, eight
were thrown out by the court and the other twenty-one were sent to the
jury to decide if they were perquisites that were recoverable under the
contract and under the elements as previously stated.367 According to
Graves the importance of the case is that the Rodgers decision:
. . .acknowledged some collateral losses may be recovered if
proven with specificity. In a special class of cases, extraordinary
damages may be recoverable by an employee if the employment
position provides a unique status, presents the employee with spe-
cial opportunities to further one's name and reputation, and to
earn money substantially over and above salary and fringe
benefits.368
The liquidated damage provision will also indicate that the damages
are bargained-for damages, constitute a reasonable and adequate consid-
eration to the coach, and shall not be construed to be in the nature of a
penalty.
Another issue is the coach's obligation to mitigate damages, i.e., ob-
tain reasonably comparable employment or other employment for pur-
poses of offsetting the damages agreed to be paid by the university. If
other employment is obtained, a question will arise as to whether the
liquidated damages agreed to be paid by the university cease or if the
university's obligation is modified to be the difference between the
amount agreed upon and the amount received from the new employer, if
any.
Most universities recognize their continuing liability under the con-
tract and continue to pay the coach throughout the contract term or buy
365. Id. at 472-73.
366. Id. at 474.
367. Id. at 475.
368. Graves, supra note 123, at 554.
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out the contract for a lump sum. It has been suggested that a lump-sum
buy-out at the time of the termination, based on the present value of the
future payments to become due, is the proper measure of damages
rather than the installment method. The theory is that, since the breach
is complete upon contract termination, complete damages are then due
as well.
When negotiating the buy-out or the liquidated damages provision of
a termination without just cause, consideration should also be given to
continuation of some collateral benefits such as continued health insur-
ance for a certain time and the payment of moving expenses.
Examples of a termination without cause provision follow:
(1) The University has the right to terminate the Head
Coach's employment under this Agreement at any time without
cause, in which event the University will pay the Head Coach:
(a) an amount equal to three years Base Salary at the time of
termination, or an amount equal to his Base Salary for the
unexpired term of this Agreement, whichever is less. Acceptance
by the Head Coach of this amount will constitute full settlement
of any claim that the Head Coach might otherwise assert against
the University, or any of its agents or employees.
(b) Except for the obligation to pay the Head Coach his Base
Salary as set forth in Section 4.01(a), all obligations of the Univer-
sity (to the extent not already accrued or vested) to the Head
Coach shall cease as of the effective date of such termination. In
no case shall the University be liable for the loss of any Addi-
tional Compensation, collateral business opportunities or any
other benefits, perquisites or income resulting from activities such
as, but not limited to, camps, clinics, media appearances, televi-
sion or radio shows, apparel or shoe contracts, consulting rela-
tionships or from any other source that may ensue as a result of
the University's termination without cause of the Head Coach's
employment under this Agreement.
(c) All obligations of the Head Coach under this Agreement
or otherwise associated with his employment by the University
shall cease as of the effective date of such termination.
(2) The University shall have the right to terminate the Em-
ployment Agreement prior to its normal expiration without
cause. Termination without cause shall mean termination of this
Agreement on any basis other than those set forth in Section
6.01.b above. Termination by the University without cause shall
be effectuated by delivering to Employee written notice, which
notice shall be effective upon the earlier of the date set forth for
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termination in such notice or ten (10) days after receipt of such
notice by Employee. If the University exercises its right under
Section 6.01 to terminate this Agreement without cause, Em-
ployee shall be entitled to damages only as provided for below.
(3) If the University terminates this Agreement without cause
prior to its expiration, the University shall pay to Employee, as
liquidated damages, the following amount: The Coach's current
base salary for a one-year period after termination.
The University's obligation shall be paid on a bi-weekly basis
prorated over the balance of the term of this Agreement and shall
be subject to the Employee's duty to mitigate the University's ob-
ligation. Failure to timely pay such liquidated damages shall con-
stitute a breach of this Agreement and such sum shall be
recoverable in any court of competent jurisdiction. Employee
will be entitled to continue his health insurance plan at his own
expense for up to eighteen (18) months from the effective date of
termination but will not be entitled to any other employee bene-
fits except as required by applicable law. In no case shall the Uni-
versity be liable for the loss of any collateral business
opportunities or any other benefits, perquisites, or income result-
ing from activities, including, but not limited to, camps, clinics,
media appearances, apparel or shoe contracts, consulting rela-
tionships or from any other sources that may ensue as a result of
the University's termination of this Agreement without cause.
The parties hereto have bargained for and agreed to the fore-
going liquidated damages provision, giving consideration to the
fact that termination of this Agreement by the University without
cause prior to its natural expiration may cause Employee to lose
certain benefits, supplemental compensation or outside compen-
sation relating to her employment at the University, which dam-
ages are extremely difficult to determine with certainty or fairly
or adequately. The parties further agree that the payment of such
liquidated damages by the University and acceptance thereof by
Employee shall constitute adequate and reasonable compensation
to Employee for the damages and injury suffered by Employee
because of such termination by the University. The foregoing
shall not be, nor be construed to be, a penalty.
(4) Employee agrees to mitigate the University's obligations
to pay liquidated damages and to make reasonable and diligent
efforts to obtain comparable employment, such as a coaching po-
sition at a University that competes on a level comparable to that
of the University or with a professional team as soon as reasona-
bly possible after termination of this Agreement by the Univer-
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sity without cause. After employee obtains such new
employment, the University's financial obligations under this
Agreement shall cease.
Examples of termination without cause provisions more favorable to
the coach are as follows:
(1) Termination Without Cause. In the event of the Em-
ployee's termination by the University for reasons other than as
previously set forth in this Agreement during the term of this
Agreement, including any extensions therefor, the Employee
shall be entitled to the remainder of any Annual Salary plus the
University's contribution to TIAA-CREF (retirement plan) owed
under and pursuant to the terms of this Agreement plus 50% of
the then scheduled radio and T.V. income as hereinbefore refer-
enced to be paid on the same date as if Employee was still em-
ployed under and pursuant to this Agreement for the term under
which said amount shall be paid. In addition, the University shall
continue to provide Employee after such termination with such
medical and health insurance benefits for the balance of the term
of this Agreement, including any extensions therefor or until Em-
ployee obtains other full-time employment with replacement poli-
cies, whichever is the lesser period. It is the intention of this
paragraph that in the event Employee should be terminated with-
out cause that Employee would continue to receive the compen-
sation and benefits as herein specified for the full remaining term
of this Agreement without any obligation to mitigate damages
and, in addition to compensation he may be receiving from other
employment, even if the employment is similar to the employ-
ment as herein stated. In the event Employee is terminated with-
out cause, Employee shall be entitled to conduct the summer
camp and receive all benefits therefrom pursuant to paragraph 8
of this Agreement during the summer subsequent to said termina-
tion. In no case shall the University be liable for loss of any collat-
eral business opportunity or other benefits, perquisites or income
from any sources that may ensue as a result of the University's
termination of this Agreement.
(2) Termination Without Cause. In the event the University
terminates the employment contract at any time without cause,
the University will not be liable for consequential damages of any
kind, including but not limited to loss of collateral business op-
portunities or loss of other income from any sources, that might
ensue as a result of such termination, and the University's finan-
cial obligation to Employee shall be limited to paying, as liqui-
dated damages and not as a penalty, Employee's compensation as
defined in Paragraphs B.1, B.2, and C.3 of the employment con-
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tract, together with related Employee benefits as defined in
Paragraphs D.1 through D.4 (exclusive of club membership) for
the remainder of the Contract Term as defined in Paragraph A.
In addition, should the University terminate this agreement with-
out cause prior to the Vesting Date, Employee shall be entitled to
the full amount of deferred compensation provided for in Para-
graph B.4.
This paragraph and the obligations contained hereunder shall
not be subject to any obligation on the part of Employee to miti-
gate damages or to reduce the contractual obligations or agree-
ments of the University. A liquidated damage amount is an "as
bargained for" amount for and in consideration of the other terms
and provisions of this Agreement, including the buyout provision
as contained herein. The payments hereunder pursuant to the
amount as determined shall constitute a continued obligation of
the University regardless if Employee obtains other employment
as a football coach or other football related employment or any
other kind of employment. Regardless of any amounts earned
and regardless of the source, no amounts will be offset against the
liquidated damages agreed to be paid by the University for the
remaining term of the contract if Employee is terminated without
cause. The intent of this paragraph is to guarantee Employee that
in the event he is terminated without cause, that Employee will be
paid the compensation as enumerated herein for the remaining
term of his contract on a guaranteed basis without the affirmative
obligation to mitigate damages or the obligation to offset any
other sources of income.
Employee shall be paid on the same date with respect to the
compensation as listed above as if Employee was still employed
under and pursuant to this agreement for the remaining term
therefor.
There are instances where the coach will challenge his intended dis-
missal prior to its natural term. In some instances the intended termina-
tion will be met with a challenge in that the coach will take the position
that the university is in breach of its contract and will request a reconfir-
mation of the Employment Agreement. Reasons for the challenge may
include the following:
1. Fraudulent Inducement. Fraudulent inducement to contract
and breach of contractual covenants and promises such as
promises with respect to increased pay, job security, duration
of employment, and no necessity to win.
2. Disparate treatment. While other coaches in other programs
were given generous and genuine opportunities to build their
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programs, and while the University has staked its career on
the principal of diversity, the termination of a minority coach
may appear as an engagement of disparate treatment.
3. Impossibility of Performance as a defense to Termination. If
the coach is operating in a job environment that is polluted by
NCAA violations and the University fails to undertake insti-
tutional control before enduring a coach's tenure; a coach
could potentially argue that it was impossible to perform at
the level he ascribed to attain by virtue of the University's
failure.
4. Failure to Evaluate. Most handbooks and contracts require
the Athletic Director or President to evaluate the coach's per-
formance. However, when there is a failure to evaluate a po-
sition, it could be argued that there has been a failure to set
any standards of performance or to direct the coach in the
improvement of his continued performance.
5. Good Faith. The University violated all contractual cove-
nants of fair dealing and good faith and failed in good faith to
set objective standards with respect to the coach's
performance.
6. Constitutional violations for state-supported universities.
There may be both United States and state constitutional ar-
guments relative to due process and equal protection
violations.
Where these types of disputes arise in the University's termination
challenge, often the ultimate result will be negotiations relative to a set-
tlement rather than a court proceeding. The settlement in many in-
stances may produce, if the claims are legitimate, an amount greater
than that specified in the liquidated damage provision as contained in
the termination without cause provision.
Several sample settlement agreements follow:
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into by and between
(hereinafter referred to as "Coach") and University (hereinafter
referred to as "University") a State-supported institution of
higher education acting by and through its authorized officials.
WHEREAS, Coach was employed at University as Football
Coach under Contract dated and
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section XI of said Contract, the Univer-
sity has the right to terminate the Employment Agreement with-
out cause subject to the respective rights of the parties set forth in
Section XI, and this right to terminate was exercised by the Uni-
versity on _; and
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WHEREAS, certain claims have been raised by Coach regarding
his employment; and
WHEREAS, for reasons satisfactory to the parties hereto, the
parties desire to settle any and all claims relating to Coach's em-
ployment and termination of employment.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
contained herein, Coach and University hereby agree to the fol-
lowing terms of settlement in full satisfaction of all claims or po-
tential claims which have been, or could be, asserted by Coach
against University, its officers, agents or employees, arising out of
his employment at University or the ending of that employment:
I. WARRANTIES
A. Each party warrants and represents to the other that it has
been fully informed and has full knowledge of the terms, condi-
tions and effects of this Agreement.
B. Each party warrants and represents to the other that no
promise or inducement has been offered or made except as herein
set forth, and that this Agreement is executed without reliance
upon any statement or representation by any other party or its
agent.
II. OBLIGATIONS
A. University will
1. Pay to Coach the sum of one hundred ninety thousand dol-
lars within 30 days of the execution of this agreement. The par-
ties shall mutually agree upon the actual date of payment.
2. Provide Coach with the use of a car until .The car shall
be equivalent in make and style to that provided during his em-
ployment as Head Football Coach, and will be provided under the
same provisions regarding maintenance, insurance and fuel as ex-
isted during his employment as Head Football Coach.
3. Honor the liquidated damages obligation set forth in Sec-
tion M of the Employment Agreement dated , in
the amount of the salary remaining under the term of said con-
tract, such amount to be paid on a schedule to be mutually agreed
upon, subject to the mitigation obligation of Coach also set forth
in said contract.
B. Coach:
1. Agrees to the terms of the release specified in paragraph
IV of this Agreement.
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2. Agrees that he will in good faith mitigate the University's
obligation under Section XI of the Employment Contract dated
3. Agrees that he will not engage, directly or indirectly, in any
correspondence, telephone or email contact or off campus contact
involving prospective student-athletes, or the parent(s) or
coach(es) of such prospective student-athletes, who have, prior to
the effective date of this Settlement Agreement, either
(a) verbally committed to University, or
(b) been offered an athletic scholarship by University unless
that prospective student-athlete also has been offered an athletic
scholarship by Coach's new employer on or before
RELEASE
Coach hereby releases, acquits and forever discharges the State of
_ .; the Board of Governors of The University; the Univer-
sity, all current and former officers, agents and employees of the
above-named entities (in both their official and individual capaci-
ties); and all successors of the above-named entities from all
claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs,
sums of money, accounts, covenants, contracts, promises, attorney
fees and all liabilities of any kind or nature whatsoever at law, in
equity, or otherwise, which Coach ever had, now has or may have
for all events and occurrences from the beginning of the world to
the date of this Agreement.
COMPROMISE OF DISPUTED CLAIMS AND COSTS
Each party understands and agrees that this settlement is in com-
promise of doubtful and disputed claims; that no covenant herein
is to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of any
party hereby released; that each party hereby released denies any
liability for such claims; that each party intends merely to avoid
dispute resolution processes and buy peace and, except as specifi-
cally provided for in this Agreement, each party will bear its own
costs, including attorney fees.
EFFECT OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the parties and their agents, officers, employees, successors, as-
signs, heirs, executors, and administrators.
SEVERANCE AGREEMENT AND GENERAL RELEASE
THIS AGREEMENT is made and is effective as of _ , by
and between (hereinafter "University") and
(hereinafter "Employee").
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WHEREAS, Employee has notified the University of his resigna-
tion as Head Men's - Coach of the University effective
; and
WHEREAS, the University wants to recognize Employee's ten-
ure at the University, settle all claims between the parties and
finalize the termination of his employment and relationship with
the University; and
WHEREAS, Employee wants to finalize the termination of Em-
ployee's employment, settle all claims between the parties and ac-
cept the severance benefits offered by the University under the
terms of this Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties to this Agreement, in consider-
ation of the mutual promises contained in this Agreement and
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency
of which are hereby acknowledged, agree as follows:
1. Employee has submitted written notice of his resignation (at-
tached as Exhibit A) stating that it is effective as of __ (the
"Resignation Date"). Said date was the last day Employee re-
ported for work at the University.
2. On or around _ , the University paid Employee a lump
sum amount equivalent to __ days of pay at his current weekly
salary as payment for his accrued vacation time through his Res-
ignation Date. In addition, the University shall pay Employee
severance pay from mid-day on March 1, 2000, through June 30,
2000, or until he has secured other regular employment, which-
ever occurs first, an amount equivalent to his weekly salary as of
the Resignation Date. The first payment shall be made within five
business days of the expiration of the revocation period set forth
in Paragraph 10 of this Agreement, and will include payment for
all payroll periods elapsed since the Resignation Date through
the last full payroll period ending prior to the expiration period of
the revocation with appropriate state and federal taxes and with-
holding deductions made. The remaining severance pay shall be
paid in accordance with the University's payroll with appropriate
state and federal taxes and withholding deductions made. The
University shall also pay its portion of the monthly premium for
Employee's group health insurance through the University for
coverage during the period in which Employee receives severance
pay. Thereafter, Employee will have the option to continue group
health care coverage at his own cost as provided for terminated
Employees as required by law. However, February 10, 2000 will
be deemed the date of the "Qualifying Event" under the provi-
sions of applicable state law governing insurance continuation
rights. No other fringe benefits Employee received prior to his
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termination will be paid by the University after February 10, 2000.
The parties agree the severance and accrued vacation payments
Employee receives shall be deemed wages payable for each week
(for the weeks beginning February 11, 2000 and ending the week
ending June 30, 2000) he receives severance pay for unemploy-
ment insurance purposes. Employee shall notify the University
within three days of his accepting regular work or becoming self-
employed. Severance payments shall cease as of the day Em-
ployee begins regular work for a new employer.
3. Employee's benefits under the University Retirement Plan, in-
cluding any accruals for any period in 2000, shall be governed by
the provisions of that plan.
4. The University will provide Employee with a letter of refer-
ence which addresses the positive aspects of Employee's job per-
formance while an employee of the University, but which does
not mask the circumstances of Employee's resignation. A copy of
this letter of reference will become part of Employee's personnel
file and shall be available for use by Employee in future employ-
ment search situations.
5. Employee agrees to promptly return to the University any doc-
uments or property and copies of any documents or property in
his possession pertaining to the University's business. Employee
shall not copy or cause to be copied any of the records of the
University or its sponsored corporation or organizations.
6. Employee agrees not to retaliate against or harass any officer,
director or employee of the University or other sponsored corpo-
ration or organization. Employee further agrees that he will not
communicate in any manner, anything negative regarding the
University or other sponsored corporations or organizations or
any of their officers, directors, agents, employees, or act in any
way or communicate anything that may jeopardize the Univer-
sity's or its other sponsored corporation's or organization's rela-
tionships with their students, employees or the community that
they serve.
7. In consideration for the amounts to be paid to Employee
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of this Agreement, Employee hereby
fully and forever discharges and releases the University, its past
and present affiliated corporations or business entities and its past
and present employees, agents, attorneys, representatives, officers
and directors, from any and all actions, causes of action, claims,
demands, damages, costs, expenses and compensation on account
of; or in any way growing out of; any and all known and unknown
damage resulting to or to result from Employee's employment
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and/or termination of his employment at the University, but not
including acts committed after the date of this Severance Agree-
ment and General Release.
By way of example only and without in any way limiting the
generality of the foregoing language, Employee's release shall in-
clude any claims for relief or causes of action under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e, et
seq.; the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. '
12101 et seq; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29
U.S.C. secs. 791, 793 and 794; the Civil Rights Enforcement Stat-
utes, 42 U.S.C. secs. 1981 through 1988; the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. sec. 1001, et seq.; the
National Labor Relations Act; 29 U.S.C. sec 151, et seq.; the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. ' 201 et seq.; the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. ' 651 et seq; the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. ' 2601 et seq.;
the Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. '1 et seq.; the Clayton
Act, as amended, '15 U.S.C. '12 et seq.; the Wisconsin Fair Em-
ployment Laws, ' 111.33, et seq.; the Wisconsin Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act, ' 103.10, Wis. Stats.; and any other federal, state or
local statute, ordinance, or regulation dealing in any respect with
discrimination or termination of employment, and, in addition,
from any claims, demands, or actions brought on the basis of al-
leged wrongful or retaliatory discharge, breach of an oral or writ-
ten contract, misrepresentation, defamation, interference with
contract or intentional or negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, damage to business or professional reputation, conspiracy,
negligence, invasion of privacy, or any other intentional tort or
negligence claim or contract claim of any sort under the common
law of any state or other jurisdiction.
Employee intends in executing this Agreement that it shall be
effective as a bar to each and every claim, demand, and cause of
action Employee may have at the time of the execution of this
Agreement.
8. Employee shall not disclose information related to Univer-
sity's or its other sponsored corporation's or organization's opera-
tions or any student or personnel information he has received as
an Employee of the University to persons other than to properly
authorized University employees and agents at any time after his
resignation without the prior written consent of the University
unless required by law. Employee shall not act in any way to im-
pugn the reputation of the University, its agents or employees,
jeopardize the University's relationships with students or use or
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disclose directly or indirectly University's confidential business
information, including trade secrets, student lists and personnel
information he has learned of as an employee of the University
for a period of two years after his termination. Furthermore, Em-
ployee shall cooperate with the University as may be necessary
for University operations after termination of his employment, in-
cluding, but not limited to, personnel matters.
9. Employee acknowledges that he has had sufficient time to read
this Agreement and consider his acceptance of this Agreement
and voluntarily enter into this Agreement with full knowledge of
its meaning and consequences and with the specific intention of
resolving all outstanding matters pertaining to Employee's em-
ployment and termination of his employment at the University. In
entering into this Agreement, he is relying on his own judgment
and knowledge and not on representations or statements made by
the University, its employees or agents. Employee is aware of his
right to consult an attorney before he enters into the Agreement.
Employee shall have 21 days to consider whether to accept this
Agreement.
10. For a period of seven days following the execution of this
Agreement, the Employee and Spouse may revoke this Agree-
ment. Furthermore, this Agreement will not become effective or
enforceable until the revocation period has expired. No severance
payments will be made until this Agreement has been executed
and not revoked within the seven days allowed by law.
11. The parties' participation in this Agreement is not to be con-
strued as an admission of any wrongdoing or liability whatsoever
by or on behalf of the Employee or the University, its employees
or agents.
12. This Release is intended for the sole purpose of resolving the
issues between the parties concerning Employee's employment
and separation of his employment from the University. It is not
intended for any other purpose and shall not be used by any other
party for another reason.
13. Employee shall not disclose the existence of or the terms of
this Agreement to any third party without the written consent of
the University except for the purposes of enforcing this Agree-
ment, to their attorneys and accountants for legal, financial and
tax advice concerning this Agreement or providing information to
appropriate governmental agencies.
14. In the event of breach of any provision of this Agreement, the
party not in breach shall be released from its obligations under
this Agreement and shall be entitled to seek judicial enforcement
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of this Agreement against the breaching party. The breaching
party shall be liable to the other party for any and all attorneys'
fees incurred in enforcing this Agreement.
15. If; for any reason, a court of competent jurisdiction finds any
provision of this Agreement to be illegal or unenforceable, the
offending provision will be deemed amended to the extent neces-
sary to conform to the applicable law, or, if it cannot be so
amended without materially altering the parties' mutual intent to
facilitate the settlement of all claims released in Paragraph 7 with-
out involving the University in administrative or legal proceed-
ings, then this Agreement will be null and void. If this
Agreement becomes null and void, then the University will have
no obligation to Employee under this Agreement.
16. This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accord
with the laws of the State of Wisconsin. It constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties.
The undersigned further state that they have carefully read
the foregoing Agreement, know the contents thereof and sign the
same under their own free will, being duly authorized to do so.
Recent buyouts of Division I head football coaches include the
following:
Bill Curry, University of Kentucky. Total amount: $610,000.00.
Fired near end of the 1996 season. The university paid out the
remaining two years of his annual $305,000.00-a-year contract.
Ron Cooper, University of Louisville. Total amount: $1 million.
Fired after the 1997 season by new U of L athletics director Tom
Jurich. Base salary was $107,122, plus $58,917 from radio and tel-
evision appearances. According to his contract, U of L was re-
quired to pay about $310,000.00 to buy out the final two years of
the contract. Jurich said school officials also considered the in-
come Cooper would have received from his radio and television
package, from various clothing, shoe and promotional deals and
from the estimated amount of the coach's deferred compensation
package.
Jim Donnan, Georgia. Total mount: $2.1 million. Fired after
third season. Was paid for the three years remaining on a six-year
contract. That figure included $494,000.00 for three years of his
base salary of $164,800, and more than $1.3 million for 2-1/2 yeas
in compensation for his radio and television package, Nike en-
dorsements and camp revenue. Donnan also received
$300,000.00, plus interest, from an annuity that paid him
$100,000.00 per year for each winning season. It was also re-
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ported on April 18, 2001, that the University of Georgia Athletic
Board approved an addendum to the settlement with former foot-
ball coach Jim Donnan that will pay him an additional $255,250.
The additional $225,250 was a commitment made by Adams to
Donnan in the summer of 1998. Donnan had turned down an
offer from North Carolina to remain with Georgia, and his con-
tract was re-negotiated. But, according to Adams, six months af-
ter Donnan turned down UNC there was still no signed contract.
Mike DuBose, Alabama. Total amount: $1 million. Fired after
the 2000 season. Was under contract through 2004 but will be
paid his $525,000.00-a-year salary plus benefits through January
2002. Alabama athletic director Mal Moore said that DuBose
wasn't to receive any "lump sum payment."
Gerry DiNardo, LSU. Total amount: $600,000.00. Fired after the
1999 season. Was paid the remaining four years of his $150,000.00
annual salary but did not receive the rest of his package, which
included $300,000.00 annually in radio and television appearances
and $135,000.00-a-year in endorsements.
John Cooper, Ohio State. Total amount: $1.8 million. Fired in
2000 after 13 years. Buyout consisted of $1 million from the ath-
letic department's emergency reserve fund and $800,000.00 from
several other non-restricted department accounts.
Paul Hackett, USC. Total amount: $800,000.00. Fired after the
2000 season. Was paid out the remaining two years of a five-year
contract he signed in 1997.369
Coaches and schools often disagree on how much is owed on a deal
and whether it includes all or a portion of income from radio and TV
shows, shoe contracts and other job-related endorsements.
17. Income Tax Ramifications
In some instances, the coach will challenge the university's decision
to terminate either with or without cause. Often, the coach will assert as
a defense to termination, breach of contract on the part of the university,
age or race discrimination, defamation, intentional or negligent interfer-
ence with contract, impossibility of performance and the like. The ques-
tion becomes, in the event of a settlement between the parties and a
release agreement, what are the income tax ramifications of those pay-
ments made pursuant to a termination settlement. Obviously, any pay-
369. Recent Buyouts Of Division I Head Football Coaches, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
March 3, 2001.
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ments made pursuant to a termination without cause (liquidated damage
provision) would be income pursuant to the employment contract.
Some general rules with respect to excludability follow:
1. Gross income does not include the amount of any damages
received on account of personal injuries or sickness. I.R.C.
§104(a)(2). The term damages received (whether by suit or
agreement) means an amount received through prosecution of a
legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights, or through
a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.
Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c). In order for damages to be excludable
from gross income under I.R.C. §104(1)(2), the taxpayer must
demonstrate that: (1) the underlying cause of action is based
upon tort or tort-type rights, and (2) the damages are received on
account of personal injuries or sickness.
2. Where amounts are received pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment, the nature of the claim that is the actual basis for settle-
ment and not its validity controls whether such amounts are
excludable from gross income under section I.R.C. §104(a)(2).
The critical question is in lieu of what was the settlement amount
paid.
3. Where a settlement agreement does not allocate the lump-sum
payment among the taxpayer's various claims, a court will ex-
amine the nature of each claim in turn for purposes of income tax
excludability.
4. For purposes of income tax excludability under I.R.C. 90-202,
§104(a)(2), recovery under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No 81 Stats. 602, is not based upon tort
or tort-type rights.
5. To the extent a lawsuit settlement payment is in exchange for a
taxpayer's tenure, the settlement proceeds are not excludable
from gross income under I.R.C. §104(a)(2).
6. To the extend that any payment to settle a lawsuit was for
breach of contract, the settlement proceeds are not excludable
from gross income under I.R.C. §104(a)(2).
7. To the extent that any payment to settle a lawsuit was for puni-
tive damages, then the proceeds are not excludable from gross
income under I.R.C. §104(a)(2).
8. When a settlement agreement includes both contract and tort
claims, and the claims are not specifically apportioned, the courts
may not be in a position to apportion the settlement payment
among the various possible claims for income tax excludability
purposes.
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9. Generally, when a settlement deals with a number of claims
and does not allocate the proceeds to specific claims, and there is
no evidence that a specific claim was meant to be singled out, the
United States Tax Court considers the entire amount taxable.
10. Where a settlement agreement lacks express language stating
that the payment is (or is not) made on account of personal in-
jury, the most important fact in determining how I.R.C.
§104(a)(2) is to be applied is the intent of the payer in making the
payment. In the absence of an express settlement agreement, the
payer's purpose in making the payment is the most important
factor.
11. Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that a specific portion
of settlement proceeds are paid to settlement tort or tort-type
claims for personal injuries and are thus excludable from gross
income under I.R.C. §104(a)(2), U.S. Tax Ct. R. 142(a).
18. Buyout - Opt Out - Release Provisions
Generally, an employer cannot obtain specific performance of a per-
sonal service contract. 70 This is so primarily because courts will not
force a person to engage in activity against his will, regardless of a con-
tractual obligation to perform. When this rule is applied in the area of
coaches' contracts, the result is that neither the university nor the court
can require a coach to work, even if the coach is contractually bound to
do so. Moreover, courts are reluctant to issue injunctions compelling
employment because of the inherent logistical problems in effectively
supervising and enforcing such decrees. 371 Courts have historically
viewed this form of affirmative relief as violating public policy and the
Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, since it sub-
jects individuals to a form of involuntary servitude.372
Similarly, a coach cannot force a university to allow him to work if
the university decides to terminate his position or to replace him with
another coach. The university, therefore, may remove the coach from
his position at any time, with or without a valid reason. However, the
university may have to compensate the coach with monetary damages if
the coach challenges the premature contract termination.
In the context of coaching contracts, the relationship between the
university and the coach becomes somewhat unbalanced. While the
370. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 628.
371. Id
372. Id.
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coach has clear contractual remedies against the university for breach of
contract, the same may not be true if the coach decides to terminate
performance. The advantage may lie with the coach "who can breach
the contract and leave the relationship with virtual impunity. 3 73 The
problem is even more acute when the university, in attempting to en-
force its contract, tries to prove precisely how it has been monetarily
damaged by the coach's termination of the contract.374 Moreover,
In theory, at least, an employer is clearly entitled to bring an ac-
tion for damages against any employee in breach, and coaches are
no exception. In such cases the recoverable damages are normally
measured by the cost to the employer of obtaining equivalent ser-
vices elsewhere, plus consequential damages. Some cases indi-
cated that in assessing such damages, the market value of the lost
services must be measured against that of the substitute services
procured by the employer to remedy the breach.375
Although these criteria may seem simple and reasonable, a judge or
jury may find it impossible to determine the market value of coaches'
contracts. Additionally, most premature terminations are met with ani-
mosity on at least one side, and litigation could serve merely to prolong
those negative public relations and cast a shadow over the institution's
athletic program for years. It may prove difficult to estimate - or com-
pensate for - the vast array of payments and fringe benefits a coach
may have been receiving prior to the breach. For these reasons, many
institutions avoid litigation, even if the coach is the breaching party.
Graves concludes that "[a]s a result, most employees, and certainly most
coaches, have historically been able to leave their employment virtually
at will despite their prior contractual commitments. '376
On the other hand, a university may attempt to obtain equitable re-
lief by acquiring an injunction to prohibit a "contract jumping" coach
from working for another entity. For example, in 1973, Charles "Chuck"
Fairbanks contracted with the New England Patriots to act as general
manager and head coach. A later agreement specified that employment
should continue until January 1983 and also read:
10(b) Fairbanks shall not render services directly connected with
football during the period of his employment other than for the
Patriots except with the express written permission of the Patri-
ots, which permission shall not be unreasonably withheld....
373. Graves, supra note 123, at 548.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 548-549.
376. Id. at 549.
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(d) Fairbanks shall not render services to another entity not
connected with football during the period of employment except
with the express written permission of the Patriots, which permis-
sion shall not be unreasonably withheld.3 77
In 1978, Fairbanks was approached by persons affiliated with the
University of Colorado. They tried to convince him to leave the Patriots
to become the Colorado head football coach. The Patriots sought a
court injunction enjoining Colorado from contracting with Fairbanks
while he was still under contract with the Patriots.
3 78
The District Court in Colorado entered a preliminary injunction en-
joining the University of Colorado, its regents, president, athletic direc-
tor, and certain fans from contacting Fairbanks for the purpose of hiring
him for the university.379
On appeal, the first district upheld the preliminary injunction forbid-
ding Colorado from soliciting Fairbanks' services reasoning that Fair-
banks' services were unique and the loss of his services would cause
irreparable harm to the Patriots, and money damages would be difficult
to determine. The court also held that the contractual provisions that
required Fairbanks, while under contract with the Patriots, to refrain
from contracting for "services directly connected with football. . .[or
with] another entity not connected with football," covered entities not in
direct competition with the Patriots.3 ° Therefore, the clause also prohib-
ited Fairbanks from entering into an employment agreement with the
University of Colorado.
A similar situation arose regarding Michigan State University's at-
tempt to hire George Perles, then under contract with the Philadelphia
Stars of the former United States Football League. In response to the
university's action, the Stars sued the university for $1 million.3 ' The
case ultimately ended in a settlement, with the university paying
$175,000.00 in order to obtain Perles' services and protect itself from
legal liability. 82
In many instances, a coach's contract will contain a unique service
clause to protect the university from a breaching coach. By agreeing to
this clause, the coach acknowledges that he has a special, unique and
377. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196 (1st
Cir. 1979).
378. Id.
379. Id at 1198.
380. Id. at 1199-1202.
381. SPERBER, supra note 276, at 164-165.
382. Id.
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exceptional skill, and that the university's need for continuity in its
coaching - as well as any further acquisition of coaching experience -
will reflect that uniqueness.
The contract will also require the coach to agree that the loss of his
services, prior to the expiration of the contractual term and without the
university approval, will cause an inestimable loss to the university,
which cannot be adequately compensated for by money damages. Fi-
nally, the coach will be required to promise not to accept employment
under any circumstances as a coach at any other institution, or with any
professional league, or with any other competing entity, without first ob-
taining permission from the university.
These clauses are necessary because a university may be unable to
obtain a negative injunction due to the "difficulty of proving a coach
exceptional, difficulty in proving irreplaceability or irreparable harm,
difficulty in proving money damages and difficulty in proving that the
coach would not be unreasonably burdened."3" 3
Because of the university's inability to force the coach to work, and
because of the possibility of protracted litigation, adverse publicity, a
cloud over the athletic department, and presumably, a relationship that
has deteriorated, most universities will allow their restless or ambitious
coaches go without further ado. That is unless, of course, the contract
contains some type of financial "buy-out" or "release" clause.
There are various formats of buyout or release clauses:
1. Absolute Prohibition Against Termination or Release. The
parties hereby agree that coach has special and unique knowl-
edge, skills and ability as a coach which, in addition to his contin-
uing acquisition of coaching experience here at the University, as
well as the University's special need for continuity in its program,
render the coach's services unique. Coach recognizes that his
promise to work for the University for the entire term of this
Agreement is the essence of this Agreement to the University.
Coach also recognizes that that the University is making a highly
valuable investment in Coach's continued employment by enter-
ing into this Agreement and it's investment would be lost were he
to resign or otherwise terminate his employment with the Univer-
sity prior to the expiration of the term of the Agreement. As a
result therefor, Coach is required to fulfill the term of this Agree-
ment and specifically promises not to seek, negotiate or accept
employment under any circumstances during the term of this
383. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 125, at 6.
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Agreement, whether it is in the designated sport or in any other
field.
2. Consent Required - No Penalty. The Coach agrees, and hereby
specifically promises, not to actively seek, negotiate for or accept
employment, under any circumstances, without first obtaining the
written permission of the Chancellor and Athletic Director, which
permission shall not be unreasonably withheld, as a Football
Coach at any institution of higher education which is a member of
the NCAA or for any professional team participating in any pro-
fessional league or conference in the United States or elsewhere
requiring performance of duties prior to the expiration of this
Agreement or any extension thereof. If, after discussions, Coach
wishes to accept employment elsewhere as defined above, Coach
must first obtain a release of this Agreement from the Chancellor
and Athletic Director.
It is agreed that permission to discuss another position, and the
release of this Agreement, will be pursued in good faith, and that
the University will not unreasonably withhold its approval of a
release or require Coach to pay a penalty upon termination.
3. Liquidated Damages - Lump Sum Payment.
(a) You recognize that your promise to work for the Univer-
sity for the Contract Term is of the essence of this agreement.
You also recognize that the University is making a valuable in-
vestment in your employment by entering into this agreement
and that its investment would be lost if you were to resign or oth-
erwise terminate your employment with the University before the
end of the Contract term. You further agree that if you breach
this agreement by resigning or otherwise terminating your em-
ployment with the University during the football playing season
or the football recruiting season as defined by the NCAA, the
University will suffer additional damages beyond its lost invest-
ment, including but not limited to a possible adverse effect on
recruiting. You therefore agree that should you breach this
agreement by resigning or otherwise terminating your employ-
ment during the football playing season or football recruiting sea-
son, you will pay the University as liquidated damages the sum of
$1,500,000.00. For purposes of this paragraph, the football play-
ing season concludes at the end of the last regularly-scheduled
game of the football season or, if Northwestern is selected to play
in a post-season bowl game, at the end of that post-season bowl
game.
(b) Notwithstanding the provision of subparagraph (a), if you
breach this agreement by resigning or otherwise terminating your
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employment during the football playing season or football
recruiting season within the "Termination Window," then you will
pay the University liquidated damages according to the schedule
set forth in subparagraph (c). The "Termination Window" for
purposes of this provision means;
(c) If you breach this agreement by resigning or otherwise
terminating your employment at a time outside of the football
playing season or football recruiting season or during the applica-
ble Termination Window, you will pay the University the follow-
ing amounts as liquidated damages in lieu of the $1,500,000.00 set
forth in subparagraph (a):
(1) if you terminate this agreement prior to the end of the
2002 football season, including any bowl game in which Univer-
sity is selected to play following that season, the sum of
$1,000.00,000.00.
(2) If you terminate this agreement prior to the end of the
2003 football season, including any bowl game in which Univer-
sity is selected to play following that season, the sum of
$500,000.00; and
(3) If you terminate this agreement prior to the end of the
2004 football season, including any bowl game in which Univer-
sity is selected to play following that season, the sum of
$250,000.00.
(d) It is understood and agreed that it is difficult or impossi-
ble to determine with certainty the damages that may result from
such a breach of this agreement by you and that the liquidated
damages provision of these subparagraphs are not to be con-
strued as penalties, but as an attempt by you and the University
to establish adequate and reasonable compensation to the Uni-
versity in the event you breach this agreement by resigning or
otherwise terminating your employment before the end of the
Contract Term.
4. Liquidated Damages upon Termination by Coach:
If Coach terminates this Agreement under Article V, Section
B.2. above, Coach shall pay to University, as liquidated damages,
an amount equal to Coach's Salary plus Fifty Thousand Dollars
($50,000.00.00) through the then-current Term or for one (1) year,
whichever amount is less. Such liquidated damages shall be due
and payable within sixty (60) days after the effective date of ter-
mination of this Agreement. Coach will be entitled to continue
his health insurance plan at his own expense for up to thirty-six
(36) months from the effective date of termination but will not be
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entitled to any other employee benefits except as otherwise pro-
vided herein or required by applicable law. As permitted by Wis-
consin law, Coach may secure a conversion policy for his UW
group term life insurance. In no case shall University by liable for
the loss of any collateral business opportunities or any other ben-
efits, perquisites or income from any other sources that may en-
sue as a result of Coach's termination of this Agreement.
The parties have bargained for and agreed to the foregoing liqui-
dated damages provision, giving consideration to the fact that
University will incur administrative, recruiting, and resettlement
costs in obtaining a replacement for Coach in addition to poten-
tially increased compensation costs if Coach terminates this
Agreement while serving as Head Football Coach, which dam-
ages are extremely difficult to determine with certainty or fairly
or adequately. The parties further agree that the payment of such
liquidated damages by Coach and acceptance thereof by Univer-
sity shall constitute adequate and reasonable compensation to
University for the damages and injury suffered by it because of
such termination by Coach. The foregoing shall not be, nor be
construed to be, a penalty.
5. De-escalating Payment - Voluntary Termination by Coach. In
the event Coach voluntarily terminates his employment with the
University during the term of this Agreement, the University
shall be discharged of any and all further obligations of this
Agreement with respect to the obligation to pay and/or provide
the benefits as herein specified to Coach. In the event the Coach
desires to voluntarily terminate this Employment Agreement and
take another position as a Division One Coach, Coach will be
required to buy out the terms of this Agreement and pay the Uni-
versity according and pursuant to the following schedule:
a. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agreement
after the first year of employment hereunder, Coach shall pay to
the University 80% of the Annual Salary for the remaining term
of this Agreement.
b. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agreement
after the second year of employment hereunder, Coach shall pay
to the University 60% of the Annual Salary for the remaining
term of the Agreement.
c. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agreement
after the third year of employment hereunder, Coach shall pay to
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the University 40% of the Annual Salary for the remaining term
of the Agreement.
d. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agreement
after the fourth year of employment hereunder, Coach shall pay
to the University 20% of the Annual Salary for the remaining
term of the Agreement.
e. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agreement
after the fifth year of employment hereunder, no buy-out shall be
required.
At the sole option and discretion of the Coach, said buy-out
payments may be made in lump-sum within ten (10) days after
notification of voluntary termination and/or on May 1st of
each year of the term of this Agreement with respect to the
amount owed by Coach. It is understood that this buy-out pro-
vision shall only apply to the original term of this Agreement
and shall not include and/or apply to any extensions of the
original term hereof.
Some coaches will sign a contract that includes specific language stat-
ing that they have the right to terminate their position (opt out clause)
with the university in the event a specific named school offers a position
of head coach.384 For instance, it was rumored that when Lou Holtz
signed a contract with the Minnesota Gopher football team, it had clause
that would permit him to terminate that contract in the event he was
offered the head football coaching job at the University of Notre Dame.
In essence, the contract advisor is negotiating an opt-out clause
wherein the coach is permitted to terminate his employment pursuant to
the contract without further obligation to the university. Termination is
based on a condition subsequent where if a specific and identified job
was offered during the coach's term of the employment contract with the
university.
The timing of the termination by the coach is also often addressed in
the contract. In some instances a larger amount of liquidated damages is
imposed if the Coach terminates during the season, post season or
recruiting periods. What follows are several time-related termination
provisions:
(1) Employee may terminate this Employment Agreement dur-
ing its term by giving the University thirty (30) days advance no-
384. Bob Lattenville, Put Me In, Coach: A Game Plan for Negotiating and Drafting Col-
lege Coaching Contracts, FOR THE RECORD, Dec./Jan. 2000, at 3.
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tice of the termination of her employment with the University.
While Employee is assigned the position of Head Coach of the
University's women's basketball team, such termination by the
Employee must occur at a time outside the basketball playing sea-
son and the basketball recruiting season as defined by the NCAA,
with the exception of thirty (30) immediately following the last
regularly scheduled game of the basketball season so as to mini-
mize the impact of such termination upon the University's wo-
men's basketball program.
(2) Employee may terminate this Contract during the term
hereof by giving the University thirty (30) days advance written
notice of the termination of Employee's employment with the
University. Such termination must occur at a time outside the
regular playing season and recruiting season, as defined by the
NCAA, with the exception of the five (5) days immediately fol-
lowing the last regularly scheduled game of the applicable inter-
collegiate sport's season, so as to minimize the impact of such
termination upon the Program. Simultaneously with such notice,
Employee shall provide the University with written notice of Em-
ployee's employment plans following the termination of this
Contract.
Gerry DiNardo resigned as Vanderbilt's head football coach to be-
come the head football coach for Louisiana State University. Vanderbilt
brought a breach of contract action against DiNardo.3 85 The district
court entered summary judgment for Vanderbilt awarding $281,886.43
pursuant to a damage provision in DiNardo's employment contract with
Vanderbilt.386
On December 3, 1990, Vanderbilt and DiNardo executed an employ-
ment contract hiring DiNardo to be Vanderbilt's head football coach.
Section I of the contract provided that:
The University hereby agrees to hire Mr. DiNardo for a period of
five (5) years from the date hereof with Mr. DiNardo's assurance
that he will serve the entire term of this Contract, a long-term
commitment by Mr. DiNardo being important to the University's
desire for a stable intercollegiate football program. . . Mr.
DiNardo recognizes that his promise to work for the University
for the entire term of this 5-year Contract is of the essence of this
Contract to the University. Mr. DiNardo also recognizes that the
University is making a highly valuable investment in his contin-
ued employment by entering into this Contract and its investment
385. Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999).
386. Id at 753.
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would be lost were he to resign or otherwise terminate his em-
ployment as Head Football Coach with the University prior to the
expiration of this Contract. Accordingly, Mr. DiNardo agrees
that in the event he resigns or otherwise terminates his employ-
ment as Head Football Coach (as opposed to his resignation or
termination from another position at the University to which he
may have been reassigned), prior to the expiration of this Con-
tract, and is employed or performing services for a person or insti-
tution other than the University, he will pay to the University as
liquidated damages an amount equal to his Base Salary, less
amounts that would otherwise be deducted or withheld from his
Base Salary for income and social security tax purposes, multi-
plied by the number of years (or portion(s) thereof) remaining on
the Contract.38 7
DiNardo questioned the enforceability of the liquidated damage provi-
sion and the award of liquidated damages under the original contract.
Under Tennessee law, contracting parties may agree to the payment
of liquidated damage which refers to an amount determined by the par-
ties to be justly compensated for damages should a breach occur.388 In
Tennessee, a provision will be considered one for liquidated damage,
rather than an unenforceable penalty, if it is reasonable in relation to the
anticipated damage for breach measured prospectively at the time the
contract was entered into and not grossly disproportionate to the actual
damages.389
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court rul-
ing that the employment contract contained an enforceable liquidated
damage provision and the award of liquidated damages under the origi-
nal contract. 390
19. Support of Program.
The coach will also want a covenant and commitment requiring the
university to provide academic, economic and other forms of support to
the athletic program at least equal to the level of support given to other
athletic programs by other universities in the athletic conference to
which the university is a member. Included in academic support would
be: (1) academic counselors, (2) tutoring, and (3) other educational ser-
387. Id. at 753-754.
388. Id. at 755.
389. Id.
390. DiNardo, 174 F.3d at 757-758.
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vices.391 Included in economic support would be: (1) maintenance and
improvement of physical facilities (i.e., office facilities, locker room facil-
ities, dining and dormitory facilities, as well as training and exercise facil-
ities), (2) budgets sufficient to hire and retain the maximum number of
assistant coaches, (3) budgets necessary to cover expenses associated
with first-class recruiting, and (4) awarding of the maximum number of
scholarships to athletes permissible under NCAA rules. A coach will
also want to be involved in the scheduling of games subject to the final
authority being reposed in the university's athletic director.392 The
coach should also require the program to be on technological and facility
parity with other schools in the conference.
20. Scheduling and Assistant Coaches.
There will be some negotiation between the university and the coach
with respect to the coach's authority relative to the hiring and firing of
personnel, to the scheduling and rescheduling of games with respect to
the university's program, and to input into other decisions that affect the
program. While the coach will request control over the hiring and firing
of his own assistants and the scheduling of the games, the athletic direc-
tor will probably want the right of approval or the right to participate in
the scheduling or hiring process itself.393
A sample clause follows:
PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONMAKING
The parties recognize that many factors will influence the Coach's
ability to perform successfully his duties under this Employment
Agreement. Therefore, it is agreed that the Coach will be entitled
to participate and have input into the following activities:
A. The Coach shall have the opportunity to advise appropriate
decision makers with respect to the selection and hiring of indi-
viduals for the following positions, should such selection and hir-
ing occur while the Coach is the Head Coach of the football
program: the Sports Information Director; the Director of Sports
Medicine/Football Trainer; the Strength Coach for the football
program; all support staff in the football office; the Equipment
Manager; and the Director of Athletics.
391. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 1, at 631.
392. Id at 631-32.
393. Id. at 632.
2001]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
B. the Coach shall have the opportunity for input into the design
and development of any and all facilities owned by University
which are for the exclusive or partial use of the football program.
C. the Coach shall be responsible for scheduling games for the
football program, subject to the approval of the Director of Ath-
letics, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
21. Confidentiality - Records.
To the extent permitted by law and not prohibited by state open-
record laws or freedom of information acts, the university and the coach
will want the terms and conditions of the employment arrangements to
be kept confidential. Each party will agree to refrain from disclosing the
terms and conditions of the employment agreement without the prior
written consent of the other. That is, unless, of course, disclosure is re-
quired by applicable state law. In addition, the parties will probably want
a confidentiality agreement concerning disagreement and non-disclosure
to third parties and the submission of any disagreements to some form of
arbitration procedure. Any public announcement with regard to the
employment contract shall be jointly agreed to concerning the agree-
ment itself and/or any extensions or modifications.394
The university will also want the coach, upon termination, to immedi-
ately cause certain information developed as a result of the position of
head coach to be delivered to the university as the sole and confidential
property of the university. Such materials, without limitation, may in-
clude personnel records, recruiting records, team information, films, sta-
tistics, and any other memoranda or data furnished to the coach by the
university or developed by the coach on behalf of the university as a
result of the position of coach.395
A sample record retention clause follows:
University Documents, Records, and Property. All documents,
records, materials, equipment or other property, including with-
out limitation, personnel records, recruiting records, team infor-
mation, athletic equipment, films, statistics, keys, credit cards and
any other material, data or property, furnished to Coach by the
University or developed or acquired by Coach on behalf of the
University or at the expense of the University or otherwise in
connection with Coach's employment by the University are and
shall remain the sole property of the University. Within ten (10)
394. Id. at 633.
395. Id.
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days of termination of Coach's University employment, whether
by resignation, expiration of this Contract, or action by the Uni-
versity for cause, Coach shall cause any such materials in his pos-
session or control to be delivered to the University.
22. Arbitration.
During the course of the contract period there may be disputes be-
tween the university and coach arising out of or concerning the scope,
interpretation or provisions of the employment contract. Obviously, if
there is a dispute with respect to the contract, both parties have legal
remedies, including injunctions against further continued breach, specific
performance, if any, or damages arising out of such breaches.396
An alternative, other than utilization of the courts, is arbitration or
some other form of dispute resolution procedure where the disputes are
submitted to an impartial third party. Obviously, any such clause would
need to define the disputes to be so submitted, the party to act as the
objective third-party arbitrator, the rules under which the arbitration
would be conducted, and the agreement that the decision of the arbitra-
tor shall be binding without further ability to appeal. Although the utili-
zation of the courts may be a leverage factor, a dispute resolution device
may be more efficient and ultimately more ultimately equitable for both
parties.397
A sample mediation and arbitration provision follows:
6. Mediation and Arbitration
In the event a dispute arises with regard to the terms or perform-
ance of this contract:
6.1 The parties will endeavor to resolve the dispute between
them and without rancor, each bearing any expenses it may incur.
6.2 Disputes not resolved between the parties which remain
unresolved for a period of three weeks, will be submitted to a
mediation services, as the Carolina Conciliation Services Corpo-
ration, for up to three hours of mediation (unless the parties
agree to more). The mediator will be asked to deal with appro-
priate allocation of the costs of the mediation including reasona-
ble attorneys' fees.
6.3 If the dispute is not resolved by mediation, the parties will
submit the dispute to binding arbitration in _ (state) in ac-
396. Id. at 634.
397. Id.
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cordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association
then in effect, unless the parties mutually agree on a different
arbitrator.
3. Conclusion
College sports are a business, but so is the relationship between a
university and its coach. As such, that relationship should be treated in
the strictest contractual and legal sense.3 98 Overall, the job of putting a
contract together for a college coach is a difficult and vitally important
one, for the proper contract can protect the coach, and also provide the
university with assurance that it has created the best possible relation-
ship with the coach it wants.
In addition to the twenty-one specific areas covered in this article,
the following are several concluding thoughts to keep in mind as one
begins to assess the relationship between the coach and university:
1. A coach's contract is his most important protective armor in
a job environment of fatalities.
2. There are certain family protection issues, such as termina-
tion without cause, death or disability, that deserve
guarantees.
3. Put aside the disease of job elation, make certain that not
only the numbers and package are right but also the contract
is also right.
4. Statistics don't lie in a job environment characterized by a
continuously high ratio of turnover, exit provisions must be
particularly emphasized.
5. The modern day coach is everything to everybody. Your du-
ties must be specifically delimited and described in the areas
of coaching, administration, travel, student affairs, alumni
relations, and development.
6. The position is unique. It is the only position for which you
were hired and for which you will be fired. Reassignment is
a word that is not a part of your contract or Webster's
dictionary.
7. The trend appears to be following the Knight Commission
recommendation that outside income be controlled by the
university through university-wide contracts. More of your
future negotiation will be directly with your Athletic Direc-
tor than with third parties or out-sources.
8. The place in which you play may hold the key to player
recruiting and being on budget.
398. Id.
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9. Your contract needs to address the issue of facilities parity in
the world of the athletic arms race.
10. Get a sophisticated lawyer that has experience and under-
stands the specialty of coach's employment contracts.
11. Unbiased due process is the basis of the American dispute
resolution system and it belongs in coaching as well.
12. Terminations for cause provisions are brutal. If you can't ex-
plain it in common English, delete it.
13. If you plan to jump, be prepared to pay.
14. This is a business. Partnerships work best.
15. Because NCAA Rules can end your career, document all ac-
tivities on a daily basis.
16. College athletics is all about big business. Ride the crest
while you have the opportunity, make hay while the sun
shines.
17. Plan for termination. It's going to happen regardless of your
record or how good you are.
18. Contract negotiations are a business deal and ultimately
adversarial.
19. Limit your liability with respect to the acts of others, espe-
cially student athletes and assistant coaches.
20. You are a highly paid executive. Thom Park has said that
financial engineering and planning is an absolute and inte-
gral part of your economic process.
21. The University will expect you to have a team of sophisti-
cated representatives who will assist you during the process,
said Bill Carr, former Athletic Director at Florida and
Houston.
22. Contractual support of and for the program is as important
as the term of your contract and may be its equivalent.
23. Universities are willing to recognize that future pay should
be based on performance and success. Bonuses for student
and athletic successes are part of your contract.
24. Coaching is not an overnight affair. It takes time to build
programs.
25. Rollover provisions give universities some financial pause to
summarily fire you without cause.
26. Be creative. The sky is the limit with respect to structuring
financial perquisites.
27. Coaches are part of a continuing education process in under-
lining the importance of athletics to the University and dis-
pelling the thought that power coaches are the CEOs of
multi-million dollar athletic enterprises and become laws
unto themselves.
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28. The big time in money in college coaching brings financial
security but also brings expectations.
29. There is no cushion for short-term failure.
30. Winning is the name of the game.
